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Introduction			 The	United	States	and	France	are	both	struggling	with	a	policy	dilemma	of	national	and	international	significance	arising	from	the	tension	between	principles	of	religious	freedom	and	the	need	to	protect	their	national	identity.	Many	residents	of	both	countries	believe	that	Muslims	threaten	their	national	security.	This	widespread	fear	of	Muslims	is	evident	in	both	countries,	on	the	local	and	federal	level.		States,	counties	and	towns	as	well	as	federal	legislative	bodies	in	the	two	countries	have	attempted	to	limit	the	religious	freedoms	of	Muslim	citizens,	residents	and	immigrants.	Political	parties	and	demographic	groups	from	across	the	political	spectrum,	from	left	to	right,	view	this	policy	dilemma	as	an	existential	challenge	to	their	respective	countries.	On	the	one	hand,	some	Muslims’	non-acceptance	of	their	adopted	country’s	mainstream	social	norms	and	mores,	and	even	their	legal	systems,	makes	some	American	and	French	groups	argue	that	the	essence	of	their	societies	is	at	risk.		The	participation	of	even	a	very	small	number	of	Muslims	in	terrorist	acts,	at	times	with	ties	or	declared	allegiance	to	foreign	terror	organizations,	generates	fears	and	demands	for	a	security	policy	that	treats	an	entire	immigrant	population	as	a	threat.	Conversely,	the	demand	for	policies	that	impose	an	“American”	or	“French”	way	of	life	or	culture	and	force	religious	expression	out	raises	concerns	among	many	American	and	French	citizens	and	politicians.	They	fear	that	their	countries’	fundamental	commitment	to	religious	freedom,	civil	liberties	and	tradition	of	sanctuary,	a	key	part	of	their	national	value	system,	could	be	sacrificed.	With	predictions	that	the	number	of	Muslims	worldwide	will	be	equal	to	that	of	Christians	by	2050,	the	tension	between	these	
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principles	will	only	become	more	salient.1		 This	thesis	seeks	to	explore	how	religious	freedom,	controlled	through	U.S.	and	French	legislation	and	jurisprudence,	has	conflicted	with	national	identity.	National	identity	has	ben	measured	by	conforming	or	not	to	social,	political	and	cultural	norms.	This	thesis	will	also	demonstrate	how	religious	freedom	has	conflicted	with	national	security	policy,	resulting	in	policies	that	reflect	American	suspicion	of	Muslims	and	inspire	backlash	from	the	Muslim	world.		Chapters	one	and	two	will	analyze	how	France	and	the	United	States	have	each	faced	the	challenge	of	protecting	religious	freedom,	absorbing	immigrants	into	their	nations	and	maintaining	national	identity	and	security	over	their	long	histories.		Next,	Chapters	three	and	four	will	move	to	the	more	contemporary	challenges	of	balancing	religion	and	national	identity,	raised	in	France	primarily	by	its	population	of	North	African	immigrants	and	in	the	United	States	by	a	more	diverse	range	of	immigrant	groups	from	Muslim-majority	countries.	Then	Chapters	five	and	six	will	explore	the	specific	current	day	concerns	and	policy	challenges	such	as	the	burkini	in	France	and	the	anti-Muslim	policies	of	President	Trump,	and	will	provide	a	critique	of	the	policy	options	for	each	country	and	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	various	approaches.		 Finally,	the	conclusion	will	assess	the	current	political	players	and	how	their	actions	may	influence	future	religious	and	immigration	policy,	and	draw	on	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	each	country’s	policies	to	develop	new	policy	alternatives.		
	
	
	
																																																										1	“Nones”	on	the	Rise:	One-in-Five	Adults	Have	No	Religious	Affiliation.”	Pew	Forum	on	Religion	&	Public	Life.	
Pew	Research	Center,	9	Oct.	2012.	Web.	27	Apr.	2017.		
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CHAPTER	1:	LAICITÉ	AND	THE	EVOLUTION	OF	RELIGION	IN	FRANCE	
	 		 While	all	countries	view	the	role	of	religion	differently,	France’s	notion	of	laïcité2	separates	it	from	the	majority	of	western	countries.	Most	of	the	French	embrace	laïcité;	for	them	it	is	a	liberal	and	tolerant	concept	that	prevents	religion	from	intruding	into	the	civic	space.	So	what	is	the	problem?	This	principle	of	strict	secularism	has	evolved	throughout	the	country’s	long	history	and	has	developed	into	a	mechanism	used	to	curb	religion	and	religious	practice	rather	than	safeguard	religious	liberty,	namely	that	of	Muslims.	As	the	percentage	of	Muslims	in	France	rises	and	France	becomes	increasingly	diverse,	the	tension	between	laïcité	and	freedom	of	religion	has	become	a	political	crisis	that	remains	largely	unsolved.		France’s	roots	in	tradition	have	led	the	country	to	develop	a	rigid	national	identity	and	create	a	policy	of	laïcité	that	most	are	unwilling	to	adapt	to	solve	the	current	woes.	The	story	of	this	ideological	development	begins	with	the	French	Revolution.		 In	1789	France	found	itself	in	a	precarious	place.	The	monarchy	and	church	were	the	center	of	power	in	a	country	that	no	longer	supported	either	institution.	Economic,	political	and	religious	crises	led	to	the	popular	revolt	known	as	the	French	Revolution.	Through	violence	the	people	rebelled	against	the	monarchy,	aristocracy	and	clergy.		Priests	were	guillotined,	Notre	Dame	was	taken	over,	political	dissidents	were	imprisoned,	and	battles	broke	out	in	the	streets	of	Paris,	marking	what	had	been	the	most	radical	persecution	of	Christians	in	Europe	since	end	of	the	Roman	Empire.	3		The	King	at	the	time,	Louis	XVI,	was	forced	to	switch	his	rule	from	that	of	an	absolute	monarch	to	a	
																																																								2	Laïcité	is	translated	to	secularism,	but	also	calls	for	separation	of	church	and	state,	liberty	of	conscience	and	state	neutrality	in	religious	matters.	3	Jones,	Colin.	Paris:	The	Biography	of	a	City.	New	York.	Penguin	Books.	Print.	2006.	Ch	6.	
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constitutional	monarch.	When	Louis	XVI	faced	the	guillotine	the	constitutional	monarchy	eventually	gave	way	to	a	republic.	The	end	of	the	monarchy	and	the	rebellion	against	the	Church	signaled	a	shift	towards	republicanism,	and	away	from	religion.			 With	the	destruction	of	the	ancien	regime	and	the	Constitution	as	the	new	basis	for	ruling,	religion	no	longer	played	an	important	role	in	French	life	as	it	had	since	it’s	founding	when	religion	and	politics	were	tightly	intertwined.	This	shift	away	from	religion	occurred	for	several	reasons.	The	philosophes	of	the	Enlightenment	criticized	the	Church	and	systematically	questioned	the	credibility	of	religion.	Their	focus	on	progress	and	reason	as	the	basis	for	being	eroded	faith	in	religion	and	depicted	the	clergy	as	useless	members	of	society	who,	by	pledging	allegiance	to	the	religious	state	sacrificed	civil	liberties.4	In	addition,	the	French	people	saw	Catholicism	as	a	threat	to	democracy	for	its	hostility	to	individual	liberties	and	its	hegemonic	presence.	The	Catholic	Church,	as	part	of	the	State,	exercised	considerable	power	over	the	country	through	land	holdings	and	revenues.	This	caused	a	strong	hostility	towards	the	religious	powers	and	clergy	who	for	decades	prior	to	the	Revolution	had	become	rich	off	the	French	people.	Their	disregard	for	French	citizens	and	the	usurpation	of	Catholic	power	led	the	National	Assembly	to	nationalize	all	church	land,	putting	the	power	into	the	hands	of	the	government.5	This	political	move	signaled	a	weakening	of	church	power	and	was	reflective	of	a	diminishing	religiosity	in	French	society.		 The	next	significant	state	action	was	the	requirement	of	all	clergy	to	take	a	public	oath	of	loyalty	to	the	state.	This	pledge	of	loyalty	to	the	state	came	to	characterize	French																																																									4	Betros,	Gemma.	History	Review	68.	2010.	Print.	The	French	Revolution	and	the	Catholic	Church.	Web.	22	Nov.	2016.	5	Prélot,	Pierre-Henri.	"American	Civil	Religion	As	Seen	From	France:	A	Commentary	to	Fred	Gedick's	paper."	
The	George	Washington	Law	Review	41.	2011.	Print.		914.	
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national	values,	and	led	to	development	of	the	concept	of	laïcité.	Laïcité	is	often	translated	into	English	as	secularism,	but	it	also	suggests	the	same	pledge	of	loyalty	the	clergy	were	forced	to	take.	The	idea	was	and	continues	to	be,	that	the	French	are	first	and	foremost	members	of	the	nation	of	France.	Religion	should	come	second	to	citizenship.	Despite	efforts	to	rid	the	nation	of	Catholicism,	through	the	nationalization	of	land	and	the	pledge	of	loyalty,	the	French	people	continued	to	practice	in	their	homes.	Rather	than	force	Catholicism	out,	the	government	had	forced	religion	into	private	life.	The	need	to	separate	Church	and	State	while	allowing	private	practice	became	more	apparent	and	it	was	in	the	Republics’	first	Constitution,	the	1791	Déclaration	des	Droits	de	l’Homme	et	du	
Citoyen,	that	the	concept	of	freedom	of	religion	was	outlined.6	Rather	than	granting	the	people	protection	of	the	state	against	religious	influence	in	society,	the	Déclaration	emancipated	the	people	from	the	Catholic	Church.	It	provided	that	no	one	shall	be	disturbed	for	his	or	her	opinions,	even	religious	ones,	as	long	as	their	manifestation	does	not	disturb	the	public	order	established	by	law.	The	prescription	of	maintaining	“public	order”	before	all	else	has	become	a	foundational	French	concept.	This	period	in	French	history	was	characterized	by	the	demand	that	the	people	put	the	state	or	public	order	before	the	church	and	religion,	though	the	way	to	ensure	this	remain	unresolved.			 Though	the	Constitution	of	1791	emancipated	the	State	from	the	Catholic	Church,	additional	legislation	was	passed	in	1795	to	further	separate	the	two.	The	1795	law	formally	separated	Church	and	State,	and	prohibited	the	wearing	of	“religious	ornaments	or	clothing”	in	public.7	However,	the	political	climate	changed	when	just	a	few	years	later	Napoleon	came	into	power.		Though	he	himself	was	not	an	adherent	of	the	Catholic																																																									6	Britton	D.	Davis,	117.			7	Britton	D.	Davis,	117.			
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Church,	he	recognized	that	a	relationship	with	the	Catholic	Church	could	provide	him	with	the	economic	and	moral	benefits.	Napoleon	sought	to	use	the	Church	to	his	advantage	and	attempted	to	negotiate	with	the	pope.8		However,	this	failed	when	in	1802	Napoleon	introduced	the	Concordat,	a	law	that	required	all	actions	from	Rome	to	be	approved	by	the	French	government.9	Relations	between	Rome	and	France	quickly	deteriorated.	France	became	increasingly	divided	among	those	who	supported	Napoleon	and	those	who	remained	loyal	to	the	Catholic	Church	and	papal	authority.			 The	political	instability	and	class	conflict	continued	into	the	nineteenth	century.	The	revolution	of	1848	ensued,	and	ended	with	the	development	of	a	new	constitution	and	the	creation	of	the	Second	Republic.	In	the	constitution	of	1848	the	citizens	were	granted	the	right	to	personal	liberty,	freedom	of	association,	peaceful	and	unarmed	assembly,	petition	and	freedom	of	expression.	These	liberties	did,	however,	have	limits.	As	Karl	Marx	notes,	liberties	came	“always	with	the	marginal	note	that	it	is	unlimited	so	far	as	it	is	not	limited	by	the	equal	rights	of	others	and	the	public	safety	or	by	laws.”10		The	bourgeois,	as	drafters	of	the	constitution	and	the	wielders	of	political	power,	sought	to	serve	their	interests	and	theirs	alone:	limiting	Catholicism	in	the	civic	sphere.	As	a	result,	public	safety	only	referred	to	the	safety	of	the	bourgeoisie.	Resistance	to	the	church	was	further	emphasized	in	the	aftermath	of	the	anti-clerical	Paris	Commune	of	1870.	The	events	of	the	commune	inclined	Jules	Ferry,	Minister	of	Education	from	1879	to	1882,	to	reduce	the	influence	of	the	Catholic	Church.	In	1881	the	Loi	Ferry	was	passed	making	public	education	compulsory,	free	and	laïc	(free	from	religious	teachings).	Education	was																																																									8	Betros,	Gemma.	“The	French	Revolution	and	the	Catholic	Church.”		9	Betros,	Gemma.	“The	French	Revolution	and	the	Catholic	Church.”		10	Marx,	Karl.	"The	Eighteenth	Brumaire	of	Louis	Bonaparte."	Zodiac	and	Brian	Baggins	for	Marx/Engels	Internet	Archive	1995,	1999.	Web.	(13).	
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and	is	sacred	to	republicanism,	and	republicanism	embraces	a	separation	of	Church	and	State.	Marx	made	the	observation	that	“each	paragraph	of	the	constitution	contains	its	own	antithesis…so	long	as	the	name	of	freedom	was	respected	and	only	its	actual	realization	prevented,	of	course	in	a	legal	way,	the	constitutional	existence	of	liberty	remained	intact,	inviolate,	however	mortal	the	blows	dealt	to	its	existence	in	actual	life.”11	In	short,	the	constitutional	protections	did	not	guarantee	the	people	absolute	liberties,	because	history	had	revealed	that	public	order	had	to	come	first.	The	same	disruption	of	political	power	occurs	in	France	today.	The	politicians	enact	laws	that	privilege	order	over	individual	liberties,	and	when	they	sense	a	small	threat	to	public	order	they	justify	the	suspension	of	those	liberties.	This	was	the	case	during	the	late	nineteenth	century.	France	experienced	a	surge	in	nationalism	and	immigrants,	perceived	as	a	threat,	were	targeted	in	legislation.		 One	main	cause	for	the	surge	in	nationalism	was	the	Dreyfus	Affair.	France	was	in	the	midst	of	a	war	over	land	disputes	with	Germany	when	a	young	French	artillery	officer	of	Jewish	decent	was	convicted	of	treason	in	a	closed	trial	in	1894.	L’	Affaire	Dreyfus	fueled	the	rise	in	nationalism	and	further	discredited	the	Church	by	splitting	the	nation	into	two	camps:	the	pro-army,	Catholic	“anti-Dreyfusards”	and	the	anti-clerical,	pro-republican	“Dreyfusards”.12		As	a	Jew	from	Alsace,	Dreyfus	embodied	everything	the	nationalist	right	loathed.	The	conflict	with	Germany	and	the	internal	division	created	concern	about	France’s	power,	causing	the	French	to	view	any	independent	institution	that	influenced	society	as	a	limit	on	the	national	governments’	ability	to	exert	control																																																									11	Marx,	Karl.	"The	Eighteenth	Brumaire	of	Louis	Bonaparte."	Zodiac	and	Brian	Baggins	for	Marx/Engels	Internet	Archive	1995,	1999.	Web	pdf.	(13).	12	"A	Country	Divided:	Dreyfusards	and	Anti-Dreyfusards."	The National Library of Israel. The National Library 
of Israel,	n.d.	Web.	01	Feb.	2017.	
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over	its	citizens	and	their	loyalties.13		The	fear	that	radicals	would	overpower	the	government	led	the	French	to	create	a	government	that	would	impose	the	people’s	will	through	legislation	rather	than	check	and	balances	as	does	the	American	system.	Aware	of	the	country’s	fraught	religious	history,	legislators	proceeded	with	caution,	passing	legislation	that	would	limit	the	religion	in	the	public	sphere	with	the	belief	that	legislation	could	cure	the	country’s	social	ills.			 Throughout	the	twentieth	century,	the	government,	dissatisfied	with	the	legal	religious	framework,	continued	to	pass	legislation	that	would	build	a	wall	of	separation	between	church	and	state.	In	1901	France	passed	the	Law	on	Associations	requiring	parliamentary	approval	of	all	religious	congregations	and	provisions	on	freedom	of	association.14	Nevertheless,	the	1901	law	was	not	sufficient	in	ending	the	adversarial	relationship	between	the	Catholic	Church	and	the	State.	This	back	and	forth	between	the	increasingly	secular	French	government	and	the	Catholic	authority	pointed	to	one	conclusion--	the	need	to	separate	the	Church	and	State	once	and	for	all.			
1.1	The	1905	law	on	the	Separations	of	the	Churches	and	the	State		 The	1905	Law	of	Separation	of	Churches	and	the	State	officially	resolved	the	conflict	between	the	two	institutions	and	developed	principles	fundamental	to	the	nations’	character.	The	1905	Law	is	based	on	three	pillars,	“freedom	of	conscience,	separation	of	State	and	Churches,	and	the	equal	respect	of	all	faiths	and	beliefs.”15	First,	the	law,	by	ending	official	recognition	of	the	Catholic	Church,	grants	the	people	freedom	of	belief	and	practice,	with	the	caveat	that	religious	practice	may	not	disturb	public	order,	an	idea	that																																																									13	Harrigan,	P.	J.	"The	Social	Appeals	of	Catholic	Secondary	Education	in	France	in	the	1870s."	Journal	of	Social	
History	8.3	(1975):	(135).	Print.	14	Britton	D.	Davis,	121.			15	Britton	D.	Davis,	122.			
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dates	back	to	the	Constitution	of	the	Second	Republic.	Second,	the	law	protects	from	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	religion	by	ending	public	subsidization	of	religious	institutions.	Third,	the	law	respects	the	rules	of	every	religion	and	therefore	provides	occasional	exemptions	to	some	religious	groups.	For	example	the	state	has	funded	the	building	of	a	few	churches	and	mosques.		Nonetheless,	the	three	pillars	instituted	a	policy	of	state	neutrality	toward	religious	beliefs	in	the	public	sphere	meant	to	instill	tolerance.	The	law	highlighted	an	evolution	in	French	politics,	as	it	was	a	far	more	peaceful	approach	to	curbing	the	perceived	threat	of	the	Catholic	Church	than	the	revolutionary	responses	a	century	earlier.	It	further	marked	the	decline	of	religion,	though	Catholicism	in	the	cultural	sense	has	remained	a	constant	in	French	society.		 This	struggle	for	power	between	the	French	state	and	the	Catholic	Church	characterized	the	role	of	religion	in	France.	Although	France	has	long	embraced	religious	freedom	in	its	constitutional	documents,	it	has	created	legislation	that	unfairly	targets	certain	populations.	The	nature	of	French	religious	freedom,	defined	by	the	singular	threat	of	one	religious	body,	explains	why	compared	to	the	U.S.,	which	simultaneously	affirmed	the	principle	of	freedom	of	religion	in	its	respective	Constitution	of	1789,	France	found	itself	with	a	quite	different	conception	of	the	meaning	and	implementation	of	religious	liberty.		Professor	of	Constitutional	Law	and	Civil	Liberties	at	L’Université	de	
Ceris-Pontoise,	Pierre-Henri	Prélot	observes	that	the	French	perception	of	freedom	of	religion	is	uncommon.	He	says,	“In	France,	freedom	of	religion	emancipated	the	people	from	Catholicism	and	grants	them	the	protection	of	the	state	against	religious	influence	in	society.”16	This	suggests	that	French	freedom	of	religion	should	in	fact	be	interpreted	as	
																																																								16	Prélot,	Pierre-Henri,	914.	
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freedom	from	religion	meaning	that	“man	can	only	belong	to	the	national	community	regardless	of	religious	beliefs.”17		The	difference	between	this	theology	and	the	American	point	of	view	is	clear.	The	threat	in	the	United	States	was	not	a	religious	body	but	the	government	itself.	This	directed	the	federal	government	to	guarantee	the	people	freedom	to	practice	without	government	interference,	rather	than	enforce	a	policy	of	non-practice	(at	least	in	the	public	sphere)	as	was	done	in	France.			 Politicians,	historians,	anthropologists	and	French	citizens	alike	continue	to	debate	the	intent	of	the	1905	law	and	what	its	application	should	look	like.	They	ask	themselves,	is	it	a	law	of	liberty	or	restriction?		Pierre-Henri	Prélot	argues	that	the	Law	of	1905	is	a	law	of	restriction.	He	believes	that	its	focus	on	secularism	is	necessary	for	maintaining	public	order,	dating	back	to	the	need	to	maintain	public	order	in	light	of	the	political	war	with	the	Church.			 Jean	Baubérot,	Chair	of	History	and	Sociology	of	Laïcité	at	the	School	of	Advanced	Studies,	disagrees.	Baubérot	says	of	the	law	of	1905:	“it	is	not	a	law	that	seeks	to	chase	religion	out	of	public	life:	to	the	contrary	it’s	a	liberal	text	about	tolerance.”18		Baubérot	uses	history	to	advance	his	position.	He	states	that	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	parliamentary	commission	directed	to	work	on	the	law	of	1905	was	a	joint	appointment	of	Jules	Ferry,	Ferdinand	Buisson	and	Aristide	Briand,	all	liberal	statesmen.	The	men	did	not	want	to	suppress	religion,	but	mitigate	the	political-religious	crisis	that	had	devastated	the	nation	since	the	seventeenth	century.	According	to	Baubérot,	the	three	men	engaged	in	a	campaign	of	laïcité	that	was	secular,	but	not	anti-religious	nor	
																																																								17	Prélot,	Pierre-Henri,	914.	18	Chemin,	Anne.	"«	La	loi	de	1905,	étape	fondamentale	de	la	laïcisation	de	la	République	française,	est	libérale	et	tolérante	»."	Le	Monde.fr.	Le	Monde,	15	Nov.	2016.	Web.	4	Feb.	2017.	
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anti-clerical.	They	saw	the	1905	Law	as	a	means	to	protect	freedom	of	belief	and	practice,	while	at	the	same	time	ensuring	a	non-religious	State.			 The	political	decisions	and	actions	of	the	twentieth	century	continued	to	shape	how	the	French	viewed	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion,	which	by	in	large	was	closer	to	Prélot’s	view.		Though	it	may	appear	unrelated,	the	1971	decision	of	the	Conseil	
Constitutionel	(the	French	equivalent	of	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court)	to	incorporate	the	French	preamble	of	the	Constitution	of	1946	to	the	Constitution	of	1958	had	a	significant	effect	on	religious	freedom.	19		The	preamble	of	the	1946	constitution	proclaimed	that	women	have	equal	rights	to	those	of	men	in	all	spheres.	This	inclusion	became	the	basis	for	the	right	to	gender	equality,	which	decades	later	the	French	government	and	feminists	would	call	on	to	impose	the	2004,	2010	and	2016	laws	banning	religious	symbols,	veils	and	burkinis	in	public.	In	addition	to	the	call	for	equality	of	the	preamble,	article	I	of	the	French	Constitution	of	1958	states:	“France	shall	be	an	indivisible,	secular,	democratic,	and	social	republic.	It	shall	ensure	the	equality	of	all	citizens	before	the	law,	without	distinction	of	origin,	race	or	religion.	It	shall	respect	all	beliefs.	”20	Despite	the	call	for	equality	irrespective	of	religion	in	the	Constitution,	politicians	continue	to	refer	back	to	the	Law	of	1905	when	establishing	freedom	of	religion.	The	issue	with	using	the	law	as	the	basis	for	religion	in	modern	life	is	that	first,	social	and	demographic	conditions	and	the	make	up	of	France	have	changed	immensely,	and	second,	the	French	politicians	who	drafted	the	1905	law	disagreed	over	the	meaning	of	separation	of	Church	and	State.	One	camp	argued	it	meant	allowing	everyone	to	practice	his	or	her	own	religion	(soft	laïcité),	the	other	argued	that	free	practice	of	religion	must	not	be	public,	state	sanctioned	and																																																									19	Britton	D.	Davis,	125.			20	Britton	D.	Davis,	125.			
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confined	to	the	private	domain	(strict	laïcité).	When	examined	more	closely,	the	text	of	the	law	of	1905	echoes	the	former	definition	of	freedom	of	religion.	The	principle	of	
laïcité	however,	echoes	the	second	more	restrictive	vision.			
1.2	Defining	and	interpreting	modern	Laïcité		 In	modern	France	laïcité	is	seen	as	the	cornerstone	of	French	society,	a	reflection	of	French	identity,	a	rule	of	French	life.	History	tell	us	that	the	modern	characterization	of	laïcité	has	grown	out	of	the	need	of	the	French	government	to	separate	itself	from	the	Catholic	Church	and	regain	control	of	the	people.	As	a	result	of	the	separation,	religious	practice	and	symbols	are	seen	as	a	step	back	in	the	wrong	direction	and	as	a	threat	to	the	established	democracy	of	the	Fifth	Republic.	Hence,	the	Fifth	Republic	continues	to	grapple	with	notions	of	religious	freedom	and	practice	of	it	by	its	Muslim	residents.	This	is	in	part	because	the	current	interpretation	of	the	principle	of	laïcité	permeates	state	lines.	It	seeks	to	control	the	internal	organization	of	a	religion.	Britton	Davis	recognizes	
laïcité	as	a	political	tool.	She	points	out	that	laïcité	is	an	undefined	concept	with	“no	official	agreement	as	to	what	it	means	or	what	it	requires	of	the	French	Republic.”21	This	allows	for	the	principle	to	be	adapted	to	either	attack	or	protect	a	religious	action.	Beginning	in	1989	with	the	Headscarf	Dilemma,	principles	of	laïcité	were	effected	in	French	policy	in	ways	that	threatened	liberty	instead	of	protecting	it.	By	analyzing	the	strife	religious	past	of	France,	characterized	by	religious	conflict	between	the	Catholic	Church	and	the	State,	the	causes	of	the	current	tensions	become	clearer.	However,	one	shaping	factor	is	missing--immigration.																																																										21	Britton	D.	Davis,	125.			
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1.3	Immigration	in	France		 In	order	to	understand	how	French	views	of	Muslims	have	evolved,	it	is	necessary	to	review	immigration	in	France.	Low	rates	of	foreign	immigration	and	later	large-scale	immigration	from	its	former	colonies	have	played	into	the	current	conception	of	laïcité	and	what	it	means	to	be	French.		The	French22	have	been	for	the	most	part	white	and	catholic,	giving	way	to	a	rigid	national	identity.	The	Français	de	souche,	(French	with	roots)	those	with	four	grandparents	born	in	France	consider	themselves	to	be	the	true	French	citizens.	In	1851	only	1.1	percent	of	the	French	population	was	foreign	born,	while	in	the	U.S.	9.7	percent	of	the	population	was	foreign	born.23	The	percent	point	difference	was	quite	significant	in	defining	the	character	of	each	nation.	Two	decades	later	in	1911	after	the	Law	of	Separation	of	Churches	and	State,	the	foreign	born	population	in	France	remained	low	at	2.9	percent,24	meanwhile	the	U.S.	the	foreign	born	population	had	reached	14.7	percent.25	These	differences	in	immigration	led	to	a	very	different	development	of	national	identity	for	each	nation.	The	U.S.	was	a	multi-religious	and	multi-cultural	nation	and	therefore	it	was	not	emancipation	from	religion	that	the	country	needed,	but	protection	to	practice.	France	remained	fairly	homogenous,	white	and	catholic	and	thus	there	developed	a	strong	French	national	identity	that	continues	to	be	central	to	French	life.	Anyone	who	did	not	fit	the	French	mold	was	supposed	to	suppress	his	or	her	own	foreign	identity	for	the	sake	of	the	nation.	For	this	reason	we	see	that	France	favors	a	policy	of	assimilation	rather	than	accommodation.		
																																																								22	Throughout	this	thesis	my	use	of	the	term	“the	French”	refers	to	the	white,	catholic	majority.	23	Bureau,	US	Census.	"Foreign	Born."	US	Census	Bureau.	N.p.,	n.d.	Web.	22	Jan.	2017.	24	Schain,	Martin.	The	Politics	of	Immigration	in	France,	Britain	and	the	United	States:	A	comparative	Study.	New	York.	Palgrave	Macmillan;	ch2,	40.	2008.	25	"The	Foreign	Born	Population	in	the	U.S."	US	Census	Bureau.US	Census	Bureau.,	2010.	Web.	22	Jan.	2017.	
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	 This	dates	back	to	the	nineteenth	century	when	French	colonial	power	ruled	over	many	Muslim-majority	countries.	France	erected	its	first	immigration	and	naturalization	law	in	1889.	The	law,	Jus	Solis,	established	citizenship	for	anyone	born	in	a	French	territory,	and	thus	appeared	to	be	an	invitation	to	join	French	society.		To	the	disappointment	of	these	Muslim	peoples,	laws	were	enacted	that	limited	their	rights.	Many	categories	of	people	such	as	the	Algerian	Muslims	were	French	nationals	yet	did	not	have	the	same	political	or	social	rights	as	full	French	citizens.	This	was	due	to	the	Crémieux	decree	in	place	from	1830	to	1870.26	The	law	placed	handicaps	on	the	ability	of	certain	French	nationals	to	vote,	assemble	and	serve	as	civil	servants,	institutionalizing	discrimination	between	French	nationals	and	French	citizens.	Yet	in	spite	of	this	discrimination	and	culturalized	conception	of	integration,	French	nationality	illustrates	some	sense	of	inclusiveness	in	its	willingness	to	extend	limited	citizenship	to	its	former	ethnically	different	territories.	The	theory	perhaps	being	that	the	stronger	the	link	with	French	society	the	more	likely	the	immigrant	community	would	integrate	with	the	traditional	republican	French	people.	The	French	place	extreme	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	assimilation	and	often	perceive	anyone	who	challenges	French	identity	as	a	threat	to	or	burden	on	French	society.		 To	this	end,	throughout	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	century	the	government	passed	immigration	laws	in	a	back	and	forth	pattern	of	restricting	and	then	loosening	legislation	in	an	effort	to	reduce	immigration	and	integrate	new	arrivals.	Though	several	laws	included	discriminatory	measures	on	the	basis	of	race,	the	immigration	laws,	with	the																																																									26	Hajjat,	Abdellali	,	and	Christophe	Bertossi.	"EUDO	Citizenship	Observatory,	Country	Report:	France."	European	University	Institute,	Florence	Robert	Schuman	Centre	for	Advanced	Studies.		EUDO	Citizenship	Observatory,	Jan	2013.	Web.	Accessed	Mar.	2017.				
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exception	of	Crémieux,	did	not	target	religious	groups	because	religion	was	a	largely	private	matter.	The	French	were	instead	concerned	with	controlling	the	behavior	of	the	immigrants	who	had	made	it	to	French	soil.	To	do	this	the	government	tightened	immigration	laws	in	the	name	of	national	security.	One	such	law	was	that	of	1912	requiring	immigrants	to	carry	identity	documents	with	detailed	descriptions	and	pictures,	and	giving	administrative	authorities	the	ability	to	deny	entry	to	people	whose	“presence	appeared	dangerous”.27			 In	stark	contrast	to	the	law	of	1912,	the	war	and	postwar	period	welcomed	immigrants.	The	state	itself	became	involved	in	the	recruitment	of	immigrant	manpower.	However,	the	French	people	were	less	enthusiastic	of	the	rise	in	immigration	when	they	experienced	a	depression	of	wages.	An	unfavorable	bias	towards	immigrants	developed	in	the	1930’s,	and	as	the	depression	grew	worse	legislation	was	passed	authorizing	quotas	on	employment	in	several	industries.	This	ended	as	the	Second	World	War	began.			 The	immigration	policy	of	the	postwar	period	was	based	on	the	same	principles.	Postwar	reconstruction	had	revitalized	the	economy	and	produced	a	labor	market.	The	need	for	immigrants	was	furthered	by	the	population	reduction	caused	by	wartime	deaths	and	low	fertility	rates.	Prompted	by	the	booming	economy	and	job	opportunities,	large	numbers	of	Muslim	citizens	hailing	from	former	colonies	began	to	immigrate	to	France.	This	shift	from	nuns	to	Muslims	was	quite	jarring	for	the	French	who	still	lived	in	a	majority	catholic	country28.	The	North	Africans	continued	to	be	viewed	as	the	least	desirable,	especially	the	Algerians	who	had	just	fought	a	brutal	war	of	independence	against	the	French	in	1954	led	by	a	radical	Islamic	group	attempting	to	overthrow	the																																																									27	Schain,	Martin,	42.		28	Bell,	David	A.	"Veil	of	Tears:	A	Review	of	"Why	the	French	Don't	Like	Headscarves:	Islam,	the	State	and	Public	Space"."	Review-A-Day.	Powells.com,	8	Mar.	2007.	Web.	01	Mar.	2017.	
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secular	government.	29		The	methods	of	warfare	such	as	guerrilla	fighting,	torture	tactics	and	terrorism	drew	international	attention	and	caused	the	Algerians	to	be	seen	as	violent	people	who	posed	a	threat	to	internal	security.	Despite	their	undesirable	standing	large	numbers	of	Algerian	workers	were	able	to	migrate	to	France	through	family	reunification,	guest	worker	policies	and	an	increase	in	asylum	designations.		 As	the	size	and	permanence	of	the	Muslim	community	grew	more	apparent	in	the	1960’s	and	1970’s,	the	government	tried	to	both	reduce	the	number	of	immigrants	entering	the	country	and	send	them	home	to	their	countries	of	origin.	In	the	1960’s	the	French	Administration	attempted	to	limit	Algerian	immigration,	which	represented	the	largest	group	of	Maghreb	immigrants	with	a	population	of	800,000,	through	a	series	of	negotiations	and	contracts	with	the	Algerian	government.30	Ten	years	later,	the	French	government	attempted	to	send	one	million	of	the	legal	Muslim	immigrants	home,	first	through	informal	encouragement	and	then	with	policies	that	would	subsidize	the	return	trip	home.31	When	the	effort	to	send	the	immigrants	home	failed,	the	government	reverted	to	a	new	tactic:	encouraging	integration	by	supporting	Muslim	organizations.	Scared	that	a	lack	of	integration	and	employment	could	lead	the	Muslim	population	to	rebel,	the	government	supported	Islam,	encouraging	the	creation	of	Muslim	organizations.	This	accounted	for	the	increasing	visibility	of	Islam	in	France	and	the	ensuing	change	in	policy.			 By	the	1990s,	many	of	the	Muslim	immigrants	had	established	patterns	of	settlement.	By	living	in	one	geographic	area	and	cultivating	their	collective	identity,	they	inadvertently	made	their	own	assimilation	and	integration	more	difficult.	Nationhood																																																									29	Hitchens,	Christopher.	"A	Chronology	of	the	Algerian	War	of	Independence."	The	Atlantic.	Atlantic	Media	Company,	01	Nov.	2006.	Web.	06	Mar.	2017.	30	Schain,	Martin.	47.	31	Schain,	Martin,	51.	
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scholar	William	Brubacker	explains	the	conflicts	over	the	immigration	and	integration	of	North	Africans	through	a	historical	framework.	He	believes	that	“the	influx	of	immigrants	from	non-white,	non-Christian	countries	and	those	immigrants’	expression	in	the	1980s	of	their	desire	to	retain	their	own	culture	and	religion	inevitably	ran	up	against	the	brick	wall	of	the	French	idea	of	citizenship.”32	The	French	felt	threatened	by	the	Maghreb	population	resulting	in	yet	another	policy	shift.	Politicians	seeking	to	remedy	the	lack	of	integration	introduced	the	requirement	of	proof	of	“good	integration”	in	the	Loi	Chevenement	of	1998.33		The	law	reflects	the	cornerstone	of	French	society:	the	requirement	of	belonging	to	the	country	first	and	any	other	group	second.	Today	the	rise	of	Islam	in	France	has	once	again	called	into	question	the	emphasis	the	nation	places	on	its	values	namely,	respect	for	tolerance,	willingness	to	protect	civil	liberties	and	how	far	it	will	go	to	safeguard	what	it	regards	as	its	true	identity.			 This	chapter	has	provided	the	historical	foundation	of	religion	and	immigration	in	France	necessary	to	examine	the	current	tensions	between	laïcité,	Islam,	national	security,	and	French	policy.	The	next	chapter	will	provide	the	historical	context	in	the	United	States	to	set	up	the	later	comparative	analysis.							
																																																								32	Bellar,	Elisa	T.,	The	Headscarf	Affair:	The	Conseil	d’État	on	the	Role	of	Religion	and	Culture	in	French	Society,	39	Texas	International	Law	Journal:	586	(2004).	33	Schain,	Martin,	55.		
	 21	
CHAPTER	2:	FOUNDATIONS	OF	AMERICAN	RELIGION	AND	IMMIGRATION		
		 	Although	the	United	States	is	a	multi-religious	nation	today,	that	was	not	always	the	case.	The	United	States	has	gone	through	of	religious	evolution	of	sorts.	It	began	as	a	religious	haven	but	very	soon	several	colonies	became	intolerant	of	minority	religions.	The	colonies	progressed	during	the	era	of	the	Constitution	and	the	Enlightenment	resulting	in	an	expansion	of	freedom	of	religion.	But	then,	Pan-	Protestantism	took	hold	early	in	the	nineteenth	century	creating	a	climate	intolerant	of	other	religious	groups.	This,	coupled	with	the	Second	Awakening	and	an	influx	of	Catholics	and	Mormons	who	arrived	in	the	mid	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries,	caused	the	country	to	respond	with	a	fear	of	aliens	and	minority	religions.	Since	then	U.S.	has	continued	to	struggle	to	come	up	with	a	sound	principle	and	application	of	freedom	of	religion	that	allows	for	religious	liberty,	and	at	the	same	time	minimizes	threats	both	perceived	and	actual	from	foreign-born	populations	and	religious	minorities,	today,	namely	Muslims.				 The	widely	held	notion	that	America	has	always	been	a	welcoming	nation	tolerant	of	all	religions	is	untrue.	While	the	majority	of	early-generation	Americans	were	Christian,	there	was	significant	religious	conflict	among	the	Protestant	sects.	The	colonists	took	the	new	land	for	a	Protestant	country.	The	homogeneity	of	chiefly	Puritan	colonies	in	New	England	created	a	climate	intolerant	of	other	religions.	Few	were	spared,	Puritan	dissidents	and	Catholics	were	seen	as	abhorrent	and	were	discriminated	against,	killed	or	banished.	Four	Quakers	were	hanged	in	Boston	between	1661	and	1695	for	standing	up	for	their	beliefs.34	In	the	Massachusetts	Bay	Colony	intolerance	was	particularly	strong.	It	quickly	became	clear	that	religious	tolerance	was	a	term	unknown	to	the	colonists.																																																									34	Davis,	Kenneth	C.	“America’s	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."	
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	 There	were	few	and	very	small	religious	minorities,	a	handful	of	Catholics,	a	handful	of	Jews	and	a	handful	of	Muslims35.	Though	the	homogeneity	began	to	lessen	as	new	immigrant	groups	arrived,	the	intolerance	remained	high.	Small	numbers	of	Irish	began	immigrating	to	the	colonies	as	early	as	the	1600’s.	Having	observed	the	disastrous	effects	of	Catholicism	in	Europe,	the	English	sought	to	keep	them	out.		Still	under	British	control,	colonial	law	limited	the	number	of	Catholics	authorized	to	enter	the	colonies.	Consequently,	the	majority	of	Irish	coming	to	the	new	land	were	Protestant.	This	fostered	religious	intolerance	that	would	continue	throughout	the	colonial	era,	with	a	strong	target	on	the	Catholics.	Cotton	Mather,	a	Massachusetts	preacher,	condemned	Catholics	in	his	sermons	and	created	statutes	that	discriminated	against	Catholics	by	limiting	their	ability	to	vote	and	own	property.	36	Despite	a	growing	separation	from	Britain,	British	rule	continued	to	impact	the	politics	of	the	colonies,	causing	the	colonists	to	grapple	over	their	position	on	religious	tolerance.		 As	more	and	more	immigrants	came	to	the	colonies,	the	struggle	became	greater	and	religious	differences	divided	the	colonies.		The	first	big	wave	of	non-Protestant	immigrants	came	in	1718.37		This	first	major	migration	was	a	group	of	Irish	Presbyterians,	Catholics,	Anglicans	and	Quakers.38	Prompted	by	religious	persecution,	lack	of	political	autonomy	and	dire	economic	conditions	back	home	the	Irish	sought	refuge	in	the	colonies.	After	their	arrival	more	groups	sought	refuge	in	the	new	nation.	Maryland	was	founded	as	a	religious	haven	for	Roman	Catholics	but	still	welcomed	persons	of	all	faiths	to	practice																																																									35	The	small	number	of	Muslims	was	due	to	the	African	slaves.	The	presence	of	Islam	was	unknown	to	many	colonists.	36	Davis,	Kenneth	C.	"America's	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."		37	Colonial	Scots-Irish	Immigrants:	The	Irish	Records."	Colonial	Scots-Irish	Immigrants:	The	Irish	Records.	N.p.,	n.d.	Web.	20	Jan.	2017.	38	"Colonial	Scots-Irish	Immigrants:	The	Irish	Records."	Colonial	Scots-Irish	Immigrants:	The	Irish	Records.	N.p.,	n.d.	Web.	20	Jan.	2017.	
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without	persecution,	discrimination	or	exclusion	from	political	life.39	The	inclusive	spirit	of	its	founding	did	not	last	very	long.	By	1750	tensions	between	the	Catholic	and	Protestant	Marylanders	were	high.	Historian	Timothy	W.	Bosworth	wrote,	“Protestant’s	references	to	Catholics	of	provincial	Maryland	appeared	quite	similar	to	views	expressed	about	“subversive”	minority	groups	throughout	American	History.”40	The	arrival	of	more	religious	groups	created	a	new	uncertainty	among	the	colonists	who	did	not	anticipate	such	religious	diversity.	Soon	it	was	no	longer	just	British	law	that	tried	to	prevent	immigrants	with	faiths	other	than	Protestantism	from	immigrating	to	the	colonies	and	participating	in	political	life,	but	American	law	and	policy	began	to	do	so	as	well.		
	
2.1	The	Constitution	and	the	Right	to	Freedom	of	Religion		 When	the	Revolutionary	war	ended	and	King	George	the	III	extended	an	olive	branch	to	Catholics	in	Canada	in	1774,	anti-Catholic	sentiments	grew	stronger	in	America.41	The	increasing	intolerance	did	not	stop	at	disdain;	laws	were	enacted	to	keep	non-Protestants	from	wielding	political	power.	In	Massachusetts	only	Christians	were	able	to	hold	office,	while	Catholics	could	hold	office	if	they	renounced	allegiance	to	the	Pope.	New	York’s	State	Constitution	in	1777	banned	Catholics	from	public	office.	Maryland	and	South	Carolina	formed	Protestant	state	churches.42	Then	a	change	occurred;	spurred	by	Enlightenment	thought,	politicians,	acknowledging	they	had	come	to	America	to	escape	religious	persecution,	began	to	question	the	ethics	of	these	restrictive	and	discriminatory	laws	many	had	once	tried	to	escape	when	fleeing	England.																																																											39	Chapelle,	Suzanne	Ellery	Greene.	Maryland:	A	History	of	its	People.	Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	U	Press,	1986.	Print.	40	Bosworth,	Timothy	W.	“Anti-Catholicism	as	a	Political	Tool	in	Mid-Eighteenth-Century	Maryland.”	The	
Catholic	Historical	Review.	Vol.	61,	No.	4	(Oct.,	1975),	pp.	540.	Web.	7	Apr.	2017.	41	"	Davis,	Kenneth	C.	"America's	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."	42	Davis,	Kenneth	C.	"America's	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."	
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	 It	was	around	this	time	that	Thomas	Jefferson	began	a	dialogue	about	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion.	As	governor	of	Virginia,	Jefferson	drafted	a	bill	that	would	call	for	legal	equality	for	all	citizens	irrespective	of	religion	or	lack	of	religion.	When	Jefferson	was	unable	to	muster	support	for	the	bill,	Madison	came	to	his	aid	and	began	a	campaign	against	religion	in	government	with	an	essay	titled,	“Memorial	and	Remonstrance	Against	Religious	Assessments.”43	One	of	the	most	important	points	Madison	made	was	that	a	religious	state	would	be	“a	departure	from	that	generous	policy,	which	offering	an	Asylum	to	the	persecuted	and	oppressed	of	every	Nation	and	Religion,	promised	a	lustre	to	our	country.”44	That	is	to	say	the	United	States	was	founded	as	a	nation	for	the	persecuted	and	to	attempt	to	limit	freedom	of	religion	would	have	been	to	go	against	the	very	values	that	prompted	the	creation	of	the	new	nation.		 Eventually	Jefferson	was	able	to	gather	support	for	the	Virginia	Act	for	Establishing	
Religious	Freedom.	After	the	bill	was	passed,	Jefferson	famously	wrote	that	“within	the	mantle	of	its	protection,	[were]	the	Jew,	the	Gentile,	the	Christian	and	the	Mahometan,	the	Hindoo	and	Infidel	of	every	denomination.”45		As	champions	of	freedom	of	religion	and	separation	of	Church	and	State,	Jefferson	and	Madison	slowly	changed	American	attitudes.		 A	symbol	of	the	attitudinal	change	was	the	American	Constitution	of	1787.	In	Article	VI,	the	Constitution	established	that	there	would	be	no	religious	test	for	office,	the	first	of	future	protections	of	freedom	of	religion.	It	stated	that,	federally	elected	and	appointed	officials	“shall	be	bound	by	Oath	or	Affirmation,	to	support	this	Constitution,	but	no	religious	Test	shall	ever	be	required	as	a	Qualification	to	any	Office	or	public	Trust	under	
																																																								43	Davis,	Kenneth	C.	"America's	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."		44	Davis,	Kenneth	C.	"America's	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."		45	Davis,	Kenneth	C.	"America's	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."	
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the	United	States.”46		Knowing	all	too	well	the	dangers	of	a	country	divided	by	religion	and	run	by	the	head	of	the	church,	Washington,	Madison,	Jefferson	and	Adams	fought	to	ensure	that	America	would	be	a	tolerant	republic	by	including	principles	of	religious	freedom	in	the	founding	document	of	the	nation.		 However,	not	all	were	satisfied	with	the	Constitution’s	ability	to	protect	individual	liberties	of	the	people.	The	anti-federalists	demanded	more.	In	an	effort	to	appeal	to	the	anti-federalists,	Madison	introduced	a	number	of	amendments	that	came	to	be	known	as	the	Bill	of	Rights.	It	was	the	Bill	of	Rights	that	granted	the	people	of	the	United	States	fundamental	rights	and	protections	by	the	government,	including	the	right	to	practice	religion	freely.	It	was	in	congressional	debates	that	Madison’s	ideas	were	developed	into	the	religion	clauses	of	the	First	Amendment.	In	June	of	1789	Madison	outlined	his	proposed	amendments,	“The	civil	rights	of	none	shall	be	abridged	on	account	of	religious	belief	or	worship,	nor	shall	any	national	religion	be	established,	nor	shall	the	full	and	equal	rights	of	conscience	be	in	any	manner,	or	on	any	pretext,	infringed…”47	His	fellow	congressmen	did	not	immediately	accept	his	proposed	amendments.	Mr.	Sylvester,	one	of	the	congressmen	present	at	the	debate	in	August	of	1789	feared	the	amendment	would	abolish	religion	all	together.	Madison	countered	that	the	purpose	was	to	prevent	Congress	from	making	laws	that	would	enforce	the	observation	of	religion,	create	a	national	religion	or	“compel	men	to	worship	god	in	any	manner	contrary	to	their	conscience.”48	The	chief	concern	during	the	period	was	protecting	the	people	from	government	imposition	of	religion.	The	idea	of	restricting	practice	of	religion	was	not	part	of	the	discussion,	because	no	one	imagined	the																																																									46	Davis,	Kenneth	C.	"America's	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."		47	Wilson,	John	Frederick.,	and	Donald	L.	Drakeman.	Church	and	State	in	American	History:	The	Burden	of	
Religious	Pluralism.	Second	ed.	Boston:	Beacon	Press,	1987.	Print.	(76).		48	Wilson,	John	Frederick.,	and	Donald	L.	Drakeman,	76.	
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complexity	of	a	multi-religious	country.	This	distinction	between	the	need	to	protect	the	people	from	the	government,	versus	the	need	to	protect	people	from	the	Church,	as	had	been	the	case	in	England	and	in	France,	is	one	of	the	most	significant	factors	in	each	countries	notion	of	separation	of	church	and	state	and	freedom	of	religion.		 Ultimately	Congress	recognized	the	importance	of	freedom	of	religion	and	reached	a	compromise.	The	Bill	of	Rights	was	ratified	in	1791	guaranteeing	the	people	perhaps	their	most	important	right,	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion.49	In	addition	to	the	Bill	of	Rights,	President	Washington,	in	a	letter	to	the	Hebrew	Congregation	in	Newport,	Rhode	Island,	promised	the	country	full	liberty	of	conscience.	The	letter	reads:		“The	Government	of	the	United	States	gives	to	bigotry	no	sanction,	to	
persecution	no	assistance,	requires	only	that	they	who	live	under	its	
protection	should	demean	themselves	as	good	citizens,	in	giving	it	on	all	
occasions	their	effectual	support.	Everyone	shall	sit	in	safety	under	his	own	
vine	and	figtree,	and	there	shall	be	none	to	make	him	afraid.”50	This	letter	is	considered	by	American	historian	Melvin	Urofsky	to	be	a	“treasure	of	the	nation”	for	its	strong	call	for	religious	liberty.51	French	politician	Alexis	de	Tocqueville	wrote	that	America	had	been	“born	free,	unfettered	by	the	religious	and	social	bigotries	of	medieval	Europe.”52	Tocqueville	is	correct	in	highlighting	the	stark	differences	between	the	nations.	Though	the	United	States	was	founded	by	a	group	of	British	Protestants,	by	the	time	of	the	Revolution	the	nation	had	become	a	religious	and	political	haven	for	many	Europeans.	Comparatively,	in	Europe,	the	anti-clerical	French	Revolution	was	just																																																									49	"The	Story	Behind	the	George	Washington	Letter	to	the	Hebrew	Congregation	in	Newport,	RI,	August	21,	1790."	Bill	of	Rights	Institute.	N.p.,	n.d.	Web.	3	Feb.	2017.		50	The	Story	Behind	the	George	Washington	Letter	to	the	Hebrew	Congregation…”	51	The	Story	Behind	the	George	Washington	Letter	to	the	Hebrew	Congregation…”	52	The	Story	Behind	the	George	Washington	Letter	to	the	Hebrew	Congregation...”	
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beginning.	Washington	recognized	the	diversity	of	the	nation	and	it	was	in	this	vein	that	the	American	motto,	E	Pluribus	Union-	Out	of	Many,	One,	became	a	symbol	of	American	tolerance	and	diversity.			 Today	America	continues	to	known	as	the	land	of	religious	liberty,	with	the	religion	clauses	of	the	First	Amendment	being	a	cornerstone	of	this	freedom.	The	First	Amendment	grants	the	people	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion,	protects	individuals	from	state	restriction	of	religion	and	protects	religions	in	their	own	right.	This	protection	is	not	unique;	most	Western	countries	share	this	conception	of	religion,	however	interpretations	differ.53	In	the	United	States,	civil	religion	is	a	common	faith.54	More	precisely,	American	civil	religion	has	been	defined	as,	“a	set	of	religious	beliefs…shared	by	most	Americans	and	consistent	with	the	particular	theologies	of	[most	American	religions]”	55.		Essentially,	American	civil	religion	is	a	mixture	of	religious	and	secular	beliefs	that	dates	back	to	the	country’s	founding.	Civil	religion	is	meant	to	unite	the	American	people	through	a	shared	but	separate	partnership	between	the	State	and	the	Church.	Despite	the	name	American	civil	religion	is	not	fundamentally	religious.	In	fact,	American	civil	religion	developed	as	the	U.S.	became	less	religious,	influenced	by	enlightenment.			 As	enlightenment	ideas	disseminated	throughout	the	country	the	idea	of	separating	Church	and	State	became	more	palatable.	Ten	of	the	fourteen	states	either	disbanded	their	establishments	or	stopped	enacting	policies	that	supported	a	state	religious	establishment.56	This	included	loosening	political	limits	on	dissenting	groups.	At	the	national	level	the	first	Congress	had	introduced	an	amendment	that	eliminated	religious																																																									53	Prélot,	Pieree-Henry,	914.	54	Prélot,	Pieree-Henry,	918.	55	Prélot,	Pieree-Henry,	918.	56	Green,	Steven	K.	"The	Separation	of	Church	and	State	in	the	United	States."	Oxford	Research	Encyclopedia	of	
American	History	(2014):	n.	pag.	Oxford	Research	Encyclopedias.	Web.	12	Jan.	2017.	
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tests	for	public	office	and	established	separation	of	Church	and	State.	The	Supreme	Court	first	used	the	term	separation	of	Church	and	State	in	1879,	however	it	was	not	until	the	incorporation	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	that	the	term	became	a	constitutional	promise.	In	the	Court’s	first	Establishment	Clause	holding	Justice	Black	wrote	that	the	amendment	meant:		“Neither	 a	 state	 nor	 the	 Federal	 Government	 can	 set	 up	 a	 church.	Neither	can	pass	laws	which	aid	one	religion,	aid	all	religions,	or	prefer	one	religion	over	another	[…]	No	tax	in	any	amount,	 large	or	small,	can	be	 levied	 to	 support	 any	 religious	 activities	 or	 institutions,	 whatever	they	 may	 be	 called,	 or	 whatever	 form	 they	 may	 adopt	 to	 teach	 or	practice	 religion	 […]	 In	 the	 words	 of	 Jefferson,	 the	 clause	 against	establishment	 of	 religion	 by	 law	 was	 intended	 to	 erect	 “a	 wall	 of	separation	between	Church	and	State.”57	The	rhetoric	of	the	1946	Everson	v.	Board	of	Education	decision	did	not	reflect	the	ultimate	holding	in	which	the	court	ruled	in	favor	of	the	state,	allowing	state	reimbursement	of	religious	bussing.58	Conservatives	and	liberals	agreed	on	the	principle	of	separation	of	church	and	state,	however	they	had	differing	views	and	understandings	when	it	came	into	practice.	Liberals	understood	the	separation	to	mean	that	the	government	could	not	maintain	a	state	religion,	finance	religious	activities	or	coerce	action	on	behalf	or	against	religion.	Conservatives	understood	it	to	mean	that	the	government	had	leeway	to	recognize	religious	traditions	and	customs	and	use	them	in	non-denominational	ways	as	well	as																																																									57	Green,	Steven	K.	"The	Separation	of	Church	and	State	in	the	United	States."		58	Ultimately	the	court	held	that	services	like	bussing	that	are	“separate	and	so	indisputably	marked	off	from	the	religious	function”	and	do	not	violate	the	First	Amendment.	("Everson	v.	Board	of	Education	of	the	Township	of	Ewing."	LII	/	Legal	Information	Institute.	Cornell	University	Law	School,	n.d.	Web.	3	Feb.	2017.)	
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financially	assist	religious	bodies	when	it	benefitted	the	State.	The	politicians,	who	were	among	the	elite	Americans,	favored	the	first	view,	upholding	the	values	of	the	Constitution.		 However,	subsequent	behavior	did	not	echo	the	principles	of	the	Constitution.	The	Founders	did	not	anticipate,	in	1792,	how	diverse	the	U.S.	would	become.	The	laws	of	the	Constitution	were	created	with	the	belief	that	the	U.S.	would	remain	a	fairly	homogenous	society.	When	a	mere	twenty	years	later	the	population	began	to	diversify,	the	reality	was	not	that	of	the	Constitution.	No	one	expected	the	change	in	religious	diversity	that	would	result	from	surges	of	immigration	of	Mormons,	Catholics,	and	Jews,	and	therefore,	when	it	began	the	people	felt	little	obligation	to	uphold	the	values	of	the	legal	framework.			
2.	2			Popular	Reactions	and	Policy	Against	Religion	and	Immigrants		 At	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century	Americans	were	no	longer	committed	to	preventing	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	religion.	The	American	public	did	not	share	the	same	view	as	the	political	elite	who	believed	freedom	of	religion	was	a	protected	right.	The	country	saw	a	return	of	intolerance	as	immigration	increased.	Violence	erupted	in	the	1830’s	when	a	second	wave	of	Irish	Catholic	immigrants	arrived	and	again	in	the	1840’s	following	the	Irish	Potato	famine.		The	Irish	that	came	during	this	period	were	poor	by	American	standards	and	were	willing	to	work	for	low	wages.	Many	Americans	grew	to	resent	them	and	their	unsanitary	living	conditions	that	polluted	neighborhoods.	Age-old	tensions	between	Protestants	and	Catholics	were	exacerbated.	Protestants	burned	down	Saint	Mary’s	Catholic	Church	in	New	York	City	in	1831.	The	violence	continued	across	the	nation.	The	1844	Bible	Riots	in	Philadelphia	left	twenty	dead,	two	churches	burned	to	the	
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ground,	and	homes	destroyed.59	By	the	1850’s	there	was	a	far	more	challenging	demographic	mix	than	anyone	expected,	which	opened	the	door	to	strong	anti-immigrant	and	anti-Catholic	sentiments.	These	tensions	ultimately	led	to	the	founding	of	the	Nativist	American	party	and	the	Know-Nothing	party.			 	The	Know-Nothing	party	gained	traction	in	the	1850’s	as	an	anti-immigrant,	and	anti-Catholic	party	that	targeted	non-responsive	politicians.	The	party	disliked	Catholicism	because	of	its	roman	hierarchical	structure,	anti-republican	values	and	its	aim	to	subvert	government	and	curb	individual	freedom.60	The	Know-Nothings,	like	the	French	revolutionaries,	felt	Catholic	values	posed	a	threat	to	the	nation.	The	Know-Nothings	were	described	as	a	party	that	“sprang	from	the	people,	not	professional	politicians”	and	as	a	creation	of	a	party	of	“men	outside	politics.”61	The	people,	guided	by	bigotry	and	not	fact,	felt	threatened	by	Catholicism.	By	1850	The	Catholic	Church	was	the	single	largest	religious	body	in	America.	The	presence	of	the	church	coupled	with	fact	that	40	percent	of	second	wave	immigrants	hailed	from	Ireland	incited	anger	and	resentment	among	nativists.62	The	nativists	stressed	the	disproportionate	presence	of	Irish	Catholics	who	were	poor	and	criminals	and	sought	to	limit	their	political	power	by	spreading	anti-immigrant	propaganda.	The	Know-Nothings	won	several	elections	on	this	nativist	platform	and	gained	reasonable	popularity.	When	the	Republican	Party	finally	superseded	them	in	1856,	they	had	already	incorporated	some	of	the	Know-Nothing’s	anti-immigrant	rhetoric.	By	absorbing	the	anti-immigrant	gene	in	the	Republican	Party,	the	Republicans	were																																																									59	"Irish	-	Religious	Conflict	and	Discrimination."	Immigration:	Irish.	Library	of	Congress.	Library	of	Congress,	n.d.	Web.	15	Jan.	2017.	60	Levine,	Bruce.	“Conservatism,	Nativism,	and	Slavery:	Thomas	R.	Whitney	and	the	Origins	of	the	Know-Nothing	Party.”	The	Journal	of	American	History,	vol.	88,	no.	2,	2001,	pp.	455.	Print.	61	Levine,	Bruce,	456.	62	"Waves	of	Immigration	in	America."	Waves	Of	Immigration	In	America	Timeline.	Preceden,	n.d.	Web.	18	Jan.	2017.	
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eventually	branded	as	the	white	Protestant	party,	at	least	in	the	South.		 To	the	detriment	of	the	nation,	the	Republicans	had	adopted	the	anti-immigrant	rhetoric.	The	discrimination	began	to	extend	to	several	other	groups.		In	1924	the	U.S.	government	imposed	a	policy	that	would	constrain	immigration	through	a	quota	system	and	complete	ban	of	Asian	immigration.	The	Act	set	a	two	percent	national	origins	quota	based	on	the	1890	U.S.	census	data	and	included	a	provision	that	excluded	entry	for	any	alien	based	on	race	or	nationality.	Driven	by	the	fear	that	immigrants	would	not	assimilate,	politicians	imposed	these	discriminatory	laws.	The	majority	of	the	immigrants	targeted	through	the	quota	were	those	who	practiced	a	religion	other	than	Protestant	Christianity,	such	as	the	Jews,	the	Chinese,	and	the	Irish	Catholic.	Religious	discrimination	was	brought	to	the	forefront	in	the	immigration	policies	of	the	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century,	and	was	not	corrected	until	it	was	challenged	in	the	courts	and	outlawed	by	the	1965	Immigration	and	Nationality	Act.63		
2.3			U.S.	Religious	Jurisprudence:	Supreme	Court	Cases			 During	the	latter	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	there	arose	a	tension	between	official	legal	principles	and	popular	and	political	manifestations	of	bigotry	culminating	in	an	effort	to	have	popular	impulse	embodied	in	law.	Simply	put,	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion	did	not	have	the	full	weight	of	the	American	people	behind	it.	In	addition	the	Bill	of	Rights	did	not	yet	apply	to	state	law,	and	as	a	result	several	religious	minorities	lost	cases	in	the	Courts.		
																																																								63	The	1965	Immigration	and	Nationality	Act	barred	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	national	origin	and	abolished	the	1924	national	origins	quota.	(source:	"US	immigration	legislation	online."	U.S.	Immigration	
Legislation:	1965	Immigration	and	Nationality	Act	(Hart-Cellar	Act).	The	University	of	Washington-Bothell	Library,	n.d.	Web.	3	Apr.	2017.)	
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	 The	Mormons	were	one	such	group.		The	Mormons	faced	disapproval	of	because	their	values	were	in	direct	opposition	to	those	of	the	founding	nation.	In	1862	the	Morrill	Act	made	the	Mormon	practice	of	plural	marriage	illegal.	This	act	would	provide	the	basis	to	convict	Reynolds	in	1878.	In	Reynolds	v.	US,	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	the	free	exercise	clause	did	not	guarantee	a	right	to	partake	in	an	illegal	religious	practice.	64		In	sum,	the	court	ruled	that	religious	duty	is	not	a	sufficient	criminal	defense.	In	the	case,	Reynolds,	a	Mormon	man,	was	charged	with	violating	the	anti-bigamy	act.	In	this	landmark	decision	the	Court	distinguished	between	belief	and	practice,	holding	that	Reynolds	had	the	right	to	believe	what	he	wanted,	but	he	could	not	practice	as	he	pleased	if	that	practice	violated	a	criminal	law	created	to	protect	the	public	good.		The	Supreme	Court	established	that	the	federal	government	could	in	some	circumstances	restrict	the	religious	liberty	of	the	people.	The	Mormons	came	under	attack	because	the	country	felt	their	values	were	hostile	to	the	nation,	just	as	the	Muslims	have	today.	Though	the	prohibition	of	plural	marriage	was	a	fairly	minor	limit	on	civil	liberties,	it	foreshadowed	the	future.	This	was	the	first	of	many	decisions	that	gave	the	state	greater	control	and	imposed	limits	on	the	civil	liberties	of	the	people.		 Another	indication	of	the	new	direction	of	U.S.	jurisprudence	was	the	1875	Anti-Catholic	Blaine	Amendment.	Though	the	amendment	was	short	a	few	votes,	it	underscored	that	the	majority	of	Congress	was	in	favor	of	stricter	separation	of	Church	and	State.	The	Amendment,	which	targeted	Catholic	parochial	schools,	stated	that	no	federal	funds	would	be	allocated	to	fund	religious	schools	and	that	no	state	could	establish	a	state	religion.65	The	courts	continued	to	rule	in	favor	of	states	often	citing	public	safety	as	a	basis	for	their																																																									64	Kulchycki,	Scott,	and	Roger	Wang.	"Religion	in	United	States	Domestic	Policy."	Stanford.	2003.	Web.	14	Jan.	2017.	65	"What	Is	a	Blaine	Amendment?"	Findlaw.	Find	Law	LLCN.p.,	n.d.	Web.	19	Jan.	2017.	
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decision.	One	such	example	was	Jacobson	v.	Massachusetts	(1905).	In	Jacobson,	the	Court	allowed	the	state	to	enforce	the	requirement	of	the	small	pox	vaccine	despite	claims	that	the	vaccine	violated	some	people’s	religious	beliefs.66		In	Bradford	v.	Roberts	(1899)	the	District	of	Colombia	entered	into	a	contract	with	a	hospital	run	by	Catholic	nuns.67	The	contract	was	upheld	because	the	hospital	had	no	religious	purpose	and	served	to	provide	all	people	in	the	community	with	medical	care.	The	common	theme	in	these	cases	was	deference	to	the	state.	Congress	continued	to	enact	laws	that	discriminated	on	the	basis	of	religion	and	the	courts	deferred	to	the	states,	evading	the	promises	of	the	First	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.			 	However	there	did	begin	a	movement	to	reconcile	the	two	facets	of	freedom	of	religion.	In	Jacobson	the	argument	made	by	the	plaintiff	was	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	religion,	in	Bradford,	preference	of	one	religion	to	another.	To	reconcile	these	principles	the	courts	began	evaluating	a	policy	of	strict	separation.	The	1946	Everson	v.	Board	of	
Education	case	coined	the	term	“strict	separationist”	to	describe	a	favoring	of	non-establishment	of	religion.	68	Critics	of	the	term	charge	that	“a	separationist	perspective	imposes	a	regime	of	secularism,	one	that	is	not	neutral	toward	religious	matters	but	that	privatizes	and	marginalizes	religion.”69	The	majority	in	Everson	disagreed.	In	Everson	the	court	applied	the	Establishment	Clause	to	state	law	through	the	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.	By	narrowly	applying	the	law,	the	court	found	that	the	state’s	
																																																								66	Kulchycki,	Scott,	and	Roger	Wang.	"Religion	in	United	States	Domestic	Policy."	Stanford,	2003.	Web.	14	Jan.	2017.	67	Kulchycki,	Scott,	and	Roger	Wang.	"Religion	in	United	States	Domestic	Policy."	Stanford,	2003.	Web.	14	Jan.	2017.	68	Kulchycki,	Scott,	and	Roger	Wang.	"	Religion	in	United	States	Domestic	Policy."	Stanford	University,	2003.	Web.	14	Jan.	2017.	69	Green,	Steven	K.	"The	Separation	of	Church	and	State	in	the	United	States."	Oxford	Research	Encyclopedia	of	
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funding	of	Catholic	school	busses	did	not	violate	the	First	Amendment.	The	critics	of	strict	separation	won,	and	so	the	urgency	for	an	explicit	policy	of	strict	separation	diminished.		 Strict	separation	sought	to	establish	secularism.	But	secularism	did	not	and	has	not	prevailed	in	our	nation.	One	reason	for	this	was	the	Cold	War.	In	the	war	against	the	communist	soviets,	the	American	people	banned	together	regardless	of	individual	religion	to	fight	atheistic	communism.		Diane	Kirby	stated	that	the	Cold	War	was	“a	global	conflict	between	the	god-fearing	and	the	godless.”70	The	threat	to	American	national	security	was	no	longer	domestic,	and	consequently	the	focus	shifted	from	immigrants	and	internal	religious	minorities	to	foreign	threats.	The	need	to	destroy	the	enemy	and	all	that	it	stood	for	enhanced	religious	pluralism	and	multiculturalism	within	the	United	States.			 The	move	towards	religious	tolerance	was	further	emphasized	by	the	response	to	the	holocaust.	As	a	reaction	to	the	Nazi	genocide	and	the	Americans’	guilt	for	intervening	too	late,	there	began	a	decline	in	anti-Semitism	in	the	1940’s.	This	combined	with	invocations	of	“Judeo-Christian”	partnership	minimized	the	differences	between	the	two	religions	and	helped	to	include	Judaism	as	part	of	the	common	faith	of	Americans.71		In	1963	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	in	favor	a	Jewish	woman	who	had	argued	that	her	place	of	work	had	violated	the	First	Amendment	by	denying	her	unemployment	benefits	for	refusing	to	work	on	the	Sabbath.	In	this	case,	Sherbert	v.	Verner	the	court	ruled	for	the	individual	and	for	religious	liberty.72	This	period	of	religious	pluralism	cultivated	a	new	American	spirit	more	inclusive	of	religion,	at	least	on	the	surface.		
																																																								70	Kirby,	Dianne.	Religion	and	the	Cold	War.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2003.	Print.	(1).	71	“Religion	-	The	cold	war	and	the	fifth	great	awakening”	Encyclopedia	of	the	New	America.	Web	6	Feb.	2017.	72	Kulchycki,	Scott,	and	Roger	Wang.	"	Religion	in	United	States	Domestic	Policy."	Stanford	University,	2003.	Web.	14	Jan.	2017.	
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	 The	inclusive	spirit	did	not	last	long.	The	1980’s	and	1990’s	saw	an	eruption	of	conflict	between	the	U.S.	and	Islam	marked	by	U.S.	involvement	in	the	Iran-Iraq	war,	the	rise	of	the	Nation	of	Islam	and	acts	of	terror	committed	by	Muslim	radicals.	These	events	led	the	U.S.	to	be	cautious	of	Islam	and	those	who	identified	as	Muslim.	This	period	from	1980	to	2010	will	be	explored	at	length	in	chapter	four	and	will	analyze	how	the	U.S.	dealt	with	the	threat	of	Islam	and	the	need	to	protect	the	right	to	religious	freedom.		 	The	United	States	and	France,	as	detailed	in	the	first	two	chapters,	place	different	emphasis	on	freedom	of	religion	and	religious	expression.	The	paradox	being	while	both	countries	have	established	freedom	of	religion	as	a	founding	principle,	the	outcome	has	been	dissimilar	at	every	turn.	The	United	States	did	not	encounter	the	same	difficulty	as	the	French	did	of	clashing	with	one	already	established	religious	institution,	instead	religious	groups	within	the	country	clashed,	exacerbated	by	high	rates	of	immigration.		France	on	the	other	hand	went	through	an	anti-clerical	revolution	and,	struggling	to	emancipate	government	and	religion,	developed	a	regime	of	secularism.	What	both	countries	do	share,	though,	is	this	threat	to	their	national	identity	and	public	order	that	causes	them	to	tighten	laws	against	religious	freedom.	The	French	manifestation	of	this	fear	is	more	pronounced	today	though	it	has	only	been	realized	in	the	policy	of	the	last	fifty	years,	whereas	anti-religious	policy	has	pervaded	American	society	since	its	founding,	but	was	thought	to	have	been	reconciled	after	the	issues	with	the	Catholics.			 The	next	chapter	will	explore	the	French	concept	of	laïcité	and	how	it	has	been	used	to	manipulate	French	policy	and	limit	religious	practices	that	the	non-Muslim	French	identify	as	a	threat.		
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CHAPTER	3:	FREEDOM	OF	RELGION	V.	LAICITÉ	IN	MODERN	DAY	FRANCE				 As	we	have	now	seen,	the	French	and	the	Americans	view	freedom	of	religion	in	different	if	not	opposing	ways.	While	the	French	set	out	to	create	a	secular	nation,	America	was	in	the	process	of	creating	a	multi-religious	one.	This	chapter	will	attempt	to	reconcile	laws	enacted	and	actions	taken	by	the	French	government	that	appear	to	privilege	Christianity	over	Islam,	and	target	the	religious	freedom	of	the	growing	Muslim	population.73		
3.1			The	Start	of	Unfair	Application	of	Laïcité		 There	is	a	widespread	belief,	on	the	left,	among	Muslims	and	among	advocates	of	civil	liberties	that	the	laws	of	laïcité	have	been	unfairly	applied	to	the	Muslim	population.	This	notion	is	not	unsupported.	Several	events	in	recent	history	provide	evidence	of	unfair	application.	In	1996	Pope	John	Paul	II	visited	the	city	of	Tours	to	commemorate	the	baptism	of	the	founder	of	France,	the	Frankish	King	Clovis.74	The	state	financed	his	trip	despite	the	direct	order	of	the	1905	law	that	the	government	shall	not	fund	religious	events.	President	Chirac	justified	the	action	arguing	that	the	Pope	was	the	leader	of	the	Vatican	state	and	the	spiritual	leader	of	the	French	people.		The	government’s	nonchalance	in	making	exemptions	for	Catholic	leaders	contradicts	the	principle	of	laïcité,	and	is	one	of	many	government	actions	that	showed	deference	to	Christian	religions.				 The	frenzied	debate	over	Islam	and	religious	symbols	began	around	1990.			Between	1950	and	1989	many	of	France’s	colonies	gained	independence,	which	drove	a	flow	of	Muslim	immigration	to	France.	By	1989,	the	Muslim	population	of	France	had																																																									73	Refer	to	the	Appendix	(pg	102)	for	data	on	the	Muslim	population	of	France.	74	Bohlen,	Celestine.	"Pope	Is	Showing	Stamina	on	His	French	Visit."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times	Company,	22	Sept.	1996.	Web.	06	Mar.	2017.	
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grown	considerably,	producing	stronger	anti-Muslim	sentiments.	In	1950	there	was	a	Muslim	population	of	230,000	and	by	1980	the	number	had	grown	to	2.5	million.75	In	addition	to	the	significant	growth,	Muslims	had	settled	disproportionately	around	Paris	making	their	presence	far	more	apparent	and	stimulating	a	debate	about	their	place	in	French	society.	76			 It	was	during	this	time	that	perhaps	the	best-known	example	to	date	of	unfair	application	of	the	principles	of	laïcité	occurred.	In	what	became	known	as	L’Affaire	du	
foulard,	also	often	referred	to	as	the	1989	headscarf	case,	the	principal	of	a	middle	school	in	Creil,	a	suburb	of	Paris,	expelled	three	teenage	girls	for	refusing	to	take	off	their	headscarves.	Though	he	justified	the	action	by	stating	the	expulsion	was	done	“in	the	name	of	respect	for	laïcité,”	77		his	comments	after	the	fact	are	far	more	telling	of	his	motivations.	The	principal	said,	“the	veils	are	a	strategy	to	Islamify	the	young	Arabs	of	Creil.”78	His	remarks	articulated	the	strong	Islamophobia	beginning	to	spread	across	France.	Left-wing	opponents	pointed	out	“it	is	curious	indeed	to	expel	girls	from	public	schools	in	the	name	of	“integrating”	them	more	fully	into	French	society,”79	highlighting	the	duplicity	of	the	expulsion.			 The	case	garnered	national	media	attention	and	split	the	country	between	the	supporters	of	“open	laïcité”	and	the	fierce	guardians	of	“French”	identity.	Supporters	of	the	expulsion	argued	that	the	veils	violated	the	rules	of	secularism	and	imposed	religious	ideas	
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on	the	students	at	the	school.	They	also	made	the	argument	that	from	a	feminist	perceptive	the	ban	was	beneficial	policy	that	would	protect	girls	from	being	forced	to	wear	the	veils	by	the	patriarchal	religion	of	Islam.	This	argument	was	invalidated	when	the	father	of	two	expelled	sisters	assured	the	press	that	he	did	not	require	the	girls	to	be	veiled,	and	when	the	girls	themselves	reiterated	that	they	had	made	the	decision	to	be	veiled	on	their	own.			 Then,	after	weeks	of	media	frenzy,	a	government	official	finally	spoke	up.	Lionel	Jospin,	then	Minister	of	Education,	stated	that	while	students	must	“respect	laïcité	by	not	wearing	ostentatious	religious	symbols,”	education	comes	first,	and		“	schools	exist	to	welcome	students	not	to	exclude	them.”80	His	comments	generated	a	firestorm	of	criticism	from	his	own	party,	the	right,	and	the	media,	all	of	which	accused	him	of	favoring	the	Muslim	community.	Throughout	the	affaire	President	Mitterrand	remained	silent,	passing	the	decision	on	to	the	Conseil	d’État,	the	highest	administrative	jurisdiction	in	France	that	advises	and	judges	the	executive.	Three	months	later,	on	November	27,	the	Conseil	d’État	presented	its	opinion:	Students	who	wear	religious	symbols	are	not	automatically	violating	the	principle	of	laïcité,	and	therefore	the	directors	of	schools	can	make	decisions	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	The	ruling	seemed	to	favor	the	girls,	but	because	the	case	left	the	ultimate	interpretation	and	implementation	to	principals	and	local	schools	boards,	it	left	room	for	individual	prejudice.	The	most	important	outcome	of	the	case	was	that	the	Court	had	determined	the	policy	itself	was	valid.	Its	constitutionality	would	depend	on	the	situation.			 In	the	years	after	the	decision,	the	Conseil	Constitutionel	(Supreme	Court)	heard	many	similar	cases,	often	ruling	in	favor	of	students’	right	to	wear	the	religious	garb.	In	fact,	between	1992	and	1999	the	court	upheld	students’	rights	to	wear	headscarves	in	84	
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percent	of	cases.81	The	cases	were	about	more	than	religious	rights,	they	brought	four	main	issues	to	the	forefront:	“the	role	of	secularism	in	the	public	school	system;	women’s	rights;	the	spectre	of	a	fundamentalist,	aggressive	Islam	proselytising	France;	and	the	integration	of	North	Africans	and	other	non-European	immigrants.”82	Danielle	Mitterrand,	wife	of	President	Mitterrand,	reprimanded	the	country	for	being	unwilling	to	accept	religions	other	than	Christianity	200	years	after	the	Revolution.83	The	political	climate	of	France	did	play	a	significant	role	in	the	French	reluctance	to	accept	the	Muslim	immigrant	community.	Several	events	caused	the	French	people	to	be	wary	of	Muslims.	A	wave	of	terrorist	bombings	hit	Paris	in	September	of	1986;	three	French	hostages	were	taken	in	Beirut,	Lebanon	in	1986,	and	relations	with	Iran	were	far	from	amiable.84	The	headscarf	came	to	be	a	symbol	of	Islamic	danger	to	the	French	Republic.	These	tensions	though	temporarily	resolved	with	the	judgment	of	the	Conseil	d’État,	were	far	from	laid	to	rest.		
	
3.2			The	2004	Act	on	Religious	Symbols	a.k.a.	The	Headscarf	Ban	
								The	debate	on	headscarves	and	Islam	has	remained	a	salient	topic	in	French	politics,	complicated	by	a	growing	awareness	of	the	Muslim	population.	In	the	name	of	laïcité	and	neutrality	France	does	not	gather	religious	data	on	its	population.	However	many	estimates	have	been	made	that	7	to	8	percent	of	the	French	population	is	Muslim,	making	France	home	to	the	largest	Muslim	population	in	Europe.85	The	size	of	the	Muslim	population	has	not	gone	unnoticed;	in	1999	a	survey	found	that	51	percent	of	the	French	population	felt	
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there	were	too	many	Arabs	in	the	country.	This	sentiment	not	only	continued	into	2003,	but	grew	and	re-emerged	more	openly	towards	Islam,	with	73	percent	supporting	the	headscarf	ban.86	In	response	to	rising	anti-Muslim	sentiment,	President	Chirac	appointed	the	Stasi	Commission	to	investigate	how	to	adapt	laïcité	to	the	modern	and	drastically	different	French	nation,	and	address	best	practices	concerning	the	headscarf	in	schools.			 In	2003	the	Stasi	Commission	recommended	a	headscarf	ban	in	schools;	this	was	passed	by	parliament	in	2004	by	a	vote	of	593-36	with	31	abstentions.	87		The	law	prohibits	the	wearing	of	“ostentatious”	religious	symbols	in	schools	and	if	violated	leaves	disciplinary	decisions	up	to	local	school	boards.	The	vagueness	of	the	term	“ostentatious”	was	not	accidental.	The	French	Parliament	knew	that	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	would	rule	that	a	complete	ban	on	religious	symbols	was	restrictive	to	religious	freedom.	The	French	Parliament	therefore	made	a	calculated	decision	when	choosing	the	language	(particularly	the	word	“ostentatious”)	of	the	ban	that	would	enable	them	to	target	wearers	of	the	Islamic	veil.			 Another	problem,	among	many,	was	the	ease	with	which	Parliament	was	able	to	enact	a	law	that	on	its	face	appeared	discriminatory.	The	problem	was	institutional.	Prior	to	2008	the	only	parties	able	to	request	a	constitutional	review	of	a	law	were	high-ranking	party	members	such	as	the	president	of	the	republic,	the	prime	minister,	the	president	of	the	national	assembly	or	the	one	of	the	sixty	senators.	The	people	had	no	outlet	to	protest	nor	to	call	into	question	what	they	felt	was	unjust	legislation,	and	no	government	official	felt	inclined	to	refer	the	Act	of	2004	to	the	Conseil	d’État	to	have	its	constitutionality	determined.	The	duplicity	is	unsurprising	considering	that	there	was	not	a	single	Muslim																																																									86	Bell,	David	A.	"Veil	of	Tears:	A	Review	of	"Why	the	French	Don't	Like	Headscarves:	Islam,	the	State	and	Public	Space"."		87	Britton	D.	Davis,	124.	
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government	official	in	2004,	and	that	the	majority	of	parliament	consisted	of	white	Christian	males.88	The	government	seems	to	forget	that	laïcité	was	developed	to	protect	the	state	from	religious	conflict,	yet	the	ban	has	instead	entrenched	the	division	between	the	Muslims	and	the	“French.”		 The	headscarf	affair	was	for	many	French	Muslims	a	confirmation	of	their	status	as	outsiders,	“pushing	them	towards	a	more	radical	Islam	that	is	less	accommodating	with	life	in	the	late	twentieth	century.”89	After	the	law	passed	many	Muslim	girls	began	wearing	black	headscarves	in	place	of	the	more	common	colorful	scarves,	and	journalists	facetiously	asked	whether	schools	would	soon	ban	silk	scarves	from	Hermès.			 A	less	well-known	outcome	of	the	law	was	the	effect	it	had	on	turban	wearing	Sikh	boys	and	the	government’s	response.	The	small	Sikh	minority	of	France	had	never	been	viewed	as	a	threat	to	laïcité	and	as	a	result	the	government	did	not	consider	implications	of	the	law	on	non-threatening	Sikhs.	When	the	Ministry	of	Education	eventually	realized	that	the	wearing	of	Sikh	turbans	also	violated	the	law,	it	quietly	offered	to	pay	full	tuition	for	the	Sikhs	at	private	schools.	The	Ministry	of	Education’s	devious	actions	to	aid	only	the	Sikhs	made	the	ultimate	purpose	of	the	ban	blatantly	obvious:	the	ban	was	created	to	assuage	the	public	and	send	the	symbolic	message	that	France	would	fight	against	the	dangers	of	Islam.			 In	conclusion,	the	headscarves	for	many	of	the	non-Muslim	French	represent	the	general	refusal	of	Muslim	immigrants	to	integrate	into	society,	as	well	as	their	participation	in	international	terrorism,	urban	violence,	and	the	oppression	of	women.	Ultimately,	the	French	public	saw	the	ban	as	a	protection	against	the	growing	influence	of	Islam.																																																									88	"Muslims	in	European	Politics."	EuroIslam	News	and	Analysis	on	Islam	in	Europe	and	North	America.	N.p.,	n.d.	Web.	03	Mar.	2017.	89	Malik,	Iftikhar	Haider.	“Islam	and	Modernity:	Muslims	in	Europe	and	the	United	States.”	London:	Pluto	Press,	2004.	
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Unfortunately,	the	government	failed	to	acknowledge	the	casualties	of	the	ban.	The	majority	of	the	girls	affected	were	French	born	and	relatively	non-religious.	One	example	is	Schérazade,	a	young	Muslim	girl	who	did	not	regularly	wear	the	veil,	but	decided	to	risk	expulsion	and	don	the	veil	her	senior	year	of	high	school.	For	her	this	was	an	act	of	protest	against	the	restrictive,	discriminatory,	and	racist	French	government	who	was	limiting	her	right	to	religious	freedom.	This	is	one	girl	but	the	larger	picture	paints	the	same	story.	The	ban	has	caused	over	60,000	students	to	drop	out	of	public	schools	each	year.90	It	tells	Muslim	girls	who	have	grown	up	in	France	and	consider	themselves	French	that	their	religion	conflicts	with	their	ability	to	ever	be	fully	French.	It	tells	them	French	society	rejects	them.	And	yet,	the	government	has	attempted	to	rationalize	the	ban	in	the	name	of	neutrality	and	respect	for	all	religions.	
3.3			Rationalizing	the	Ban		
	 Despite	worldwide	agreement	that	the	headscarf	ban	unjustly	affects	Muslims,	the	French	government	has	tried	to	argue	that	its	implementation	was	done	in	the	name	of	respect	for	all	religions.	Nicolas	Sarkozy,	French	president	from	2007	to	2012,	addressed	the	dispute	on	laïcité	in	a	2009	speech,	asserting	that,	“	the	problem	of	the	burka	is	not	religious	problem,	it’s	a	problem	of	liberty.	It	is	not	a	religious	symbol,	it’s	a	symbol	of	enslavement,	it’s	a	symbol	of	humiliation.”	He	then	continued,	“I	want	to	say	solemnly,	it	will	not	be	welcome	on	French	soil.”91		Sarkozy	believes	that	a	laïc	ban	is	the	solution,	claiming	that	laïcité	“is	the	respect	of	all	[religious]	opinions	and	all	beliefs.”92	His	comments	when	analyzed	in	conjunction	are	almost	comical.	Sarkozy’s	statements	are																																																									90	Malik,	Iftikhar	Haider.	“Islam	and	Modernity:	Muslims	in	Europe	and	the	United	States.”	91	“Une	Laïcité	Sans	Voile.”	Esprit	Éditorial	no.	295.	Esprit	Presse,	Juin	2003.	Web.	27	Apr.	2017.			92	“Une	Laïcité	Sans	Voile.”	Esprit	Éditorial	no.	295.	Esprit	Presse,	Juin	2003.	Web.	27	Apr.	2017.			
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contradictory:	the	ban	does	not	target	one	religion	but	also	the	burka	is	not	welcome	on	French	soil.	Though	the	burka,	the	full	body	veil	with	a	mesh	cover	for	the	eyes	and	the	niqab	the	full-face	veil	which	leaves	a	slit	for	the	eyes,	do	for	much	of	the	world	symbolize	the	oppression	of	women,	it	is	hard	to	understand	how	a	ban	of	it	is	not	religious	discrimination.	Nevertheless,	the	majority	of	the	French	agreed	with	Sarkozy’s	statements,	for	one	of	two	reasons.	A	teacher	in	a	Muslim	banlieue	of	Paris	discussed	the	arguments	made	in	the	laws	that	eliminated	religious	teaching	in	schools	in	1881	with	her	class.	The	class	found	the	same	arguments	were	made	regarding	the	2004	debate	on	the	veil.	She	said	her	students	were	moved	when	they	realized	it	“wasn’t	just	something	against	Islam,	that	it	comes	out	of	a	tradition.”93	Many	French	people	believe	that	the	headscarf	ban	is	necessary	to	promote	laïcité	and	equality.	The	other	group	agrees	with	Sarkozy	for	a	less	noble	reason:	because	they	see	headscarves	as	being	just	a	step	removed	from	suicide	bombs,	especially	after	September	11	and	the	bombings	in	Madrid	and	London.	The	danger	of	violent	radical	Islam	may	exist,	but	it	is	not	clear	how	the	headscarf	ban	in	schools	and	the	limit	on	religious	liberty	will	have	any	effect	in	reducing	any	legitimate	threat.	Nonetheless,	the	French	continued	to	expand	the	ban,	in	2011	banning	full-face	veils	in	public	spaces	placing	a	restriction	on	attire	that	many	Muslims	consider	a	religious	obligation.		
3.4			S.A.S.	V.	FRANCE		 The	headscarf	cases	came	to	epitomize	the	national	debate	on	immigration,	security	and	religious	identity.	As	the	Muslim	population	grew,	especially	around	the	country’s	capital	where	the	percent	of	Muslims	had	reached	fifteen	compared	to	the	national	average	of	seven	percent,	the	French	felt	increasingly	threatened.	The	perceived	change	caused	by	
																																																								93	Packer,	George.	"The	Other	Paris."	The	New	Yorker.	The	New	Yorker,	31	Aug.	2015.	Web.	28	Mar.	2017.	
	 44	
the	new	and	growing	Muslim	population	caused	the	French	to	feel	as	though	they	were	losing	a	part	of	their	national	identity	and	that	their	national	security	was	at	risk.94		President	Sarkozy’s	2009	remarks	reflected	this	fear	and	sparked	Parliament	to	dive	deeper	into	the	burka	dilemma.			 In	2010,	a	parliamentary	commission	comprised	of	thirty-two	members	reached	the	conclusion	that	the	burka	was	incompatible	with	secularism,	and	asked	parliament	to	adopt	a	resolution	that	would	require	women	to	keep	their	faces	uncovered	when	receiving	public	services.	Within	a	year	parliament	passed	a	law	that	banned	the	covering	of	the	face	(outlawing	the	wearing	of	the	niqab	and	burka)	in	all	public	places,	with	support	from	the	French	government	and	many	mainstream	Muslim	organizations.	France	was	the	first	European	country	to	outlaw	full-face	veils.	One	group	that	stood	in	strong	opposition	to	the	law	was	French	police.	Police	unions	did	not	support	the	ban	arguing	it	would	be	very	difficult	to	enforce	and	could	create	riots.95		Other	critics	sought	to	point	out	the	law’s	unproductiveness.	When	the	law	went	into	effect	it	was	estimated	there	were	about	five	million	Muslims	in	France	and	that	about	2,000	wore	the	full-face	veil.	Oliver	Roy,	an	expert	on	political	Islam,	questioned,	“Why	target	something	which	in	fact	is	an	exception	and	only	concerns	hundreds	of	women	-	most	of	them	converts	in	France?	It's	not	a	movement	of	support	for	the	burka,	but	a	feeling	of	discrimination."96	The	discriminatory	aspect	is	hard	to	ignore.	Furthermore,	the	penalties	of	the	law	seek	to	punish	the	men	who	the	French	Government	says	force	women	to	be	veiled.		In	general	terms	the	law	states	that	a	person	
																																																								94	Taylor,	Adam.	"Map:	France’s	growing	Muslim	population."	The	Washington	Post.	WP	Company,	09	Jan.	2015.	Web.	14	Apr.	2017.	95	Erlanger,	Steven.	"France	Enforces	Ban	on	Full-Face	Veils	in	Public."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times	Company,	11	Apr.	2011.	Web.	05	Feb.	2017.	96	Cigainero,	Jake.	"Five	Years	into	Ban,	Burqa	Divide	Widens	in	France."	DW.com.	Deutsche	Welle,	4	Oct.	2016.	Web.	12	Apr.	2017.	
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may	not	wear	a	veil	in	public	space,	and	that	if	worn	she	may	be	asked	to	remove	it.	If	the	wearer	of	the	veil	does	not	comply	she	will	be	fined	approximately	130	euros	or	jailed,	and	even	if	she	complies	and	removes	the	veil	she	will	be	subject	to	a	public	hearing.	For	anyone	who	forces	another	person	to	wear	a	veil	the	penalty	is	far	harsher,	resulting	in	one	year	of	jail	time	and	a	30,000	euro	fine.97	The	difference	in	the	severity	of	punishment	between	men	and	women	who	violate	the	law	reflects	the	opinion	of	the	French	policymakers	who	believe	they	are	saving	Muslim	women	from	oppression.	However,	not	everyone	agreed	with	this	view	or	the	constitutionality	of	the	law,	which	led	to	the	famous	2011	S.A.S.	v.	France	case.		 The	law	outlawing	full-face	coverings	was	quickly	called	into	question	for	violating	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion	and	free	expression.	Muslims	and	supporters	of	religious	freedom	resisted	the	policy.	The	same	day	the	law	went	into	force	in	April	of	2011,	a	24-	year-old	devout	Muslim	French	woman	filed	an	application	with	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECtHR)	declaring	that	the	law	was	a	violation	of	her	rights.		The	woman	who	allowed	the	court	to	disclose	only	her	initials	is	known	as	S.A.S..	In	her	application	S.A.S.	emphasized	that	free	from	pressure	she	had	chosen	to	wear	the	veil	and	that	she	did	not	wear	the	veil	at	all	times,	only	when	she	felt	it	was	necessary	to	express	her	religion	and	her	personal	and	cultural	faith,	for	example	during	Ramadan.		Plainly	put,	the	ban	on	veils	in	public	places	constrains	the	freedom	of	women	who	wear	veils	or	who	may	want	to	wear	veils	in	the	future.	With	those	details	in	mind	S.A.S.	argued	that	the	law	violated:	article	9	(freedom	of	religion),	article	10	(freedom	of	expression),	article	8	(privacy),	article	
																																																								97	Guepratte,	Étienne.	"La	République	Se	Vit	à	Visage	Découvert."	La	République	Se	Vit	Ã	Visage	Découvert.	Le	Service	D’information	Du	Gouvernement.	Web.	02	Feb.	2016.	
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14	(freedom	from	discrimination),	article	3	(non-subjection	to	degrading	treatment)	and	article	11	(freedom	of	assembly)	of	the	European	Declaration	of	Human	Rights.			 The	court	found	several	of	the	claims	inadmissible	and	decided	to	investigate	solely	on	the	basis	of	the	right	to	freedom	of	religion	and	the	right	to	privacy.		The	law	was	upheld	with	fifteen	of	seventeen	judges	finding	the	burka	ban	necessary	in	a	democratic	society	to	protect	the	rights	and	freedom	of	others.	The	French	attribute	great	importance	to	the	deciding	principle	of	“vivre	ensemble”	(living	together).	This	argument	of	“living	together”	is	inherently	biased.	It	favors	assimilation	in	the	tug	of	war	between	assimilation	and	multiculturalism.	The	two	dissenting	judges	in	the	case	found	the	concept	of	“living	together”	problematic,	stating	that	the	ban	makes	a	“mockery	of	freedom	of	expression…	and	the	right	to	identity	or	personality.”98	Their	opinions	echo	those	of	advocates	of	civil	liberties	who	agree	that	the	ban	leads	France	and	the	ECtHR	down	a	slippery	slope	where	the	majority	has	the	ability	to	reject	forms	of	expression	it	does	not	identify	with.		The	court	itself	said	there	was	a	“resulting	risk	of	abuse.”99		The	dangers	seem	difficult	to	reconcile,	but	as	Josh	A.	Bowen	explains,	“The	Republic	is	based	not	on	a	shared	faith,	but	on	a	faith	in	the	possibilities	of	sharing	a	life	together,	despite	vast	differences	in	appearance,	history,	and	religious	ideas.”100	Even	if	this	is	true,	there	comes	a	point	when	the	French	must	evaluate	if	they	have	tipped	the	balance	between	the	values	of	living	together	and	those	of	a	democratic	society	such	as	pluralism,	individualism	and	
																																																								98	Marshall,	J.	"S.A.S.	v	France:	Burqa	Bans	and	the	Control	or	Empowerment	of	Identities."	Human	Rights	Law	
Review	15.2	(2015):	378.	Print.	99	Marshall,	J,	378.	100		Bowen,	John	Richard.	Why	the	French	Don't	like	Headscarves:	Islam,	the	State,	and	Public	Space.	Princeton:	Princeton	UP,	2007.	Print.			
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multiculturalism.	The	S.A.S.	decision	tipped	the	scale	again	in	the	wrong	direction	threatening	the	religious	liberties	of	the	French	people,	primarily	those	of	Muslims.		 The	decision	also	highlighted	the	differences	between	the	French	and	U.S.	legal	frameworks.	In	S.A.S.	v.	France	the	court	said	it	was	unable	to	find	a	European	consensus	as	to	whether	there	should	be	a	blanket	ban	of	the	full-face	veil	in	France.	This	was	despite	the	fact	that	only	two	out	of	47	countries	have	chosen	to	impose	a	ban,	suggesting	there	is	in	fact	consensus.	This	led	the	court	to	adopt	a	wide	margin	of	appreciation	to	French	authorities	and	therefore	find	a	non-violation	of	Article	9	[right	to	religious	freedom].	When	determining	if	the	ban	violated	Article	9’s,	the	ECtHR	considered	four	questions:		1)	Was	there	a	limitation	of	the	freedom	to	manifest	religion?	2)	Was	the	limitation	prescribed	by	law?	3)	Was	it	necessary	in	a	democratic	society	to	protect	the	public?	4)	Was	the	limit	proportional	to	the	goal?		These	questions	favor	the	government	and	put	an	emphasis	on	the	burden	to	society.	In	the	U.S.	claims	of	violation	of	religious	freedom	are	weighted	against	three	questions:		1)	Is	there	a	substantial	burden	imposed	on	the	plaintiff?	2)	Was	the	burden	in	the	government’s	compelling	interest?		3)	Was	the	burden	the	least	restrictive	means?101		These	three	questions,	though	similar	to	the	French	standard,	project	a	stricter	view	of	a	reasonable	burden	and	favor	the	individual	making	the	claim.	The	difference	in	legal	framework	between	the	U.S.	and	the	ECtHR,	which	defers	to	policy	of	the	country	against	
																																																								101	Cismas,	Iona	and	Cammarano,	Stacy.	“Whose	Right	and	Who’s	Right?	The	U.S.	Supreme	Court	v.	The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	on	Corporate	Exercise	of	Religion.”	The	Boston	University	International	Law	
Journal.	Vol.	34,	No.	1.	2016.	Print.	
	 48	
who	a	claim	is	made,	explains	why	France	has	passed	a	law	that	would	by	U.S.	standards	be	considered	a	form	of	religious	discrimination.					 Luckily	for	the	Muslim	population	and	for	the	more	open-minded	French	people,	the	reversal	of	the	2016	burkini	ban	marked	a	welcome	shift,	tipping	the	balance	in	favor	of	religious	rights	for	the	individual.	It	also	marked	the	newfound	policy	of	the	court	that	acknowledged	and	decided	that	anxieties	over	terrorism	should	not	motivate	policymaking.	Those	cases	will	be	examined	in	detail	in	chapter	5	to	provide	a	comparative	analysis.	The	next	chapter	will	examine	how	the	United	States	has	handled	discrepancies	of	the	right	to	religious	freedom	in	the	last	fifty	years.																	
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CHAPTER	4:	COMBATING	ISLAM	IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	AND	DISPUTES	OVER	THE	
RIGHT	TO	RELIGIOUS	FREEDOM			 In	France	the	challenge	of	balancing	Islam	and	religious	freedom	has	been	manifested	primarily	through	the	debate	on	legislation	outlawing	headscarves.	In	the	United	States	the	approach	to	regulating	Islam	and	displays	of	Islam	has	been	far	more	varied.	The	second	chapter	set	up	the	paradigm	of	religious	freedom	from	English	settlement	to	the	1980’s.	This	chapter	will	cover	the	period	in	the	U.S.	(1980	to	2009)	that	saw	a	rise	of	Islamophobia.	This	period	was	characterized	by	hostage	crises,	terrorist	bombings,	and	conflict	in	the	Middle	East,	which	resulted	in	the	demand	by	Americans	for	policies	that	restrict	civil	liberties	and	treat	the	Muslim	population	as	a	threat.	Next,	the	chapter	will	examine	the	period	from	2010	to	2015,	during	which	there	was	a	shift	in	the	American	political	regime	of	open	hostility	towards	Muslims	and	examine	the	ensuing	limits	on	religious	freedom.	Finally,	this	chapter	will	analyze	how	the	U.S.	has	dealt	with	the	challenge	of	maintaining	public	safety	or	national	security	while	balancing	the	right	to	religious	liberty.102		
4.1					Instilling	Fear:	Terror	and	Conflict	in	the	Middle	East				 An	American	in	1979	turns	on	the	radio	and	hears	about	the	anti-western	Islamic	revolution	in	Iran	and	the	capture	in	Iran	of	52	American	hostages.	The	violence	continues	into	1983	when	U.S.	embassy	in	Kuwait,	and	Marine	barracks	in	Beirut,	are	bombed,	all	of	these	acts	carried	out	by	Islamic	militant	groups.	Throughout	the	country	this	raised	anti-Islamic	sentiments	and	fear	of	Muslims	that	had	lain	dormant	for	years.103	Closer	to	home,	
																																																								102	Refer	to	the	Appendix	(pg	102)	for	data	on	the	Muslim	population	of	the	U.S.	103	Islamophobia	has	been	present	since	the	country’s	founding.	The	Ottoman	Wars	created	fear	of	Muslims	back	then.	Though	the	fear	has	lain	dormant,	feelings	of	islamophobia	have	remained	in	the	cultural	background.	So	when	the	Iranian	revolution	broke	out,	Americans,	who	knew	nothing	about	Iran	but	did	
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the	Nation	of	Islam	was	crumbling	as	result	of	its	reputation	as	a	violent	Black	Nationalist	organization.	Though	most	Muslims	do	not	consider	the	Nation	of	Islam	to	be	representative	of	true	Islam,	and	instead	consider	the	Nation’s	beliefs	contrary	to	those	of	Islam,	the	American	public	found	another	reason	to	disapprove	of	the	religion.		A	decade	later	in	1993	a	group	of	Islamic	extremists	attempted	to	bomb	the	World	Trade	Center.	These	events	stirred	anti-Muslim	sentiments.		
4.2			Effects	of	9/11:	An	attack	on	Civil	Liberties		 If	the	anti-Muslim	sentiment	of	the	1980’s	and	90’s	seemed	strong,	after	2001	it	grew	exponentially	in	public	opinion.	The	September	11,	2001,	terror	attacks	were	the	event	that	most	drastically	changed	the	course	for	Muslims	in	America.	The	bombings,	carried	out	by	extremists	in	the	name	of	Islam,	created	a	fierce	anti-Muslim	campaign	across	America.	This	campaign	of	anti-Muslim	sentiment,	unlike	after	2010,	was	not	evidenced	in	religious	policy	but	in	privacy	policy.	It	caused	many	Americans	throughout	the	nation	to	question,	hate	and	fear	Muslims.	One	measurable	manifestation	of	the	fear	was	the	1600	percent	increase	(28	to	481)	in	anti-Muslim	hate	crimes	following	the	September	11,	attacks	as	reported	by	the	FBI.104	Muslim	American	associations	denounced	the	attacks	and	tried	to	reassure	their	American	friends	and	neighbors	that	the	perpetrators	of	the	horrific	attack	were	not	true	Muslims	but	were	radical	extremists	who	had	perverted	their	religion.	They	flew	American	flags	as	a	sign	of	support	and	invited	America	to	learn	more	about	Islam.	Some	Muslims	and	Americans	took	the	opportunity	to	
																																																																																																																																																																																			know	about	the	violent	history	of	the	Muslims,	once	again	became	Islamophobic.	(Source:	Peter	Gottschalk-	Professor	of	Religion	at	Wesleyan	University.	Lecture	at	Trinity	Apr.	11	2017.)		104	"Data:	Hate	crimes	against	Muslims	increased	after	9/11."	Public	Radio	International.	PRI,	12	Sept.	2016.	Web.	07	Feb.	2017.	
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learn	and	write	about	Islam,	but	unfortunately	many	more	anti-Muslim	individuals	distorted	the	truth	and	spread	myths	and	bigotry	vilifying	all	Muslims.				 The	culmination	of	the	anxiety	brought	on	by	9/11	was	the	2001	Patriot	Act.	Passed	just	45	days	after	the	September	11th	attacks,	the	Patriot	Act	made	changes	to	surveillance	laws	allowing	the	government	to	spy	on	Americans,	listen	to	phone	calls,	monitor	email,	collect	bank	information,	and	track	internet	movement.	Its	passage	begged	an	important	policy	question:	were	Americans	willing	to	give	up	their	civil	liberties	in	the	name	of	national	security?	The	answer	was	yes,	64	percent	polled	approved	of	the	law.105	In	Washington,	politicians	agreed.	The	Patriot	Act	passed	by	a	vote	of	98	to	1	in	the	Senate	and	357	to	66	in	the	House.106	The	67	constitutional	defenders	had	lost	out.	Many	Americans	saw	this	legislation	as	an	appropriate	reaction	to	the	worst	terror	attack	to	happen	on	U.S.	soil.	Others	saw	this	as	a	dangerous	restriction	of	civil	liberties	that	would	allow	the	government	to	encroach	on	the	lives	of	millions	of	innocent	Americans.	One	purpose	of	the	Act	was	to	allow	the	FBI	to	grant	National	Security	Letters	in	place	of	traditional	search	warrants	issued	by	judges.	These	NSL’s	were	far	easier	to	obtain	with	less	evidence	than	needed	for	a	traditional	warrant,	prompting	miscarriages	of	justice.	The	FBI	issued	192,499	NSL’s	between	2003	and	2005	with	only	one	leading	to	a	terror	related	conviction.107			 Another	aspect	of	the	law	was	the	“sneak	and	search”	component	that	enabled	federal	law	enforcement	agencies	to	search	property	without	giving	notice	to	the	owner	until	weeks	later.	Of	these	searches	less	than	one	percent	ended	up	being	terror	related.	It																																																									105	Saad,	Lydia.	"Americans	Generally	Comfortable	With	Patriot	Act."	Gallup.com.	Gallup,	02	Mar.	2004.	Web.	07	Apr.	2017.	106	"Who	Stood	for	Constitutional	Liberties	and	Voted	Against	the	USA	PATRIOT	Act	in	2001?"	Daily	Kos.	N.p.,	7	June	2013.	Web.	07	Apr.	2017.	107	"Surveillance	Under	the	Patriot	Act."	American	Civil	Liberties	Union.	ACLU..n.d.	Web.	07	Feb.	2017.	
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also	happened	that	a	large	portion	of	Americans	monitored	were	of	Muslim	faith	or	had	ties	to	Muslim	majority	Arab	countries.	Take	for	example	Ben	Kahla,	an	American	with	aspirations	of	being	a	diplomat	who	was	studying	at	University	in	Saudi	Arabia	when	the	FBI	arrested	him.	The	FBI	had	Kahla	“shackled,	blindfolded	and	dressed	in	a	Guantanamo-orange	jumpsuit	before	being	driven	to	jail	in	Washington	under	full	police	escort”	where	they	held	him	for	a	month,	accused	of	having	links	to	the	“Virginia	jihad”	and	indicted	him	on	three	separate	occasions	even	after	receiving	the	first	not-guilty	verdict.	108	The	Government	and	FBI	made	the	argument	that	in	order	to	protect	American	citizens	they	needed	to	be	able	to	monitor	them	more	closely.	They	also	argued	that	this	temporary	infringement	on	the	rights	of	American	citizens	would	help	federal	law	enforcement	to	catch	terrorists.	The	data	shows	this	was	untrue.	Instead	the	United	States	compromised	its	core	values	and	unfairly	applied	the	law	on	its	Muslim	population.	The	tactics	of	the	Patriot	Act	and	the	torture	of	Muslim	prisoners	at	Abu	Ghraib	and	Guantanamo	including	intentional	mishandlings	of	the	Quran,	not	only	tarnished	the	reputation	of	America	abroad	but	inflamed	anti-American	sentiments	creating	the	potential	for	more	terror	attacks	on	U.S.	soil.		 The	actions	brought	by	the	Patriot	Act,	though	invasive	and	contrary	to	American	values	and	promises	of	individual	freedom,	were	not	illegal.	The	actions	taken	by	the	NYPD	to	survey	Muslim	communities,	including	student	associations,	mosques,	businesses,	community	leaders	and	individuals,	were.	The	intelligence	division	of	the	NYPD	illegally	monitored	and	watched	Muslim	communities	in	the	New	York	Area	and	even	communities	more	than	100	miles	away	in	Pennsylvania,	Connecticut	and	New	Jersey.	Just	reading	the	
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name	of	the	report,	“Radicalization	in	the	West:	The	Homegrown	Threat,”109	it	becomes	clear	that	the	investigation	was	created	under	the	pretense	that	Muslims	pose	a	risk	to	U.S.	national	security.	The	report	treats	anyone	with	ties	to	Islam	as	suspicious	and	monitors	people	in	Muslim	communities	regardless	of	any	wrongdoing	or	probable	cause.	This	illegal	investigation	began	in	2002	but	continued	into	2006	and	2007	when	officers	even	went	to	college	and	university	campuses	where	they	infiltrated	Muslim	Student	Associations	hoping	to	find	students	with	ties	to	terror	cells.110	They	came	up	empty	handed.	This	illegal	practice	has	been	going	on	since	the	1980’s.	Though	this	2006	breach	of	civil	liberties	did	not	constitute	a	restriction	of	religious	freedom,	the	students	and	communities	monitored	felt	the	effects	in	their	ability	to	practice	freely	and	free	from	worry.	The	witch-hunt	for	terrorists	in	Muslim	communities	based	on	the	unfounded	relationship	between	those	who	practiced	Islam	and	those	who	were	potential	terrorists	had	significant	consequences	for	American	Muslims.	Many	no	longer	felt	safe	or	welcomed	in	their	own	country.	The	spiral	of	Islamophobia	did	not	end	there.		
4.3			Limits	on	Religious	Freedom		 The	September	11th	attacks	had	another	effect	on	Muslims	in	America;	it	began	the	short-lived	debate	on	headscarves.	Several	of	the	hijackers	had	obtained	Florida	driver’s	licenses	prompting	the	Florida	Department	of	Highway	Safety	to	review	its	driver’s	license	system.	The	Miami	Herald	reported	on	the	issue	in	an	article	entitled	“Tighter	Security	May	
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Mean	More	Strict	Driver’s	License	Rules.”111	The	requirement	to	remove	headscarves	for	photo	identification	appeared	to	have	been	implemented	in	good	faith.	There	was	a	legitimate	security	threat	and	the	most	practical	solution	was	to	implement	a	policy	that	would	allow	for	more	careful	and	precise	identification.		However,	Sultaana	Freeman	did	not	agree,	and	with	the	help	of	the	ACLU	she	filed	a	claim	in	January	of	2002	expressing	that	Florida	had	violated	her	right	to	religious	free	exercise.	The	suit	was	heard	before	Judge	Thorpe	in	Florida’s	circuit	court.	Judge	Thorpe	ruled	that	the	demand	to	lift	the	veil	did	not	pose	a	substantial	burden	to	Freeman’s	religious	liberty,	and	furthermore	that	the	State’s	need	to	identify	drivers	outweighed	her	need	to	wear	the	veil.		The	media	were	not	shy	in	voicing	support	for	the	State.	Journalists	insulted	Freeman	labeling	her	as	an	extremist	who	was	acting	foolishly.	The	media	ignored	the	fact	that	several	similar	cases	had	been	decided	in	favor	of	the	plaintiff	and	his	or	her	right	to	religious	exercise.	This	limit	on	the	civil	liberties	of	one	Muslim	woman	was	one	case	of	many	that	highlighted	the	newfound	sense	of	anxiety	towards	Muslims	who	were	thought	to	threaten	national	security.	However,	unlike	in	France	the	headscarf	issue	did	not	surpass	the	question	of	drivers’	licenses	and	identification	photos.			 This	case	is	fascinating	for	another	reason:	it	is	one	of	the	few	decided	in	a	similar	vein	to	the	French	headscarf	cases.		Judge	Thorpe	found	that	Florida’s	demand	that	Freeman	remove	the	veil	did	not	pose	a	significant	burden	to	her	right	religious	exercise.	Furthermore,	Jay	Vail	a	Florida	Assistant	Attorney	General,	in	a	statement	that	could	have	been	taken	right	out	of	the	French	headscarf	decisions,	said,		“When	there	is	a	matter	of	common	interest	that	promotes	public	safety,	then	we	must	yield	on	our	right	to	free																																																									111	Rothstein,	Adam.	"Jihad	for	Journalists."	Religion	in	the	News.	Trinity	College,	Spring	2003.	Web.	3	Jan.	2017.	
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exercise	to	the	extent	that	it’s	necessary	to	secure	that	public	safety	interest.”112	This	decision	picks	up	on	the	French	ideals	of	“living	together”	which	were	used	to	justify	the	headscarf	ban	in	SAS	v.	France.	This	rhetoric	did	not	gain	traction	in	the	U.S.	but	has	gained	traction	Europe.	In	a	March	2017	article	published	in	the	UK	Spectator,	a	European	Muslim	woman,	Qanta	Ahmed,	advocated	for	a	ban	on	veils.	She	believes	that	the	ban	is	actually	good	for	everyone,	including	Muslims.	She	pointed	out	that		“There’s	nothing	from	the	early	Islamic	period	about	what	the	khimar	—	or	veil	—	should	cover,	whether	face,	body	or	hair.	The	Quran,	in	Sura	24:31,	reminds	Muslim	women	simply	of	the	need	to	‘draw…[it]	over	their	bosoms’.”113		While	this	information	is	important,	she	misses	the	point.	It	does	not	matter	whether	the	Quran	explicitly	requires	wearing	of	the	veil,	what	matters	is	that	if	a	person	feels	a	strong	commitment	to	adopt	a	certain	religious	practice	they	feel	is	central	to	their	religion,	they	should	have	the	right	to	do	so.	However	this	has	not	always	been	the	case.		 The	U.S.	has	not	always	supported	religious	exemption	and	accommodation.	In	fact	in	the	1990	Smith	decision	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	although	the	government	has	the	power	to	accommodate	religious	practice	and	beliefs,	it	is	not	required	to	when	the	practice	or	belief	is	in	breach	of	the	law.	In	the	1990	landmark	Supreme	Court	decision,	the	Court	heard	the	arguments	of	the	Employment	Division	of	Oregon,	who	argued	it	did	not	have	to	pay	the	unemployment	benefits	of	Smith	who	had	been	fired	for	smoking	peyote	during	a	religious	ceremony.114	The	court	ruled	that	because	peyote	was	illegal	even	for	
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sacramental	use	under	state	law,	the	Unemployment	Division	was	justified	in	denying	the	benefits.	The	Court	explained	that	it	has	never	held	that	an	individuals’	religious	beliefs	excuse	him/her	from	complying	with	an	otherwise	valid	law.	The	court	explained	that	a	ruling	like	that	could	lead	to	a	private	right	to	ignore	generally	applicable	laws	creating	a	constitutional	anomaly	that	would	be	hard	to	uphold.	By	granting	deference	to	the	state	this	decision	marked	a	move	away	from	a	policy	of	more	open	religious	freedom	to	a	more	restrictive	policy	of	religious	freedom.	Nevertheless,	the	precedent	established	in	Smith	did	not	last	very	long.				
4.4			An	Era	of	Religious	Based	Legislation			 In	response	to	the	Smith	decision,	Congress	nearly	unanimously	passed	the	Religious	Freedom	Restoration	Act,	which	President	Clinton	signed	into	law	in	1993.	RFRA	states	that	“government	shall	not	substantially	burden	a	person’s	exercise	of	religion	even	if	the	burden	results	from	a	rule	of	general	applicability,”	unless	the	restriction	is	“in	furtherance	of	a	compelling	governmental	interest”	and	is	“the	least	restrictive	means	of	furthering	that	compelling	interest.”115		The	creator	of	the	law	felt	that	“the	compelling	interest	test	as	set	forth	in	prior	Federal	court	rulings	is	a	workable	test	for	striking	sensible	balances	between	religious	liberty	and	competing	prior	governmental	interests.”116		The	compelling	interest	test	comes	from	Sherbert	v.	Verner	(1963).	The	test	was	described	as:	“if	a	person	claimed	a	sincere	religious	belief,	and	a	government	action	placed	a	substantial	burden	on	that	belief,	the	government	needed	to	prove	a	compelling	
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state	interest,	and	that	it	pursued	that	action	in	the	least	burdensome	way.”117	With	RFRA	in	place	Congress	hoped	the	American	people	would	be	secure	in	their	right	to	religious	freedom	and	practice.		 The	victory	granted	by	the	passage	of	RFRA	was	in	some	ways	short	lived.	In	Boerne	
v.	Flores	(1997)	the	Supreme	Court	struck	down	RFRA	as	unconstitutional	arguing	that	congress	had	overstepped	its	bounds.	Archbishop	Flores	had	brought	suit	against	the	city	of	Boerne,	Texas	for	refusing	to	give	him	a	permit	to	build	a	church.	The	facts	of	the	case	are	insignificant;	the	basis	for	ruling	was	the	constitutionality	of	RFRA,	and	the	Court	stated	Congress	did	not	have	the	power	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	to	apply	RFRA	to	the	states	and	their	local	ordinances.118	This	led	in	2000	to	the	creation	of	yet	another	law:	The	Religious	Land	Use	and	Incarcerated	Persons	Act	(RLUIPA).	Like	RFRA,	RLUIPA	was	passed	unanimously	and	with	the	full	support	of	President	Clinton.	In	2000,	the	country	was	committed	to	protecting	religious	freedom	for	everyone.	The	Act	was	designed	to	protect	religious	organizations	from	discriminatory	zoning	and	land	use	laws.	It	bars	discrimination	based	on	religion,	requires	all	religious	groups	to	be	treated	equal	to	non-religious	places	of	assembly,	and	obliges	the	state	to	provide	proof	of	compelling	interest	if	any	zoning	or	landmark	actions	impart	a	substantial	burden	on	a	religious	group.119			 Over	the	last	14	years	RLUIPA	has	helped	many	Muslims	safeguard	their	right	to	religious	freedom,	however	when	the	act	was	written	it	was	not	especially	intended	to	aid	Muslims;	mosques	were	hardly	mentioned.	Prior	to	9/11	levels	of	discrimination	towards	Muslims	remained	fairly	low.	There	was	no	pressing	need	to	create	legislation	that	would	protect	Muslims.	Post	9/11	there	was	a	stark	contrast	as	tensions	rose.	In	2001	the																																																									117	Bomboy,	Scott.	"What	is	RFRA	and	why	do	we	care?"		118	"City	of	Boerne	v.	Flores."	Oyez.	Oyez,	n.d.	Web.	22	Mar.	2017	119	Cismas,	Ioana,	and	Stacy	N.	Cammarano.		
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Department	of	Justice	investigated	421	hate	crimes	against	Muslims	as	compared	to	28	the	year	before.120	For	many	American	Muslims	RLUIPA	came	at	a	crucial	time.		 After	the	passage	of	RFRA	and	RLUIPA,	religious	zoning	issues	appeared	to	be	for	the	most	part	reconciled	between	cities	and	religious	groups.	In	Boston,	the	Boston	Redevelopment	Authority	with	support	from	Mayor	Menino	and	other	City	of	Boston	officials	sold	the	Islamic	Society	a	parcel	of	land	to	be	used	to	build	a	mosque.	Though	the	sale	was	met	with	hostility	due	to	the	well	under-market	price	the	city	had	given	the	Islamic	Society,	the	sale	went	through.121		However,	resentment	grew	provoking	one	Roxbury	resident	to	file	a	suit	against	the	City	and	the	Islamic	Society	for	violating	the	constitutional	principle	of	separation	of	Church	and	State.	To	add	to	the	fire,	the	ownership	of	the	mosque	was	transferred	from	an	African-American	Muslim	group	to	a	suburban-based	Muslim	group	with	ties	to	Saudi	Arabia	and	other	Middle	Eastern	countries.	This	new	group,	the	Islamic	Society	of	Boston,	was	known	for	its	base	of	conservative	Middle	Eastern	Muslims	and	was	suspected	of	having	ties	to	Islamic	extremists.	In	fact	multiple	members,	including	ISB’s	founder	Abdulrahman	Alamoudi	who	was	convicted	for	being	an	Al	Qaeda	financier,	and	the	Tsarnaev	brothers	who	carried	out	the	Boston	Marathon	Bombing,	had	been	found	to	have	ties	with	Al	Qaeda	and	other	Islamic	extremist	Organizations.122	Nonetheless,	the	City,	perhaps	out	of	fear	of	appearing	Islamophobic	or	violating	RLUIPA,	allowed	the	mosque	to	be	built.	The	result	of	the	controversy	over	the	mosque	of	Boston	
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points	to	the	growing	deference	to	religious	organizations	after	the	passage	of	the	RFRA	and	RLUIPA.			 Aside	from	the	residual	effects	of	9/11,	the	2000’s	saw	few	attacks	on	the	religious	freedom	of	Muslims	in	large	part	because	President	Bush	kept	the	Muslim	dilemma	from	becoming	a	partisan	issue.	To	the	contrary,	in	2007	the	United	States	elected	its	first	Muslim	Congressman,	Democrat	Keith	Ellison	of	Michigan.	A	year	later	in	2008	Andre	Carson	a	Democrat	from	Indiana	was	sworn	in	on	Jefferson’s	Quran.123	Unfortunately,	this	period	of	religious	acceptance	came	to	a	halt	when	President	Bush	left	the	White	House	in	2009.	Bush	had	made	a	conscious	effort	to	keep	Islamophobia	at	bay,	but	with	his	departure	and	the	election	of	a	Democratic	President,	the	Republican	Party	was	freed	of	the	responsibility	to	maintain	a	welcoming	and	open	front	towards	Islam.	Instead,	the	Republican	Party	explicitly	expressed	hostility	towards	Islam	and	framed	it	as	a	partisan	issue.	The	year	2010	marked	a	sad	rupture	in	the	American	political	regime:	no	longer	would	both	parties	be	united	in	protecting	religious	liberty	for	all	citizens.					
4.5			The	2010	Policy	Shift:	Open	Hostility	Towards	Muslims			 After	2010	it	became	clear	that	it	was	not	just	the	Republicans	who	felt	a	strong	need	to	control	and	limit	the	power	of	the	Muslim	population,	but	so	did	much	of	the	general	population.	The	latent	anti-Muslim	sentiment	that	had	surged	in	the	months	after	9/11	had	re-merged.	The	shift	in	politics	was	reflected	in	the	attitudes	of	the	American	people	who	brought	suits	against	Muslims,	burned	Qurans	and	attempted	to	ban	Sharia	law.		And	there’s	significant	empirical	data	to	support	the	claim	that	an	ideological	and																																																									123	Karim,	Talib	I.	"Second	Muslim	Takes	His	Seat	in	the	House	of	Representatives."	The	Muslim	Link.	The	Muslim	Link,	01	Apr.	2008.	Web.	20	Mar.	2017.	
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attitudinal	shift	occurred.		Pew	reports	that	Muslims	had	a	higher	approval	rating	shortly	after	9/11	than	in	2010.124	Data	on	hate	crimes	and	RLUIPA	cases	show	a	dramatic	increase	in	hostility	towards	Muslims	after	2010.	Of	the	forty	RLUIPA	cases	involving	mosques	or	Islamic	schools	twenty-one	were	opened	after	2010.		The	Equal	Employment	Opportunity	Commission	received	a	record	803	complaints	from	Muslim	workers	in	2009,	a	figure	that	is	up	twenty	percent	from	the	previous	year.125		In	addition	to	the	increase	in	sheer	number,	a	report	by	the	Institute	for	Social	Policy	and	Understanding	found	that	the	manner	of	protest	had	changed.126	No	longer	was	opposition	to	Muslims	being	voiced	in	the	controlled	environments	of	public	sessions	and	town	hall	meetings,	anti-Islamic	groups	took	their	protest	to	the	streets.			 The	hostility	towards	Muslims	was	manifested	in	the	streets	of	New	York.	The	display	of	anti-Muslim	sentiments	expressed	in	land	use	controversy	over	the	building	of	mosques	drew	national	attention,	most	notably	for	the	so-called	Ground	Zero	Mosque	in	Lower	Manhattan	and	the	Murfreesboro	Islamic	Center	in	Tennessee.	In	both	of	these	cases	the	opposition	resorted	to	drastic	measures.		When	plans	were	announced	to	build	a	Muslim	Community	center	four	blocks	from	the	Ground	Zero	site	ten	years	after	9/11	there	began	an	emotionally	charged	debate.	At	the	outset	the	community	board	of	lower	Manhattan	approved	the	construction	of	the	Park51	center	agreeing	with	Daisy	Khan,	the	President	of	the	American	Society	for	Muslim	Advancement,	that	the	Islamic	center	could	provide	the	opportunity	to	celebrate	pluralism	and	counter	the	extremist	movement.	But,	as	the	project	attracted	media	attention,	its	proponents	were	accused	of	being	insensitive,																																																									124	Rashid,	Qasim.	"The	War	Over	Muslims	in	America."	The	Huffington	Post.	TheHuffingtonPost.com,	31	Dec.	2010.	Web.	20	Mar.	2017.	125	Greenhouse,	Steven.	"Muslims	Report	Rising	Discrimination	at	Work."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times	Company,	23	Sept.	2010.	Web.	23	Mar.	2017.	126	Treene,	Eric	W.		
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disrespectful	and	intolerant	towards	Muslims.	President	Obama	waded	into	the	controversy	declaring,	“This	is	America.	And	our	commitment	to	religious	freedom	must	be	unshakeable.	The	principle	that	people	of	all	faiths	are	welcome	in	this	country	and	that	they	will	not	be	treated	differently	by	their	government	is	essential	to	who	we	are.”127	Ultimately,	his	words	made	a	tribute	to	the	politicians	and	preachers	of	our	country	who	for	centuries	have	sought	to	create	an	America	that	is	religiously	tolerant.	His	comments	were	not	enough	to	convince	New	Yorkers	to	allow	the	project	to	move	forward	in	the	name	of	religious	tolerance,	and	the	project	was	defeated.		 A	similar	situation	ensued	in	Murfreesboro,	Tennessee,	but	instead	resulted	in	triumph.	Proposals	to	build	the	mosque	were	met	with	vehement	disapproval	and	violence.	The	Muslim	community	of	Murfreesboro	purchased	land	in	an	area	of	Rutherford	County	zoned	for	church	and	mosque	building,	and	placed	a	sign	on	the	new	land	that	read	“Future	Site	of	the	Islamic	Center	of	Murfreesboro.”	The	sign	was	vandalized	with	the	words	“Not	Welcome.”128		A	few	months	later	sizable	opposition	had	assembled	and	a	group	of	several	hundred	opponents	rallied	in	the	Murfreesboro	Square	to	protest	the	construction.	Two	months	later	one	of	their	construction	trucks	was	set	on	fire	in	what	remains	an	unsolved	arson	case.		The	opposition	argued	that	the	Islamic	Center	had	ties	to	terrorism	and	that	Islam	was	not	a	religion	but	a	political	ideology.	Their	most	valid	claim	was	that	the	Center	had	failed	to	provide	sufficient	notice	under	the	Tennessee	Open	Meetings	Act.	The	Chancery	Court	ruled	in	favor	of	the	opposition	and	ordered	the	county	not	to	issue	a	certificate	of	occupancy.	The	U.S.	then	filed	a	claim	under	RLUIPA	that	the	denial	of	the	certificate	of	occupancy	violated	the	Islamic	Center’s	right	to	practice	their	religion	and																																																									127	"Davis,	Kenneth	C.	"America's	True	History	of	Religious	Tolerance."	128	Treene,	Eric	W.		
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thus	posed	a	substantial	burden.	The	federal	court	ruled	in	favor	of	the	Islamic	Center	and	the	opposition’s	subsequent	attempts	to	appeal	and	reverse	the	decision	were	unsuccessful.129	The	case	represented	a	victory	both	for	the	Islamic	center	and	for	RLUIPA,	which	had	successfully	protected	a	minority	religious	group	from	discriminatory	zoning	laws.			 This	small	victory	for	religious	freedom	was	set	back	by	a	new	debate:	the	banning	of	Sharia	Law	in	U.S.	courts.	The	comments	made	in	the	Murfreesboro	case	about	Islam	being	an	ideology	or	cult	and	not	a	religion	inspired	several	politicians	to	claim	that	Muslims	had	no	protections	under	the	First	Amendment.	Lieutenant	Governor	of	Tennessee	Ron	Ramsey	said,	"It's	time	for	American	Muslims	who	love	this	country	to	publicly	renounce	violent	jihadism	and	to	drum	those	who	seek	to	do	America	harm	out	of	their	faith	community.”130		His	comment	acknowledges	that	there	are	American	Muslims	who	love	the	US,	and	yet	his	proposal	treats	all	Muslims	as	unpatriotic	threats	to	national	security.		Ramsey	was	not	alone	in	the	quest	to	ban	Sharia	law.	Over	32	state	legislatures	have	since	proposed	bills	that	would	limit	consideration	of	religious	law	in	court	cases,	essentially	banning	Sharia	Law.131	From	2010	to	2012	six	states,	Arizona,	Kansas,	Louisiana,	Oklahoma,	South	Dakota	and	Tennessee,	passed	such	laws,	and	another	five	had	restrictions	on	considering	religious	law	in	court.	Oklahoma	attracted	the	most	attention	for	its	law,	which	specifically	mentioned	outlawing	Sharia	Law	in	a	referendum	to	amend	the	state	constitution.	A	federal	judge	struck	down	the	amendment	as	unconstitutional	on	several	grounds,	for	discriminating	among	religions	without	compelling	state	interest,	and																																																									129	Treene,	Eric	W.		130	McMorris-Santoro,	Evan.	"Tennessee	Lt.	Gov:	Religious	Freedom	May	Not	Count	For	Muslims	(VIDEO)."	
TPM	(Talking	Points	Memo).	N.p.,	26	July	2010.	Web.	24	Mar.	2017.	131	Kirckland,	Michael.	"Under	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court:	Islamic	law	in	U.S.	courts."	Under	the	U.S.	Supreme	
Court:	Islamic	Law,	Sharia	in	U.S.	Courts	UPI.com.	UPI,	19	May	2013.	Web.	20	Feb.	2017.	
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because	the	amendment	did	not	remedy	any	identifiable	problem.	Furthermore,	supporters	of	the	law	admitted	at	a	public	hearing	that,	“they	did	not	know	of	even	a	single	instance	where	an	Oklahoma	court	had	applied	Sharia	law	or	used	the	legal	precepts	of	other	nations	or	cultures,	let	alone	that	such	applications	or	uses	had	resulted	in	concrete	problems	in	Oklahoma.”132	The	lack	of	knowledge	and	evidence	suggests	the	obvious;	the	law	was	generated	by	prejudice	and	fear,	and	not	fact.	Despite	the	victory	in	court,	it	was	clear	that	open	Islamophobia	had	been	institutionalized.			 Public	hostility	only	grew	in	proceeding	years.	On	the	anniversary	of	9/11	in	2013	an	evangelical	pastor	in	Florida	set	plans	in	motion	to	burn	2,998	Qurans	in	a	public	park.	This	was	not	Pastor	Terry	Jones’	first	Quran	burning.	In	2010	he	had	made	plans	to	burn	Qurans	but	was	stopped	by	a	phone	call	from	the	Department	of	Justice.	In	2011	he	watched	while	his	congregation	set	fire	to	Qurans,	and	in	2012	he	himself	partook	in	the	burning.133	Under	the	First	Amendment	Jones	has	the	right	to	symbolic	free	speech,	meaning	that	though	reminiscent	of	a	hate	crime,	he	can	burn	a	Quran.	But,	Jones	was	arrested	on	felony	charges	for	breaking	state	laws	that	prohibit	the	open	transportation	of	fuel.	Jones’s	actions	were	detrimental	for	their	role	in	perpetuating	anti-Muslim	violence	and	for	the	threat	his	actions	posed	to	U.S.	foreign	policy	and	national	security.				 The	country	is	still	struggling	to	determine	whether	Americans	continue	to	use	national	security	as	a	guise	for	discriminating	against	Muslims.	RFRA	and	RLUIPA	sought	to	surmount	these	problems	by	securing	religious	freedom	for	minority	groups,	and	to	an	extent	they	have.	They	have	protected	the	rights	of	Muslims.	Still	negative	views	of	Muslims	continue	to	rise.	In	2001	only	39	percent	of	Americans	had	unfavorable	views	of	Islam,	in																																																									132	Kirckland,	Michael.	"Under	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court:	Islamic	Law	in	U.S.	Courts."		133	Peralta,	Eyder.	"Pastor	Terry	Jones	Arrested	Before	Planned	Quran	Burning."	NPR.	NPR,	11	Sept.	2013.	Web.	20	Mar.	2017.	
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2011	and	2015	this	number	was	61	percent.	This	increase	in	negative	perceptions	suggests	it	is	imperative	for	the	government	and	the	courts	to	protect	the	right	to	religious	freedom	and	fight	religious	discrimination.134				 Chapter	six	will	explore	whether	Trump	is	committed	to	doing	so	and	will	explore	what	his	policy	on	Islam	and	National	Security	may	mean	for	the	future.	But	first,	the	next	chapter	will	examine	the	Burkini	debate	in	France	and	draw	out	the	tension	between	religious	freedom,	national	identity	and	national	security.		
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CHAPTER	5:	THE	CLASH	OF	FRENCH	VALUES	AND	ISLAM				 								 		 							(Miss	Rayyan.	Digital	image.	Burkini	Ban	Defies	Human	Rights.	The	Hill,	17	Aug.	2016.	Web.)	Above	is	a	picture	of	a	burkini,	the	garment	that	created	an	outpour	of	commotion	and	reproach	the	summer	of	2016	in	coastal	France.	But	what	is	a	burkini	and	where	did	it	come	from?	Aheda	Zanetti,	a	48-year-old	Australian	designer	created	the	burkini	in	2004	in	the	name	of	integration	and	as	a	way	to	make	Muslim	women	feel	more	comfortable	on	the	beach.	Since	its	creation	is	has	become	synonymous	with	any	full	body	beachwear	worn	by	Muslim	women	inciting	an	impassioned	debate	in	France	on	religious	freedom.		
5.1			The	Burkini	Debate	Begins:	August	2016		 When	a	young	Muslim	girl	stepped	onto	the	beach	in	Cannes,	France	in	a	hijab	on	a	warm	August	day	she	expected	to	have	a	relaxed	day	enjoying	her	vacation	with	her	family	in	her	home	country	of	France.	A	police	officer	approached	her	and	told	her	that	she	had	to	remove	her	hijab	because	per	law	it	was	required	all	people	wear		“proper	dress”	at	the	
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beach.135	This	confrontation	between	a	Muslim	woman	and	French	police	was	one	of	many	that	occurred	during	the	summer	of	2016.	Cannes	was	the	first	of	over	30	French	costal	towns	to	outlaw	the	burkini	in	a	span	of	three	months.		 The	made	up	word	burkini	quickly	became	commonplace	all	over	the	world	as	news	station	after	news	station	began	reporting	on	the	ban	of	the	full	body	swimsuit	worn	primarily	by	Muslim	women	in	France.	The	burkini	ban	attracted	the	publics’	attentions	for	several	reasons;	it	was	about	feminism	and	the	presence	of	Islam;	it	was	far	reaching	and	invasive,	and	because	of	the	timing.	The	burkini	debate	came	about	a	two	weeks	after	the	Bastille	Day	terror	attack	in	Nice	during	which	a	man	claiming	allegiance	to	the	Islamic	State	drove	a	truck	down	the	main	boulevard	killing	and	injuring	over	80	men,	women	and	children,	and	came	about	three	weeks	after	the	murder	of	a	priest	by	two	armed	Muslim	men	St.-Étienne-du-Rouvray,	Normandy.				 Support	for	the	ban,	unlike	with	the	earlier	headscarf	cases,	was	not	universal	in	France.	Former	President	Nicolas	Sarkozy	called	the	burkini	a	“’provocation,”	a	symbol	of	radical	Islam	in	a	country	still	reeling	from	the	terrorist	attacks	in	Paris	last	fall	and	in	Nice	this	July.”136			Prime	Minster	Manuel	Valls	supported	the	ban,	just	as	he	had	supported	previous	legislation	restricting	religious	attire.	However,	Valls’	clashed	with	fellow	socialist	education	minster	Najat	Vallaud-Belkacem,	a	vocal	supporter	of	women’s	rights	and	critic	of	the	burkini	ban	who	said	the	ban	“let	loose	verbal	racism.”	137	Compared	to	the	2011	law	
																																																								135	“Cannes	:	une	femme	verbalisée	pour	le	port	d'un	voile	musulman."	Le	Monde.	Le	Monde,	23	Aug.	2016.	Web.	23	Oct.	2016.	136	McAuley,	James.	"France's	Burkini	Debate:	About	a	Bathing	Suit	and	a	Country's	Peculiar	Secularism."	The	
Washington	Post.	26	Aug.	2016.	Web.	5	Sept.	2016.	137	Chrisafis,	Angelique.	"France's	Burkini	Ban	Row	Divides	Government	as	Court	Mulls	Legality."	The	
Guardian.	Guardian	News	and	Media,	25	Aug.	2016.	Web.	27	Feb.	2017.	
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banning	veils,	which	82	percent	of	the	French	supported,	support	for	the	burkini	ban	was	far	lower	with	only	60	percent	in	support	of	the	ban.138		 The	drama	began	when	Cannes	outlawed	the	burkini.	Cannes	was	the	first	city	to	implement	an	ordinance.	David	Lisnard,	Mayor	of	Cannes,	helped	write	the	ban	on	the	burkini	enacted	July	28th.	The	ordinance	stated,	“Access	to	beaches	and	swimming	is	prohibited	from	the	signing	of	this	decree	until	31	August	2016	to	any	person	who	is	not	in	proper	dress,	respectful	of	good	morals	and	laïcité,	Hygiene	and	bathing	safety	adapted	to	the	maritime	public	domain.”139	The	phrase	“respectful	of	good	morals	and	laïcité”	takes	a	legal	principle	and	narrows	its	application	so	that	religious	attire	becomes	improper	dress.	Lisnard	tried	to	persuade	the	press	that	the	law	was	not	created	with	the	intention	of	discriminating	against	Muslims,	but	few	believed	his	meek	attempt	to	defend	the	ordinance.	Lisnard	said,	“"Whether	a	woman	is	Muslim,	Catholic,	Jewish	or	Buddhist,	she	can	of	course	come	and	bathe!	(...)	There	are	also	many	Muslim	women	on	the	beaches	of	Cannes.	But	they	cannot	wear	ostentatious	attire."140		We	see	here	that	just	as	with	the	headscarf	cases	the	term	ostentatious	becomes	problematic,	and	it	is	easy	to	question	the	true	intent	of	the	law.			 Lisnard	then	attempted	another	route	of	defense,	feminism.	He	claimed,	“It	is	precisely	to	protect	these	women	that	I	took	this	decision.	The	burkini	is	the	uniform	of	extremist	Islamism,	not	of	the	Muslim	religion.”141	Entrenched	in	French	society	is	the	need																																																									138	Heimlich,	Russell.	"French	Support	for	Ban	on	Full	Islamic	Veil."	Pew	Research	Center.	Pew	Research	Center,	13	July	2010.	Web.	27	Mar.	2017.	139	“Cannes	:	une	femme	verbalisée	pour	le	port	d'un	voile	musulman."		140	«	Qu’une	femme	soit	musulmane,	catholique,	juive	ou	bouddhiste,	elle	peut	bien	sûr	venir	se	baigner	!	(...)	Il	y	a	d’ailleurs	beaucoup	de	femmes	musulmanes	sur	les	plages	de	Cannes.	Mais	elles	ne	peuvent	pas	porter	de	tenue	ostentatoire.”….Direct	quotation	from:	"Cannes	:	une	femme	verbalisée	pour	le	port	d'un	voile	musulman."	Le	Monde.fr.	Le	Monde,	23	Aug.	2016.	Web.	23	Oct.	2016.	141	Blaise,	Aurelien	Breeden	and	Lilia.	"Cannes,	Citing	Security	Risks,	Bans	Full-Body	'Burkinis'	From	Its	Beaches."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times,	12	Aug.	2016.	Web.	25	Sept.	2016.	
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to	control	woman’s’	dress	and	the	necessity	to	physically	demonstrate	the	difference	between	men	and	women	while	declaring	their	equality.	The	evidence	of	this	dates	back	to	the	French	Revolution.	Eugène	Delacroix’s	famous	painting	“Liberty	Leading	the	People”	shows	a	bare	breasted	Marianne	leading	the	French	people.142	The	painting	demonstrates	the	tension	in	French	republicanism	between	the	promise	of	equality	and	the	natural	differentiation	between	the	sexes.	French	society’s	demand	that	women	undress	results	from	its	civil	religion	of	secularism.	Muslim	society	essentially	rejects	this	idea	by	requiring	women	to	be	covered,	and	the	French	find	that	intolerable.		 Another	facet	of	the	debate	derived	from	security	concerns.	Lisnard	makes	mention	of	the	need	to	maintain	public	order	“while	France	and	places	of	worship	are	the	target	of	terrorist	acts.”143	Because	the	law	particularly	targets	Muslim	women,	Lisnard	was	paradoxically	caught	claiming	that	the	law	both	protects	women	and	treats	them	as	security	threats.			 Several	anti-Islamophobic	organizations	tried	to	draw	out	this	paradox.	The	politicians	in	support	of	the	ban	left	out	a	few	essential	facts.	The	Collective	Against	Islamophobia	asked	in	a	statement,	“Must	we	remind	this	mayor	that	about	30	of	the	victims	of	the	attack	in	Nice	were	Muslims,	because	terrorism	targets	us	all	indiscriminately?”144		The	burkini	ban,	like	the	bans	before	it,	was	what	Feiza	Ben	Mohamed,	a	spokeswoman	for	a	Muslim	association	in	the	south	of	France,	called	a	haphazard	way	for	“politicians	to	hide	their	inability	to	handle	security	in	the	face	of	
																																																								142	Rubin,	Alissa	J.	"From	Bikinis	to	Burkinis,	Regulating	What	Women	Wear."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times,	27	Aug.	2016.	Web.	30	Sept.	2017.	143	Blaise,	Aurelien	Breeden	and	Lilia.	"Cannes,	Citing	Security	Risks,	Bans	Full-Body.”	144	Blaise,	Aurelien	Breeden	and	Lilia.	"Cannes,	Citing	Security	Risks,	Bans	Full-Body.”	
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terrorism.”145		Another	perceptive	young	Muslim	woman	articulated	the	danger	of	the	burkini	and	framed	the	ban	as	a	question	of	individual	freedom	begging	the	question	how	far	will	the	French	go	to	check	whether	an	outfit	conforms	to	“good	manners”.	She	expressed	that	the	bans	had	unleashed	a	wave	of	verbal	racism.	While	she	acknowledged	increased	tension	as	a	consequence	of	the	recent	terror	attacks	claimed	by	the	Islamic	State,	she	believes	“we	shouldn’t	add	oil	to	the	fire’	by	banning	burkinis”.146	The	French	Courts	agreed.		
5.2			France’s	Highest	Court	Rules	Against	the	Burkini	Ban		 On	August	25,	2016	France’s	highest	administrative	court	heard	the	case	of	the	burkini	ban.	This	came	after	an	appeal	by	the	Human	Rights	League	challenging	the	courts	decision	in	the	town	of	Villeneuve-Loubet	located	just	West	of	Nice	to	uphold	the	ban.	The	lower	court	judge	had	agreed	that	the	ban	was	“necessary,	appropriate	and	proportionate”	to	protect	prevent	public	disorder	because	the	burkini	was	“liable	to	offend	the	religious	convictions	or	(religious)	non-convictions	of	other	users	of	the	beach.”147	Apparently	many	of	the	French	agreed.	BBC	reported	that	recent	polls	indicate	that	64	percent	of	the	French	public	supported	the	ban	and	that	another	30	percent	had	no	opinion.148	So	what	led	the	higher	court	to	reach	a	different	conclusion?	And	was	it	a	departure	from	previous	rulings?	The	Conseil	d’État	found	that	"The	contested	decree	has	...	inflicted	a	serious	and	manifestly	unlawful	interference	with	the	fundamental	freedoms	of	freedom	of	movement,	freedom	of	
																																																								145	Blaise,	Aurelien	Breeden	and	Lilia.	"Cannes,	Citing	Security	Risks,	Bans	Full-Body."	146	Chrisafis,	Angelique.	"France's	Burkini	Ban	Row	Divides	Government	as	Court	Mulls	Legality."	The	
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conscience	and	personal	liberty"	and	furthermore	that	"the	emotion	and	the	fears	resulting	from	the	terrorist	attacks,	and	in	particular	those	committed	in	Nice	on	last	July	14,	can	not	suffice	to	legally	justify	the	contested	prohibition	measure."149		It	is	interesting	and	surprising	that	the	court	found	this	law	to	interfere	with	individual	freedom	while	the	headscarf	bans	did	not.	Perhaps	it	is	because	the	burkini	reassembles	a	full	body	swimsuit	and	is	not	clearly	associated	with	Islam.	Another	explanation:	in	light	of	the	recent	terror	attack	the	court	was	able	to	distinguish	between	a	perceived	threat	to	public	order	and	an	actual	security	threat.					
5.3			The	Need	for	Integration:	Balancing	Islam	and	laïcité			 The	outburst	surrounding	the	burkini	highlights	the	bigger	issue	of	balancing	religious	freedom	in	a	laïc	country.	The	fact	is	French	republican	values	clash	with	those	of	Muslim	immigrants,	exacerbating	relations	between	the	majority	white,	nominally	Catholic	Frenchmen	and	the	Muslim	immigrant	community.	Today	the	French	find	they	have	created	a	vicious	cycle:	the	lack	of	integration	and	perceived	threat	of	the	Muslim	community	brought	on	by	terrorism	leads	the	French	government	to	restrict	the	religious	liberty	of	Muslim	residents	of	France,	and	in	turn	causes	them	to	turn	away	and	isolate	themselves.	Further,	this	pattern	led	Muslim	immigrants	to	settle	in	homogenous	communities	often	associated	with	higher	rates	of	poverty	and	violence.		
																																																								149	Original	quotes:		«	l’arrêté	litigieux	a	(…)	porté	une	atteinte	grave	et	manifestement	illégale	aux	libertés	fondamentales	que	sont	la	liberté	d’aller	et	venir,	la	liberté	de	conscience	et	la	liberté	personnelle	».	«	l’émotion	et	les	inquiétudes	résultant	des	attentats	terroristes,	et	notamment	de	celui	commis	à	Nice	le	14	juillet	dernier,	ne	sauraient	suffire	à	justifier	légalement	la	mesure	d’interdiction	contestée	».		 Source:	"Le	Conseil	d'Etat	met	un	terme	aux	arrêtés	«	anti-burkini	»."	Le	Monde.	Le	Monde,	26	Aug.	2016.	Web.	25	Feb.	2017.		
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	 The	lack	of	integration	of	Muslim	immigrant	communities	is	a	direct	response	to	the	hostility	they	encounter	from	the	native	French.	The	hostility	is	evident	not	only	in	the	legislation	aimed	at	restricting	the	religious	expression	of	Muslims,	but	it	is	also	evident	on	a	micro	or	individual	level.	The	1990’s	showed	much	higher	unemployment	rates	among	young	Arabs	than	the	rest	of	the	population.	The	National	Academy	of	Sciences	found	that	a	candidate	with	a	Muslim-sounding	last	name	is	2.5	times	less	likely	to	be	offered	an	interview	than	a	candidate	with	a	Christian-sounding	family	name.150	This	discrimination	prevents	Muslims	from	earning	an	income	equal	to	that	of	their	native	French	counterparts,	and	forces	Muslims	to	live	in	poorer	neighborhoods	where	crime	is	more	prevalent.	There	is	solid	evidence	of	the	income	disparity	in	France,	with	one	study	finding	that	a	Christian	household	makes	400	euros	more	per	month	than	a	Muslim	one.151	These	socio-economic	factors	pave	the	way	for	a	separation	between	the	two	groups.	The	French	majority	has	far	more	access	to	jobs,	education	and	safe	neighborhoods.			 The	build	up	of	injustice	finally	led	to	a	series	of	riots	in	2005.	Two	young	Arab	youths	were	on	their	way	home	from	a	soccer	game	when	they	spotted	police	patrolling	the	area	for	a	routine	inspection.	In	an	attempt	to	flee	the	police	and	avoid	the	lengthy	questioning	and	accusations	common	in	the	run	down	suburb	of	Clichy-Sous-Bois,	the	two	boys	jumped	into	a	bush	and	died	of	accidental	electrocution.152	The	incident	prompted	an	outburst	of	riots	across	France	in	more	than	300	communities	resulting	in	at	least	three	deaths	and	dozens	of	injuries.	In	just	the	first	three	weeks	the	riots	caused	a	quarter	of	a	
																																																								150	Adida,	Claire	L.,	David	D.	Laitin,	and	Marie-Anne	Valfort.	"Identifying	barriers	to	Muslim	integration	in	France."	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	of	the	United	States	of	America.	National	Academy	of	Sciences,	28	Dec.	2010.	Web.	02	Feb.	2017.	151	Adida,	Claire	L.,	David	D.	Laitin,	and	Marie-Anne	Valfort.		152	Crampton,	Thomas.	"Behind	the	Furor,	the	Last	Moments	of	Two	Youths."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times	Company,	07	Nov.	2005.	Web.	02	Mar.	2017.	
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billion	dollars	in	damage	as	a	result	of	torched	cars,	buildings	and	businesses,	and	costs	of	increased	police	patrols.	By	the	end	of	those	three	weeks,	over	2,900	arrests	were	made	and	the	National	Assembly	voted	to	declare	a	three-month	state	of	emergency.	The	riots	had	made	it	clear:	the	Muslims	of	France	had	reached	their	boiling	point.			 Islam	already	had	a	bad	image	within	France,	and	these	riots	did	nothing	but	inflame	the	stereotype	that	most	Muslims	rejected	French	values	and	had	ties	to	fundamentalism.	A	poll	conducted	a	year	after	the	riots	“found	that	two	thirds	of	the	French	associate	Islam	with	religious	fanaticism.”153	Though	it	is	a	minority	rather	than	a	majority	that	ends	up	joining	extremist	movements,	the	Muslim	youth	are	certainly	not	free	from	the	influence	of	extremist	militant	groups.	Since	the	1980’s	groups	of	Islamic	hardliners	such	as	the	salafists,	wahabis	and	the	Muslim	renewal	association	known	as	Tablighi	have	recruited	new	members	in	the	banlieue	of	Paris,	often	at	riots.154	One	example	is	the	man	behind	the	June	2016	killing	of	two	police	officers	during	which	he	swore	allegiance	to	ISIS.	Laroussi	Abballa,	25,	had	previously	stated	“I	needed	recognition,”	and	“a	local	group	of	jihadists	offered	a	sense	of	purpose	in	an	otherwise	directionless	life	that	included	bouts	of	unemployment.”155	These	recruiters	use	the	unfortunate	social	conditions	of	the	Muslim	youth	(their	position	as	outsiders,	the	stigma	by	state	institutions	and	the	media)	as	leverage	and	persuade	young	Muslim	men	to	join	their	radical	movements,	which	can	sometimes	lead	to	involvement	in	terrorism.	This	is	a	growing	problem.	In	2014	there	were	four	crimes	of	jihad	terrorism.	In	2015	this	number	jumped	significantly	to	17,	indicating																																																									153	Viorst,	Milton.	"The	Muslims	of	France:	Islam	Abroad."	Foreign	Affairs.	Foreign	Affairs,	Sept.	1996.	Web.	02	Feb.	2017.	154	Khedimellah,	Moussa.	"Liberté,	Egalité,	Islam."	Religion	in	the	News.	Trinity	College,	Vol.	8,	No.	3.,	Winter	2006,	Web.	02	Mar.	2017.	155	Malsin,	Jared.	"Nice	Attack:	Why	France	is	a	Major	Target	for	ISIS."	Time.	Time,	15	July	2016.	Web.	28	Mar.	2017.		
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Islam	inspired	terrorism	is	if	anything	on	the	rise.156	This	cannot	be	blamed	on	lack	of	integration	alone	but	treating	Muslims	as	a	security	threat	does	send	the	message	that	Muslims	will	never	be	truly	French,	inciting	in	them	feelings	of	animosity	that	can	lead	to	higher	rates	of	homegrown	terrorism.				 The	barriers	to	integration	persistent	in	the	banlieue	have	remained	largely	unsolved.	Hugues	Lagrange,	a	French	sociologist	and	director	of	research	at	the	Centre	
National	de	la	Recherche	Scientifique	(CNRS),	blames	the	both	the	left	and	the	right	for	ignoring	the	key	cultural	factors.	The	right,	rather	than	recognize	the	cultural	differences	in	family	structure,	blames	the	families	of	young	Muslim	delinquents	for	their	actions	and	there	unchanging	status.	The	left,	he	says,	makes	the	mistake	of	focusing	only	on	unemployment	and	ignoring	family	conflict	and	structure.157	Lagrange	believes	that	France	must	undertake	an	ideological	change.	They	must	stop	trying	to	balance	the	xenophobic	security	discourse	and	the	mistaken	analysis	by	the	politically	correct	and	instead	put	an	end	to	formal	egalitarianism	and	stop	treating	everyone	equally.	The	French	must	recognize	that	there	exist	irreconcilable	cultural	differences	that	can	only	be	alleviated	by	embracing	multiculturalism	and	accommodation.			 Several	theorists	have	contended	that	the	rigid	French	identity	shaped	by	republicanism	and	laïcité	is	to	blame	for	France’s	cultural	clash.	Robert	Brubacker,	an	American	sociologist	who	writes	about	nationalism,	observed,	“The	French	understanding	
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of	nationhood	has	been	state-centered	and	assimilationist.”158	The	result	is	an	attack	on	those	who	do	not	fit	the	mold,	who	today	are	Muslims.		 The	French	should	soon	realize	that	this	approach	might	hurt	the	country	more	than	help	create	a	mutual	respect	and	unity.	The	connection	between	the	burkini	and	threats	to	national	security	is	lacking	in	proof.	But	it	has	been	proven	that	a	lack	of	integration,	high	rates	of	discrimination	and	a	rise	in	anti-French	sentiments	among	the	Muslim	population,	can	lead	to	homegrown	terrorism.	For	this	reason	the	French	need	to	embrace	multiculturalism	and	compromise.	This	could	mean	keeping	the	2004	law	banning	veils	in	schools	but	repealing	the	2011	law	that	bans	veils	in	public	places.	Though	French	politicians	insist	those	laws	have	been	created	in	the	name	of	respect	for	laïcité,	their	comments	suggests	otherwise.	Those	laws	have	had	negative	consequences.			 The	National	Observatory	Against	Islamophobia	found	that	from	2013	to	2015,	80	percent	of	violent	anti-Muslim	acts	were	directed	at	women,	most	of	them	veiled.159	When	the	U.S.	Judges	ruled	on	President	Trump’s	Muslims	ban	they	stated	that	they	took	his	anti-Muslim	rhetoric	into	consideration	when	determining	the	true	intent	behind	the	ban.	If	the	courts	in	France	had	done	this	in	2004	and	2011	the	outcome	might	have	been	different.			 France	needs	to	loosen	its	definition	of	what	it	means	to	be	French	and	invite	diversity.	The	U.S.	on	the	other	hand	already	embraces	diversity	and	has	strong	anti-discrimination	laws	but	must	protect	it	in	the	face	of	a	new	president	who	does	not	see	these	values	as	strengths	of	the	country.	The	last	chapter	will	critique	Donald	Trump’s	policies,	evaluate	the	true	threat	of	the	Muslim	population	of	the	U.S.,	and	make	predictions	for	the	future.																																																										158	Schain,	Martin,	60.		159	Daley,	Suzanne,	and	Alissa	J.	Rubin.	"French	Muslims	Say	Veil	Bans	Give	Cover	to	Bias."	The	New	York	
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CHAPTER	6:		OUR	FUTURE:	RELIGIOUS	FREEDOM	UNDER	THE	TRUMP	
ADMINISTRATION	
	 	
	 The	election	of	Donald	Trump	appears	to	have	ushered	in	a	new	era	of	nativism.	This	new	era	during	which	immigration	and	national	security	policy	are	a	focal	point,	has	demonstrated	the	tension	between	the	need	to	combat	foreign	threats	and	safeguard	the	rights	of	American	citizens.	President	Trump	thinks	that	the	biggest	threat	to	national	security	is	“radical	Islam”.	Due	to	the	government’s	inability	to	adequately	distinguish	the	“bad	guys”	from	ordinary	Muslim	refugees	and	immigrants,	Trump	has	launched	a	campaign	against	radical	Islam,	advocating	for	a	policy	that	discriminates	on	the	basis	of	religion	and	threatens	to	restrict	religious	liberty.	The	policies	Trump	develops	and	implements	in	the	next	four	years	have	the	potential	to	change	the	course	of	American	policy	by	redefining	the	appropriate	balance	between	religious	freedom,	national	identity	and	national	security.		 President	Trump’s	campaign	and	election	have,	in	addition	to	awakening	a	latent	nativism,	augmented	popular	fears	of	Islam.	Some	prominent	politicians,	mostly	on	the	far	right	of	the	Republican	Party,	and	conservative	talk	show	hosts	and	journalists	have	been	railing	against	the	threat	of	Islam	for	years,	claiming	without	evidence	that	Muslims	in	the	U.S	want	to	impose	Sharia	law	and	Islam	on	America.	In	light	of	a	recent	surge	of	terrorism	perpetrated	by	Muslims,	these	groups	and	Trump	have	been	able	to	attract	considerable	support	for	policies	that	threaten	the	rights	and	liberties	of	Muslims	by	framing	the	policies	as	necessary	to	protecting	Americans.	Trump	has	dared	to	implement	his	policy	of	“a	complete	and	total	ban”	of	Muslim	immigration	and	declare	that	the	U.S.	must	combat	radical	Islam	because	millions	of	Americans,	though	perhaps	not	a	majority,	agreed.		 	Since	then	millions	of	Americans	with	no	ties	to	Islam	have	sharply	criticized	his	
	 76	
rhetoric	on	Islam,	including	top	Government	Officials	such	as	President	Bush,	and	Senate	Minority	Leader	Charles	Schumer.	Many	Americans	had	hoped	Trump	would	retreat	from	his	promise	of	a	“total	and	complete	ban”	of	Muslims	and	maintain	America’s	reputation	and	tradition	as	a	country	that	has	always	promoted	freedom	of	religion	and	diversity.	Unfortunately,	this	did	not	happen.	Since	the	official	start	of	the	U.S.	presidential	campaign	in	June	2015	there	has	been	a	rise	in	both	Islamophobia	and	legislation	aimed	to	curb	Islam	in	America,	for	instance	the	attempt	by	several	states	to	ban	sharia	law.			 The	rise	in	terror	attacks	coincided	with	the	beginning	of	the	U.S.	presidential	campaign	bringing	anti-Muslim	sentiments	to	the	forefront	once	again.	In	December	2015	during	the	San	Bernardino	attack	a	radicalized	Islamic	couple	killed	14	co-workers	at	a	office	holiday	party.	Then	in	June	2016	a	Muslim	man	opened	fire	on	a	gay	nightclub	in	Orlando,	Florida	that	left	49	people	dead.	In	July,	just	days	after	Trump	gained	his	nomination	at	the	Republican	Convention,	the	world	felt	the	pain	of	the	Nice	terror	attack,	in	which	a	French	Tunisian	man	plowed	his	truck	through	crowds	of	French	and	foreigners	celebrating	Bastille	Day	in	the	Mediterranean	resort	city.	Just	weeks	later,	millions	of	American	watched	with	wide	eyes	the	news	of	the	slaying	of	a	French	priest	by	a	man	claiming	allegiance	to	ISIS.160	These	attacks,	local	and	foreign,	left	an	imprint	on	the	nation,	reinforcing	fear	and	distrust	of	Muslims	that	was	reflected	in	attitudes	and	more	importantly	in	policy.			 The	2015	attack	in	San	Bernardino	was	the	most	decisive	event	of	Trump’s	campaign;	it	was	in	the	days	after	that	Trump	cemented	his	policy	of	exclusion	and	hostility	towards	Muslims.	Five	days	after	the	terror	attack	on	December	7,	2015,	Trump	announced																																																									160	Barrett,	James.	"A	Complete	List	of	Radical	Islamic	Terror	Attacks	on	U.S.	Soil	Under	Obama."	Daily	Wire.	N.p.,	07	Dec.	2016.	Web.	01	Apr.	2017.	
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his	plan	for	a	“total	and	complete”	Muslim	ban.161	He	has	since	stated	numerous	times	that	Islam	must	not	be	“allowed	to	reside	or	spread	within	our	own	communities.”162	At	a	rally	in	Raleigh,	North	Carolina,	Trump	was	asked	how	he	would	handle	terror	attacks.	He	responded,	“I	would	get	myself	in	so	much	trouble	with	them,	we	are	going	to	handle	it	so	tough."163	Trump	then	followed	up	with	a	statement	critical	of	political	correctness,	he	said,	"How	about	the	person	who	knew	what	was	going	on	said	they	didn't	want	to	report	them	because	they	think	it	might	be	racial	profiling,	did	you	see	that?	We	have	become	so	politically	correct	that	we	don't	know	what	the	hell	we're	doing."	164	Trump	picked	up	on	the	frustration	of	many	Americans	who	felt	that	his	predecessor	ignored	these	issues.	Consequently,	several	million	Americans	applauded	him	for	taking	a	strong	approach	to	fighting	terrorism.			 Meanwhile	another	group	of	Americans	was	disappointed	by	what	they	called	Trump’s	bigoted	response.	President	Obama	and	advocates	of	civil	liberties	warned	that	creating	discriminatory	laws	that	blame	all	Muslims	(worldwide)	for	the	actions	of	a	few	(lets	not	forget-	U.S.	Citizens)	violates	the	First	Amendment,	and	has	the	potential	to	alienate	many	Muslim	Americans.	Even	some	of	the	victims	of	the	San	Bernardino	terror	attacks	disagreed	with	Trump’s	approach.	John	Ramos,	who	was	injured	in	the	attack,	was	able	to	see	the	fault	in	Trump’s	ban,	he	said,	“The	person	who	carried	out	[the	Dec.	2]	attack	was	born	in	the	U.S.	and	only	went	overseas	to	get	a	wife,	it’s	ill-conceived.”165	A	family																																																									161	Kopan,	Tal.	"Donald	Trump	on	San	Bernardino	response:	'I	would	be	so	tough'"	CNN.	Cable	News	Network,	05	Dec.	2015.	Web.	31	Mar.	2017.	162	Shane,	Scott,	Matthew	Rosenberg,	and	Eric	Lipton.	"Trump	Pushes	Dark	View	of	Islam	to	Center	of	U.S.	Policy-Making."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times	Company,	01	Feb.	2017.	Web.	12	Feb.	2017.	163	Kopan,	Tal.	"Donald	Trump	on	San	Bernardino	response…”	164	Kopan,	Tal.	"Donald	Trump	on	San	Bernardino	response...”	165	Branson-Potts,	Hayley,	Sarah	Parvini,	and	Paloma	Esquivel.	"For	victims	of	San	Bernardino	terrorist	attack,	conflicting	views	about	Trump	policy	in	their	name."	Los	Angeles	Times.	Los	Angeles	Times,	1	Feb.	2017.	Web.	31	Mar.	2017.	
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friend	of	another	victim	voiced	support	for	U.S.	policies	that	will	keep	America	and	Americans	safe	but	added,	“We	hope	America	and	President	Trump	can	do	this	without	violating	our	core	values.”166	For	now,	Trump	has	let	these	people	down.		 Several	states	and	Vice	President	Mike	Pence	appear	to	have	let	fear	and	prejudice	influence	their	policy-making.	Their	perception	of	a	threat	may	be	colored	by	their	incorrect	assumptions	about	Muslims.	As	of	2010,	55	percent	know	little	or	nothing	about	Islam	according	to	Pew	Research	Center.	Another	35	percent	say	they	know	something	and	only	nine	percent	say	they	know	a	great	deal.167	The	lack	of	information	and	the	wide	circulation	of	misinformation	have	led	millions	of	Americans	to	be	misinformed	about	Islam.	When	policy	makers	are	tasked	with	assessing	risk,	their	limited	knowledge	and	muddled	view	of	Islam	presents	a	significant	problem.		 Convinced	that	Islam	is	a	hegemonic	religion	preaching	violence,	several	states	have	attempted	to	shut	their	doors	to	Muslim	refugees.	In	order	to	reach	President	Obama’s	stated	goal	of	welcoming	10,000	refugees	into	the	country	all	states	have	had	to	share	the	burden.	Indiana	admitted	174	Syrian	refugees	during	the	fiscal	year	of	2016,	though	not	with	open	arms.168	Governor	Mike	Pence,	now	Vice	President	of	the	U.S.,	declared	the	Syrian	refugees	a	security	threat	and	announced	that	the	state	would	suspend	the	Syrian	refugee	program	and	would	not	reimburse	the	non-profit	Exodus,	which	helps	settle	new	refugees,	for	costs	incurred	on	behalf	of	the	refugees.	Exodus	sued	and	the	case	was	heard	before	the	Seventh	Circuit	U.S.	Court	of	Appeals	in	September	of	2016.	The	judges	wondered	whether	barring	refugees	was	an	effective	anti-terrorism	strategy.	Aware	of	the	discriminatory																																																									166	Branson-Potts,	Hayley,	Sarah	Parvini,	and	Paloma	Esquivel.	"For	victims	of	San	Bernardino...”	167	Liu,	Joseph.	"Public	Remains	Conflicted	Over	Islam."	Pew	Research	Center's	Religion	&	Public	Life	Project.	N.p.,	23	Aug.	2010.	Web.	3	Apr.	2017.	168	Sanneh,	Kelefa.	"Untangling	the	Immigration	Debate."	The	New	Yorker.	The	New	Yorker,	31	Oct.	2016.	Web.	02	Apr.	2017.	
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undertones	and	fear-based	motivation,	the	court	asked	the	state:	“Are	Syrians	the	only	Muslims	Indiana	fears?”169		Several	other	Governors	followed	Pence’s	lead	and	responded	with	policies	that	barred	refugees	from	entering	their	states.170	The	court	established	that	states	couldn’t	discriminate	against	immigrants	because	only	the	Federal	government	has	the	right	to	decide	who	can	and	cannot	come	into	the	country.	Assuming	that	the	most	powerful	members	of	the	government	will	execute	the	laws	with	great	care	and	integrity,	this	should	have	been	a	victory,	but	such	was	not	the	case.		 		
6.1	The	“Muslim”	Ban		 Just	weeks	after	his	inauguration	President	Trump	signed	an	Executive	Order	sticking	to	his	promise	of	banning	Muslims	from	the	country.	On	January	27,	2017	he	revealed	his	policy	which	declared	a	suspension	of	all	immigration	for	90	days	and	of	new	refugee	entries	for	120	days	from	seven	Muslim-	majority	countries:	Iraq,	Syria,	Iran,	Somalia,	Yemen,	Sudan	and	Libya.	Ironically,	the	couple	behind	the	San	Bernardino	terror	attack,	the	event	that	initially	prompted	Trump’s	proposal	for	a	Muslim	ban	(or	gave	him	an	excuse	to	execute	it),	had	ties	to	two	Muslim-majority	countries,	Saudi	Arabia	and	Pakistan--	yet	those	countries	were	left	off	the	list.	We	can	speculate	as	to	why:	perhaps	it	was	due	to	U.S.	oil	interests,	or	the	need	to	maintain	some	allies	in	the	Middle	East,	or	maybe	it	was	because	of	Trump’s	personal	business	interests.	But	regardless	of	the	reason,	Saudi	Arabia,	the	largest	breeder	of	radical	extremist	Islam	in	the	world,	was	not	on	the	list.171	The	
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methodology	behind	the	selection	of	countries	is	not	clear,	leading	much	of	the	population	to	question	the	ability	of	the	ban	to	aid	in	counter-terrorism.	The	Court	found	that,	“the	Government	has	not	offered	any	evidence	or	even	an	explanation	of	how	the	national	security	concerns	that	justified	those	designations.”	172	Politicians	in	Trump’s	own	party	have	expressed	their	shock	and	disappointment	as	well.			 Reaction	to	the	travel	ban	has	highlighted	a	divide	on	both	policy	and	principle.	Senate	Minority	Leader	Chuck	Schumer	eloquently	articulated	the	sentiments	of	many	Americans.	He	said,	“Tears	are	running	down	the	cheeks	of	the	Statue	of	Liberty	tonight	as	a	grand	tradition	of	America,	welcoming	immigrants,	that	has	existed	since	America	was	founded	has	been	stomped	upon."173	President	Bush	went	out	of	his	way	to	urge	tolerance	after	being	asked	about	Trump’s	Muslim	ban.	Bush	emphasized	America’s	strength	as	a	country	in	which	people	are	free	to	worship	as	they	please.174	The	American	public	was	split	on	the	issue.	A	poll	conducted	for	Reuters	at	the	end	of	January	found	that	48	percent	of	Americans	agreed	with	Trump’s	executive	order,	while	41	percent	disagreed.	When	asked	if	the	Order	set	a	good	example	of	how	to	best	confront	terrorism	the	number	declined	to	38	percent.175	Of	the	Americans	polled,	34	percent	said	they	had	heard	of	it	but	did	not	know	any	details	or	were	unfamiliar,	reducing	the	validity	of	the	poll’s	suggestion	that	a	majority	of	Americans	support	the	ban.	Nonetheless	a	fairly	significant	percent	of	Americans	were	found	to	be	in	favor	of	the	ban.																																																																																																																																																																																				Connolly,	Amanda.	"Saudi	Arabia	a	‘Breeding	Ground’	for	Terrorism,	Imam	Tells	Committee."	IPolitics.	N.p.,	02	Feb.	2015.	Web.	02	Apr.	2017.	3.	Van	der	Galien,	Michael.	"Saudi	Arabia	Is	the	Main	Culprit	of	Jihadism:	2.000	Saudis	Joined	Terrorist	Groups	Abroad."	Trending.	N.p.,	27	Dec.	2016.	Web.	02	Apr.	2017.	172	"The	State	of	Washington	V.	Donald	J.	Trump."	For	Publication	in	United	States	Court	of	Appeals…”	173	Merica,	Dan.	"Trump	Signs	Executive	Order	to	Keep	out	'Radical	Islamic	Terrorists'"	CNN.	Cable	News	Network,	28	Jan.	2017.	Web.	28	Jan.	2017.	174	Baker,	Peter.	"Former	President	George	W.	Bush	Levels	Tacit	Criticism	at	Trump."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times	Company,	27	Feb.	2017.	Web.	30	Mar.	2017.	175	"Ipsos	Poll	Conducted	for	Reuters	–Immigration	Ban	1.31.17."	Ispsos	/	Reuters	Thomson,	31	Jan.	2017.	Web.	1	Apr.	2017.	
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Several	states	felt	differently	and	were	propelled	to	action	by	the	belief	that	the	ban	was	morally	and	constitutionally	wrong.	A	number	of	states	filed	suits	challenging	the	constitutionality	of	President	Trump’s	travel	ban.	On	February	3,	U.S.	Federal	district	Judge	James	Robart	of	the	Ninth	Circuit	Court	issued	a	restraining	order	to	halt	Trump’s	order	nationwide.	In	the	case,	the	State	of	Washington	and	Minnesota	sued	the	President	and	The	Department	of	Justice	alleging	that	“the	Executive	Order	was	not	truly	meant	to	protect	against	terror	attacks	by	foreign	nationals	but	rather	was	intended	to	enact	a	“Muslim	ban”	as	the	President	had	stated	during	his	presidential	campaign…”176	The	DOJ	filed	an	appeal,	but	the	court	affirmed	the	earlier	ruling	and	denied	the	request.	The	three	Judge	Court	did	not	rule	on	the	constitutionality	of	the	ban	deciding	it	was	too	early	to	make	a	decision	on	claims	of	religious	discrimination,	but	found	the	government	had	not	shown	a	likelihood	of	success	or	that	failure	to	enter	a	stay	would	cause	irreparable	harm.	Trump	responded	by	revising	the	travel	ban	to	six	countries,	and	allowing	those	with	permanent	residence,	such	as	students,	engineers,	tourists,	and	relatives	to	enter	the	country.	Following	the	second	revised	order,	a	judge	in	Hawaii	argued	that	because	Trump	had	asserted	that	he	wanted	a	“Muslim	ban”	and	had	said	to	former	New	York	Mayor	Rudy	Giuliani	“show	me	the	right	way	to	do	it	legally,”	the	order	established	religious	preference	violating	the	Establishment	Clause.177	Federal	judge	Theodore	D.	Chuang	of	Maryland	agreed	in	a	narrower	ruling	and	called	for	an	indefinite	injunction	arguing	that	the	ban	continued	to	discriminate	against	Muslims	even	though	the	President	had	taken	out	stipulation	on	preference	for	“minority	religions.”	Judge	Chuang	was	willing	to	establish	the	obvious.	In	the	context	of	Trump’s																																																									176	"The	State	of	Washington	V.	Donald	J.	Trump."	For	Publication	in	United	States	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	...	U.S.	Courts,	n.d.	Web.	02	Apr.	2017.	177	Wang,	Amy	B.	"Trump	asked	for	a	‘Muslim	ban,’	Giuliani	says	-	and	ordered	a	commission	to	do	it	‘legally’."	
The	Washington	Post.	WP	Company,	29	Jan.	2017.	Web.	04	Apr.	2017.	
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statement	the	Muslim	ban	was	clearly	a	form	of	religious	discrimination.	He	stated,	“The	history	of	public	statements	continues	to	provide	a	convincing	case	that	the	purpose	of	the	Second	Executive	Order	remains	the	realization	of	the	long-envisioned	Muslim	ban.”178 The	 director	of	the	ACLU	David	Cole	believed	Chuang	statements	to	be	true	and	said	the	revised	order	is	still	“religious	discrimination	in	the	pre-textual	guise	of	national	security.	And	it’s	still	unconstitutional.”179	For	now	the	courts	have	spoken	and	ruled	Trump’s	order	is	unconstitutional.		 The	Muslim	ban	or	Executive	Order	case	is	also	noteworthy	for	its	future	implications.	In	light	of	reasonable	public	support	for	the	ban,	the	judges’	ruling	was	a	reminder	of	the	country’s	commitment	to	uphold	its	constitutional	values.		It	is	also	likely	to	end	up	in	the	Supreme	Court	and	with	a	newly	appointed	conservative	judge	there	is	a	possibility	that	the	case	may	be	decided	in	Trump’s	favor.	The	ruling	will	be	a	landmark	case	establishing	the	limits	of	religious	policy	for	the	future.	It	will	set	precedent	for	future	immigration	bans	and	will	define	the	scope	of	the	Courts	ability	to	limit	the	president’s	power.	Only	time	will	tell	who	will	prevail,	Trump	and	those	who	feel	there	is	cause	for	limiting	religious	freedom,	or	champions	of	U.S.	multiculturalism	who	want	to	promote	religious	freedom.	
	
6.2	Islam	in	U.S.	politics:	Is	the	U.S.	Obsessed?		 Many	Americans,	politicians	and	civilians	alike,	have	been	scratching	their	heads	trying	to	figure	out	why	since	2016	there	is	a	newfound	and	prominent	focus	on	Islam	and	Muslims	in	American	mainstream	politics.	There	are	several	sound	explanations	for	this.																																																									178	Zapotosky,	Matt.	"Second	federal	judge	blocks	revised	Trump	travel	ban."	The	Washington	Post.	WP	Company,	16	Mar.	2017.	Web.	13	Apr.	2017.	179	Savage,	David.	"Trump's	new	travel	ban	will	be	harder	to	challenge	in	court,	but	critics	say	it	still	targets	Muslims."	Los	Angeles	Times.	Los	Angeles	Times,	6	Mar.	2017.	Web.	02	Apr.	2017.	
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The	first	is	that	multiple	sectors	of	government	have	become	involved	in	maintaining	national	security.	The	U.S.	has	long	considered	radical	extremist	Islam	to	be	a	threat	to	U.S.	national	security,	even	prior	to	the	presidential	campaign	and	President	Trump’s	election.	In	the	past,	the	need	to	create	policy	to	combat	the	threat	of	“radical	Islam”	was	left	to	national	security	experts,	the	department	of	homeland	security,	the	military	and	so	on.	More	recently	security	policy	has	permeated	multiple	policy	areas.	American	immigration,	religious	and	discrimination	policy	also	seek	to	play	a	role	in	combatting	the	threat,	bringing	these	issues	to	the	mainstream	and	into	the	minds	of	millions	of	Americans.			 The	other	explanations	are	conditional	rather	than	institutional.	The	American	public	has	once	again	grown	concerned	because	of	a	combination	of	factors.	The	formation	of	a	new	Muslim	terrorist	group	ISIS,	which	stands	for	the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	and	Syria,	as	opposed	to	Al	Qaeda.	Al	Qaeda,	which	is	also	a	radical	Islamic	terrorist	group	does	not	have	the	key	piercing	word	‘Islamic’	in	it,	nor	does	it	refer	to	a	specific	country.		A	second	factor	is	the	rise	in	Islamic	inspired	terrorism	and	a	rise	in	the	reporting	of	that	terrorism.	Next	is	the	impact	of	the	Syrian	refugee	crisis,	which	has	caused	major	debate	in	Europe	after	it	was	discovered	that	one	of	the	November	13	Paris	attackers	had	entered	the	country	as	a	Syrian	refugee.	American	citizens	are	informed	by	the	actions	of	our	allies	in	Europe	who	are	dealing	with	these	issues.	Trump’s	proposal	to	ban	travel	from	six	Muslim	Majority	countries	resembles	France’s	reaction	to	close	its	doors	to	refugees	after	what	they	called	an	intelligence	failure.	Both	actions	stem	from	the	same	rationale;	the	difference	is	that	France	claimed	responsibility	for	its	intelligence	failure,	while	Trump	has	put	the	onus	on	Muslims.		
	
6.3	How	Are	Muslims	Faring	in	the	U.S.?		 From	a	policy	perspective	it	is	interesting	to	recognize	that	Americans	have	different	
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attitudes	towards	“Islam”	and	“Muslims.”		Americans	have	distinguished	between	their	views	on	Islam	(the	religion	in	abstract	form)	and	their	views	of	Muslims	(a	people)	leading	them	to	accept	a	policy	that	targets	Islam	but	less	so	policy	that	blocks	Muslims.	A	Brookings	poll	found	that	in	2011,	39	percent	of	Americans	had	favorable	views	of	Islam.	When	Americans	were	asked	about	their	views	on	Muslims,	a	larger	percentage	(50	percent)	expressed	favorable	views.180	The	poll	results	show	that	Americans	have	more	favorable	views	of	Muslims	than	they	do	of	Islam.	The	researcher	suggested	that	Americans	associate	Muslim	with	the	Muslim	population	in	the	country,	and	Islam	with	the	foreign	threat	of	the	religion.		The	differing	poll	results	are	unsurprising	because	Americans	have	been	primed	to	differentiate	between	Muslims	and	Islam.	Strong	anti-discrimination	laws	have	made	it	harder	for	Americans	to	express	prejudice	towards	a	people.	Islam	however	is	more	abstract	making	it	more	acceptable	to	reject.	Furthermore,	favorable	views	of	Muslims	have	increased	from	50	percent	expressing	favorable	views	in	2011	to	53	percent	in	2015.	181	Prejudice	towards	Muslims,	or	minorities	of	any	kind	had	not	been	acceptable	in	the	country’s	political	landscape	for	decades,	until	now,	until	Trump.	Unfavorable	views	of	Islam	have	increased	significantly	from	2001	(37	percent)	to	2015	(61	percent).	This	means	the	country	has	a	problem	with	Islam	that	stands	to	get	worse	under	Trump’s	administration.			 It	is	interesting	that	Americans	have	a	more	negative	view	and	a	heightened	concern	about	foreign	threats	of	Islam,	when	the	greatest	recent	threats	to	the	U.S.	have	been	homegrown	terrorists.	Based	on	risk	assessment,	the	U.S.	should	be	more	concerned	with	potential	attacks	from	domestic	terrorists	than	foreign	ones.	Of	the	U.S.	attacks	by	Muslims	
																																																								180	Telhami,	Shibley.	"What	Americans	really	think	about	Muslims	and	Islam."	Brookings.	Brookings,	16	Aug.	2016.	Web.	3	Apr.	2017.	181	Telhami,	Shibley.	"What	Americans	really	think	about	Muslims	and	Islam."		
	 85	
in	the	last	15	years,	American	residents	or	citizens	have	perpetrated	the	majority.182	That	being	said	the	percentage	of	American	Muslims	who	participate	in	terror	attacks	is	very	small.	Overall	Muslims	in	America	have	proven	themselves	loyal	to	the	U.S..		 		 Dearborn,	Michigan,	home	to	three	times	the	percent	of	Muslims	as	the	national	average,	is	one	example	of	proof	of	loyalty	and	patriotism.	Sometimes	called	the	“Arab	capital	of	North	America”	Dearborn	is	home	to	the	largest	mosque	in	the	U.S.,	the	Arab	Museum,	halal	McDonald’s	and	numerous	Middle	Eastern	cafes,	and	has	never	posed	a	threat	to	the	country	or	community.	Residents	of	the	town	interact	with	one	another	unafraid	of	their	neighbors.	This	is	because	the	Dearborn	Police	Department	has	implemented	smart	policies	that	build	trust	between	the	Muslim	community	and	the	officers.	In	the	past	several	years	fathers	have	turned	in	sons	they	suspected	of	succumbing	to	radical	online	propaganda,	students	have	turned	in	peers	and	Muslims	have	reported	FBI	informants	sent	in	to	infiltrate	communities	for	being	suspicious.			 The	high	levels	of	cooperation	between	police	and	American	Muslims	are	not	unique	to	Dearborn.	A	member	of	a	mosque	in	Virginia	turned	in	a	fellow	Pakistani	American	when	he	learned	of	his	plans	to	blow	up	a	Metrorail	in	2010.	Another	informant	alerted	the	FBI	of	the	plans	of	three	Muslim	teens	to	move	to	Syria	to	join	ISIS	in	2014.183	Furthermore,	Pew	reports	that	76	percent	of	Muslim	Americans	are	very	or	somewhat	concerned	with	the	rise	of	Islamic	extremism	around	the	world,	compared	with	a	close	81	percent	of	the	general	U.S.		population.	Contrary	to	statements	made	by	GOP	leaders	that	the	U.S.	cannot	trust	and	therefore	must	ban	all	Muslims,	the	Dearborn	Muslim	community	has	been	highly																																																									182	Barrett,	James.	"A	Complete	List	of	Radical	Islamic	Terror	Attacks	on	U.S.	Soil	Under	Obama."	Daily	Wire.	Daily	Wire,	07	Dec.	2016.	Web.	01	Apr.	2017.	183	Hirsh,	Michael,	Malcolm	Nance,	Daniel	Benjamin,	Mike	Ross,	Andrés	Miguel	Rondón,	Aron	Lund,	and	Virginia	Heffernan.	"Inside	the	FBI’s	Secret	Muslim	Network."	POLITICO	Magazine.	Politco	LLC,	24	Mar.	2016.	Web.	06	Apr.	2017.	
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cooperative	and	patriotic.184	Those	statements	are	wrong,	but	worse	they	diminish	trust,	offset	prior	success	of	programs	and	promote	exclusion.	Ayman	Taleb,	a	31-year-old	born	and	raised	in	Dallas,	Texas,	said,	"In	America,	if	you're	anything	other	than	a	WASP,	then	you're	defined	as	the	'other,'	and	whenever	a	few	select	individuals	do	something	outside	the	law,	the	entire	community	is	associated.	No	community	should	have	to	bear	the	responsibility,	no	community	should	have	to	apologize	or	be	asked	to	apologize."185	Dearborn	Chief	of	Police	Ronald	Haddad	adds	that,	“statements	that	tend	to	ignite	fear,	adversity	in	our	community,	just	diverts	us	from	what	we	normally	do	to	keep	our	community	safe.”186	America	has	not	yet	solved	its	problem,	but	Dearborn	should	serve	as	an	example	of	sound	procedure	and	policy-making,	not	just	for	the	U.S.	but	for	France	as	well.		 This	one-third	Arab	city	has	often	been	compared	to	many	of	the	banlieue	of	Paris,	but	they	are	different	in	several	very	important	ways.	Unlike	France,	the	Muslim	Arab	community	of	Dearborn	is	not	isolated	from	the	rest	of	the	city.	They	are	connected	to	the	community,	they	participate	in	politics,	and	they	make	up	a	majority	of	the	city	council.	187	The	same	is	true	of	the	American	Muslim	population	as	a	whole.	The	majority	form	part	of	the	middle-class	and	71	percent	believe	in	the	American	dream.	Furthermore	American	Muslims	share	the	same	anxieties	over	terrorism.	Pew	found	that	51	percent	are	very	
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concerned	about	Islamic	extremism,	compared	to	just	35	percent	of	the	Muslim	population	in	France.188			 The	French	could	learn	a	few	lessons	from	U.S.	policy	and	strategy	regarding	Islam	and	Muslims.	For	one,	the	Outreach-and-Informant	Program	works	far	better	than	the	police	patrolling	in	France.	Additionally,	U.S.	Discrimination	and	freedom	of	religion	laws	protect	Muslims	by	sending	the	message	that	they	are	just	as	much	members	of	the	country	as	anyone	else.	Proof	of	this	is	that	American	Muslims	are	far	more	assimilated	and	patriotic	than	the	Muslims	in	the	banlieue.	The	added	aspect	of	what	may	be	interpreted	by	many	French	Muslims	as	religious	persecution	leads	the	residents	of	the	banlieue	to	feel	a	stronger	sense	of	exclusion	and	non-acceptance.	There	are	however	some	instances	of	attempts	to	enact	exclusionary	policy	in	the	U.S.,	but	there	are	far	fewer	examples	of	this	than	in	France.			 Unbeknownst	to	many	Americans,	several	states	have	laws	similar	to	the	2004	French	Law	that	bars	religious	garb	at	schools.	Pennsylvania,	Oregon	and	Nebraska	are	three	such	states.	In	Pennsylvania	and	Oregon	the	courts	have	upheld	challenges	brought	under	the	First	Amendment	and	Title	VII	to	the	religious	garb	law	that	forbids	teachers	from	wearing	religious	costume	at	school.	The	court	ruled	in	the	case	in	Pennsylvania,	U.S.	
V.	Board	of	Education	(1990)	that	the	school	had	acted	pursuant	to	its	“Garb	Statute”	when	it	informed	a	female	Muslim	teacher	she	could	not	work	if	she	wore	a	her	veil.	When	reviewed	after	an	appeal,	the	court	upheld	its	initial	ruling	determining	that	“the	
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preservation	of	religious	neutrality	is	a	compelling	state	interest.”189	In	the	similar	1986	Oregon	case	the	court	ruled	on	parallel	grounds	in	favor	of	the	state.		 	 		 More	recently	however	the	states	have	attempted	to	correct	discriminatory	legislation	of	its	past	and	courts	have	ruled	in	favor	of	religious	rights.	This	March,	Nebraska	lawmakers	passed	a	bill	to	lift	the	state’s	ban	on	public	school	teachers	wearing	religious	garb	such	as	hijabs,	yarmulkes	and	habits.	The	new	legislation	sought	to	correct	the	discriminatory	ban	passed	in	1919	under	pressure	from	the	Ku	Klux	Klan.	Pennsylvania	has	also	passed	legislation	repealing	their	similar	ban.	There	has	also	been	a	rise	in	individual	claims	to	religious	freedom.	Muslims,	who	make	up	a	minority	religious	group	in	the	U.S.,	have	brought	more	suits	as	they	try	to	gain	acceptance	for	their	religion.	In	2015	a	young	Muslim	woman	sued	Abercrombie	and	Fitch	for	discriminating	against	her	and	denying	her	a	job	for	wearing	a	hijab.	It	was	the	second	case	that	term	that	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	in	favor	of	a	Muslim	and	religious	freedom.190	These	cases	are	evidence	of	the	fact	that	the	United	States	and	France	grapple	with	the	same	issues,	but	solve	them	in	different	ways.			 Each	country’s	sense	of	national	identity	and	national	values	has	led	to	a	different	outcome	and	policy	response.	The	U.S.	prioritizes	the	individual	while	France	prioritizes	the	state.	In	addition,	state-level	religious	motivated	legislation	and	regulation	in	the	U.S.	has	not	created	the	same	outcry	that	the	national	laws	have	generated	in	France.	Repression	of	the	religious	liberties	of	the	Muslims	in	France	accounts	for	lower	levels	of	integration.	Contrarily,	higher	levels	of	assimilation	and	employment	among	the	U.S.																																																									189	"Can	a	Teacher	Wear	Religious	Garb	to	School,	Provided	the	Teacher	Does	Not	Proselytize	to	the	Students?"	Newseum	Institute.	Newseum	Institute,	2017.	Web.	01	Apr.	2017.	190	Hurley,	Lawrence.	"U.S.	top	court	backs	Muslim	woman	denied	job	over	head	scarf."	Reuters.	Thomson	Reuters,	01	June	2015.	Web.	02	Apr.	2017.		
	 89	
Muslim	minority	suggest	they	are	better	off	than	their	French	counterparts.	Trump’s	rhetoric	has	already	threatened	this,	but	his	policies	have	the	potential	to	create	lasting	and	disastrous	change.		
	
6.4	The	Media:	The	Culprit	of	Misplaced	Fears		 President	Trump	cannot	be	blamed	alone.	He	may	perpetuate	the	idea	that	Muslims	are	dangerous	but	the	media	has	skewed	American	opinion	for	decades.	Only	a	handful	of	Muslims	have	committed	terrorist	attacks,	yet	it	seems	as	though	it	has	become	common	practice,	why?	Because	the	media	has	disproportionately	spent	more	time	reporting	on	the	attacks	perpetrated	by	Muslims.	Researchers	at	the	Georgia	State	University	did	a	study	on	terrorism	and	the	effects	of	media	skew	from	2011	to	2015.	They	found	that	for	those	five	years	Muslims	carried	out	11	of	the	89	attacks	in	the	U.S.,	yet	the	attacks	by	Muslims	received	44	percent	of	the	media	coverage.	The	exaggerated	media	focus	on	Islam	inspired	terrorism	has	skewed	American’s	and	Trump’s	perception	of	the	true	danger	of	foreign	Muslim	terrorists.	The	researchers	found	that	the	risk	of	being	killed	in	a	jihadist	terror	attack	in	the	U.S.	in	the	last	15	years	amounted	to	roughly	1	in	2,640,000.191	An	important	step	in	mitigating	the	tension	between	America	and	Islam	is	eliminating	this	bias.		The	media	should	make	a	greater	effort	to	expend	the	same	amount	of	resources	covering	non-Muslim	terror	attacks	as	it	does	for	the	Islamic-motivated	attacks.	This	will	give	Americans	a	clearer	and	more	fact-based	perspective.				 The	United	States	is	far	from	solving	its	religious	liberty	issues	and	will	likely	never	come	up	with	a	solution	that	leaves	everyone	completely	content.		With	the	creation	of	
																																																								191	Bailey,	Ronald.	"Do	Muslims	Commit	Most	U.S.	Terrorist	Attacks?"	Reason.com.	Reason	Foundation,	24	Mar.	2017.	Web.	01	Apr.	2017.	
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RFRA	and	RLUIPA	the	U.S.	added	the	necessary	legislation	needed	to	safeguard	the	rights	of	religious	minorities.	Today,	the	battle	for	Muslims	in	the	U.S.	is	far	more	ideological	than	fact	based.	As	a	result	upholding	the	laws	and	the	values	that	inspired	them	is	ever	more	important.	Multiculturalism	is	common	practice	in	the	United	States,	the	land	of	liberty,	equality	and	justice,	but	the	challenge	will	be	continuing	this	tradition.	The	Muslim	population	is	predicted	to	double	by	2050	due	in	large	part	to	immigration	according	to	Pew.	The	clash	between	Muslims	and	Americans	will	not	dissipate.	Altogether,	the	new	administration	brings	with	it	a	vastly	different	set	of	values,	far	different	from	any	previous	Republican	Administrations.	The	United	States	must	continue	to	hold	its	values	close	and	embrace	diversity,	especially	religious	diversity	not	only	for	the	sake	of	religious	freedom	and	civil	rights	but	also	for	the	sake	of	national	security.	Fighting	Islam	with	bigotry	will	not	reduce	its	threat.	Fighting	Islam	instead	with	acceptance,	trust-building	programs	and	fair	religious	policy	will.											
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CONCLUSION		 		 America	and	France	are	two	democratic	nations	founded	in	the	same	period	with	constitutions	that	guarantee	its	people	very	similar	fundamental	rights.	Yet	the	American	definition	of	religious	freedom	and	understanding	of	religious	tolerance	differs	immensely	from	France’s.	For	the	most	part,	the	American	ethos	of	live	and	let	live	or	accommodation	has	kept	the	peace	by	upholding	religious	freedom.	To	keep	the	peace	in	their	nation,	the	French	installed	a	policy	of	laïcité.			 Today	we	see	the	results	of	these	different	policy	approaches.		The	French	have	made	it	illegal	for	Muslim	women	to	wear	headscarves,	and	the	Americans	have	made	it	illegal	to	discriminate	against	women	wearing	them.	Even	when	data	has	proven	that	some	Muslims	do	pose	a	threat	to	national	security,	the	U.S.	Courts	have	upheld	American	laws	and	values	and	agreed	that	the	threat	of	a	small	percentage	of	Muslims	is	not	enough	to	justify	spying	on	Muslim	communities,	banning	all	Muslims	from	entering	the	country	and	passing	legislation	that	limits	religious	expression	in	the	guise	of	national	security	concerns.	This	has	not	always	been	the	case,	but	the	U.S.	has	tried	to	enforce	its	policy	of	tolerance,	non-discrimination	and	inclusion	towards	Muslims,	and	has	instead	focused	on	combatting	foreign	threats	of	Islam.	France	on	the	other	hand	has	imposed	a	regime	of	laïcité	and	called	for	a	public	space	free	from	religion,	leading	to	laws	that	the	Muslim	community	often	considers	discriminatory.		 In	recent	years	there	has	been	an	increase	in	legislation	and	policy	that	discriminates,	restricts	and	excludes	religious	groups,	and	those	policies	have	predominantly	and	negatively	affected	Muslims	in	both	countries.	These	policies	have	sent	the	message	to	Muslims	that	Islam	is	not	consistent	with	American	or	French	values,	and	
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that	Muslim	populations	pose	a	danger	to	national	security.	This	policy	also	has	the	effect	of	creating	barriers	to	integration	and	exacerbating	relations	between	the	Western	and	Muslim	worlds.	In	spite	of	their	differences,	both	countries	share	strengths	and	weaknesses	in	their	approaches	to	public	policy.			 A	principle	strength	of	the	American	approach	is	the	value	it	places	on	religious	tolerance.	This	emphasis	on	religious	tolerance	and	freedom	has	been	effective.	There	have	been	fewer	challenges	by	American	Muslims	over	the	right	to	religious	freedom	than	the	French,	in	large	part	because	the	U.S.	government	has	not	passed	legislation	limiting	the	religious	freedom	of	Muslims	the	way	France	has.	When	there	have	been	disputes	of	religious	freedom	in	the	U.S.,	many	have	occurred	at	the	state	level.	Some	states	have	passed	or	attempted	to	pass	legislation	regulating	the	construction	of	mosques,	stemming	from	the	fact	that	a	few	mosques	have	been	found	to	preach	radical	Islam.	Other	proposed	policies	have	attempted	to	ban	Sharia	law,	religious	wear,	and	Muslim	immigration,	all	of	which	impose	limits	on	religious	freedom	and	discriminate	on	the	basis	of	religion.	Nonetheless	the	lack	of	national	religious	legislation	of	this	nature	has	kept	tensions	between	Muslims	and	America	relatively	low,	compared	to	France.		 This	is	one	of	the	key	differences	between	the	two	countries	that	indicates	that	the	U.S.	will	likely	continue	to	protect	the	religious	liberties	of	its	citizens	in	the	next	four	years	despite	Trump’s	presidency,	while	France,	if	Le	Pen	is	elected	in	the	second	round	of	the	presidential	election,	may	not.	American’s	attitudes	towards	Muslim	people	have	become	increasingly	more	favorable	from	53	percent	in	November	2015	to	70	percent	in	October	
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2016,	despite	the	mounting	anti-Muslim	rhetoric.192	One	explanation	for	this	is,	the	more	Trump	emphasized	the	issue,	the	more	the	Democrats,	who	are	largely	responsible	for	the	huge	increase	in	favorability,	adopted	the	opposite	position;	that	Muslims	are	not	in	fact	a	threat	to	the	country’s	identity	or	security.	This	should	provide	the	American	people	with	hope	and	optimism	for	the	future.	The	silver	lining	of	a	polarizing	president,	Trump	may	open	the	eyes	of	the	American	people	to	a	previously	unimagined	future	and	mobilize	his	opposition.	Hopefully	the	same	is	true	of	France,	should	Le	Pen	win.		 	Trump’s	approach	to	Islam	is	not	new,	but	it	has	been	the	most	shocking	of	past	presidents.	The	U.S.	tends	to	react	to	national	security	threats	with	an	outward	approach.	After	9/11	the	U.S.	responded	with	an	offense	and	invaded	two	Muslim	majority	countries.	A	few	years	later	the	U.S.	sought	to	reduce	Al	Qaeda’s	influence	by	mobilizing	groups	in	Afghanistan	to	aid	the	U.S.	in	its	operation	to	neutralize	Bin	Laden.	Furthermore,	the	U.S.	has	continued	to	defend	moderate	leaders	and	governments	abroad	against	radical	Islamic	governments.	Meanwhile	France	tends	to	look	for	potential	dangers	within	the	nation.	Past	legislation	in	France,	such	as	the	2011	headscarf	ban,	has	targeted	the	Muslim	population	within	the	country.	More	recently	after	a	string	of	terror	attacks	from	2015	to	2017,	the	French	government	has	imposed	legislation	that	limits	the	religious	expression	of	Muslims	such	as	the	burkini	ban,	and	has	implemented	policies	like	the	Declaration	of	State	of	Emergency	policy	following	the	November	attacks,	that	has	constrained	the	civil	liberties	of	the	population.	Trump’s	ban	exemplifies	the	completely	different	American	policy	pattern.	According	to	him,	his	Executive	Order	seeks	to	contain	the	foreign	threats.	It	is	difficult	to	determine	if	one	policy	response	has	worked	better	than	another	considering	all	of	the																																																									192	Telhami,	Shibley.	"	How	Trump	changed	Americans’	view	of	Islam	–	for	the	better."	The	Washington	Post.	WP	Company,	25	Jan.	2017.	Web.	15	Apr.	2017.	
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geopolitical	factors	that	influence	each	nation.	However	on	a	very	basic	level,	it	may	be	possible	that	the	U.S.	strategy	of	eliminating	foreign	threats	has	worked	better	than	France’s	strategy	of	policing	its	Muslim	population.			 By	comparing	the	number	of	Islam	inspired	terror	attacks	and	challenges	to	religious	freedom	in	each	country	we	can	deduce	the	effectiveness	of	each	strategy.	The	U.S.	has	suffered	fewer	terror	attacks	by	Muslims	or	adherents	of	the	Islamic	State	than	France	in	the	last	few	years.193	There	have	also	been	fewer	challenges	by	Muslims	over	the	right	to	religious	freedom.	A	reasonable	conclusion	then	may	be	that	the	United	States’	strategy	of	focusing	on	external	threats	has	worked.	But,	upon	closer	examination	this	theory	seems	incorrect.	It	is	not	that	the	focus	on	outside	threats	has	thwarted	terror	attacks	in	the	U.S.,	but	rather	the	lack	of	stringent	laws	that	target	and	treat	all	Muslims	as	a	security	threat	has	not	created	the	sense	of	exclusion	of	Muslims	that	French	policy	has.		The	French	have	a	problem	with	homegrown	terrorism	that	the	U.S.,	at	least	until	2015,	did	not	have.	A	resident	of	the	French	banlieue	explained	that	he	believed	Larossi	Abballa,	the	French	jihadist	terrorist	who	stabbed	a	French	police	officer	in	December	of	2016,	had	committed	an	act	of	terror	because	of	revenge.	He	said	the	French	government	keeps	pressuring	them	to	conform	and	put	the	state	first,	“but	we	will	not	give	up	our	religion.	And	if	it	leads	to	a	clash…”194	It	therefore	seems	likely	that	the	root	of	France’s	Muslim	dilemma	stems	from	its	response	of	restricting	religion,	which	has	disproportionately	affected	Muslims.	This	brings	us	to	another	point	of	comparison:	integration	of	each	country’s	Muslim	population.																																																										193	There	have	been	17	Islam	inspire	terror	attacks	in	France	in	the	last	year	and	11	in	the	U.S.	from	2011-2015.	194	Worth,	Robert	F.	"The	Professor	and	the	Jihadi."	The	New	York	Times.	The	New	York	Times	Company,	05	Apr.	2017.	Web.	14	Apr.	2017.	
	 95	
	 Integration	has	failed	in	France	for	several	reasons.	Its	rigid	sense	of	what	it	means	to	be	French	and	its	one-way	model	of	integration	have	created	an	environment	where	discrimination	can	flourish	behind	the	veil	of	the	French	tradition	of	unity.	The	laws	that	attempt	to	make	everyone	the	same	by	instilling	a	regime	of	secularism	certainly	have	not	helped	the	Muslim	community	integrate.	One	issue	is	that	the	rigid	French	identity	does	not	support	integration.	For	integration	to	be	successful	both	the	receiving	country	and	the	immigrant	population	must	make	cultural	sacrifices	and	compromise.	Instead	France	has	a	model	of	assimilation,	which	clearly	has	not	been	sufficient.	The	opposition	to	Islam	in	France	has	been	manifested	in	legislation	banning	veils	and	burkinis.	In	doing	so	France	has	developed	a	reputation	especially	among	its	Muslim	population	of	being	as	anti-Islam.	France	is	unwilling	to	accept	someone	as	French	and	Muslim.	This	has	created	an	attitudinal	and	social	problem	causing	Muslims	in	France	to	feel	unwelcome,	isolated	and	excluded,	which	in	turn	has	led	them	to	withdraw	from	society	and	has	hurt	their	odds	of	socio-economic	integration.		Still	it	is	not	just	the	restrictive	laws	affecting	religion,	but	also	the	lack	of	economic	progress	among	Muslim	immigrants	that	has	stifled	integration.	The	two	are	very	closely	related.	Religious	discrimination	has	prevented	immigrants	from	economic	integration,	just	as	economic	integration	and	the	settlement	of	Muslims	in	the	banlieue	has	led	the	French	to	view	them	in	a	negative	light,	as	“other.”	Muslims	have	settled	in	the	banlieue	were	they	are	separated	from	the	French	and	lack	access	to	good	education	and	schools.	The	outcome	is	lower	levels	of	income	and	education	among	Muslims	in	France.	Muslims	have	less	access	to	education,	face	social	discrimination	in	hiring,	live	in	de	facto	ghettos,	and	lack	government	programs	to	include	Muslim	immigrants	into	the	workforce.	The	de-facto	discrimination	is	
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linked	to	France’s	colonial	hegemony	prior	to	1960.	However,	the	recent	tensions	have	exacerbated	discrimination.	Lack	of	integration	and	socio-economic	inequality	is	far	more	of	an	issue	in	France,	than	it	is	in	U.S.	and	it	is	likely	because	the	French	government	has	created	legislation	that	disproportionately	and	obviously	discriminates	against	Muslims.		 		 The	governments’	wariness	towards	Muslims	and	failure	of	integration	has	created	a	greater	potential	for	domestic	terrorism	to	thrive.	The	terrorist	of	the	April	20,	shooting	in	Paris	on	the	Champs-Eylsees,	for	which	ISIS	claimed	responsibility,	was	a	Muslim	French	national	living	in	a	banlieue	East	of	Paris	who	had	affirmed	his	hatred	for	police	and	French	authority	on	multiple	occasions.195	The	ideology	used	to	justify	the	terror	attacks	has	nothing	to	do	with	protecting	jobs	or	legislation	on	religion:	it	sees	all	of	French	society	as	the	enemy.	As	a	result,	France’s	anti-Muslim	policies	have	not	succeeded	in	integrating	their	Muslim	communities,	which	has	created	a	sharp	divide	in	the	nation	that	increasingly	poses	a	national	security	threat.			 The	U.S.	on	the	other	hand	has	succeeding	in	balancing	religious	policy	and	national	identity	and	security.	One	indication	of	this	is	the	extent	of	integration	among	Muslim	Americans.	A	policy	of	multiculturalism	and	religious	tolerance	has	encouraged	integration	in	the	U.S..	This	policy	has	led	to	consistent	rates	of	education	and	socio-economic	and	cultural	integration.	A	high	percentage	of	Muslim	Americans	(30	percent),	foreign	and	native	born,	are	colleges	graduates,	compared	to	18	percent	of	the	general	American	population.196	In	terms	of	income,	Muslims	seem	to	be	on	equal	ground	with	Americans,	at	
																																																								195	Chazan,	Barney	Henderson;	David.	"Paris	attack:	police	officer	and	suspect	shot	dead	on	Champs	Elysees."	
The	Telegraph.	Telegraph	Media	Group,	20	Apr.	2017.	Web.	20	Apr.	2017.	196	Bailey,	Brian.	"Section	1:	A	Demographic	Portrait	of	Muslim	Americans."	Pew	Research	Center	for	the	
People	and	the	Press.	Pew	Research	Center,	29	Aug.	2011.	Web.	13	Apr.	2017.		
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least	for	those	who	make	over	$100,000	a	year.197	Among	lower	income	brackets	the	gap	widens.	There	has	also	been	a	slight	decline	in	Muslims’	incomes	recent	years,	which	could	be	the	result	of	higher	rates	of	Islamophobia	and	the	economic	recession	of	2007	to	2009.	Furthermore,	a	majority	of	Muslim	Americans	(56	percent)	have	a	desire	to	integrate	and	adopt	American	customs,	a	strong	indicator	that	the	country	appears	welcoming.	Another	marker	of	successful	integration	is	the	answer	to	the	question	of	“how	do	you	think	of	yourself	first?”	Of	U.S.	Muslims	polled,	49	percent	said	Muslims	first,	compared	to	46	percent	of	Christians	who	responded	that	they	identify	as	Christian	before	American.	These	are	all	signs	that	American	policy	has	succeeded	in	welcoming	and	integrating	Muslims.		 However,	this	could	all	change	in	the	next	four	years	under	the	Trump	Administration.	The	brief	periods	in	the	U.S.	during	which	anti-Catholics	and	anti-alien	sentiment	prevailed	were	limited,	but	Trump	has	awoken	an	American	spirit	that	fears	the	foreign	alien	and	could	have	a	profound	domestic	impact.	The	leaders	of	any	country,	the	president,	his	administration	and	any	of	his	appointees,	have	the	power	to	change	laws,	create	new	laws	through	executive	orders,	and	interpret	them	in	new	ways.	If	they	have	different	values	than	past	administrations,	they	can	influence	a	change	in	established	precedent	and	attempt	to	redefine	the	meaning	of	the	laws.	Trump	and	his	appointees	have	the	potential	to	do	this.		Throughout	his	campaign	and	in	the	first	few	months	of	his	presidency	President	Trump	has	shown	that	his	values	and	policy	suggestions	are	strikingly	different	than	our	last	few	presidents.	His	policies	will	affect	the	entire	country,	but	will	have	the	strongest	impact	on	Muslims	who	he	believes	threaten	to	change	the	American	fabric.		
																																																								197	Bailey,	Brian.	
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	 In	France	the	future	too,	is	shaky.	The	ideological	gap	between	the	two	presidential	candidates,	the	centrist	Macron,	and	the	far	right	Le	Pen,	resembles	the	polarizing	U.S.	campaign	between	Clinton	and	Trump.	Macron	won	the	first	round	by	a	slim	margin	of	three	points.	Whoever	is	elected	will	impose	his	or	her	views	and	policies	on	the	country,	as	Trump	had	begun	to	do.	The	candidates	stand	miles	apart	in	terms	of	ideology	and	policy	agendas.	The	world	is	a	waiting	to	see	who	will	capture	the	votes	of	French	citizens.	If	Marine	Le	Pen	wins	the	election,	France	could	shift	in	the	same	direction	the	U.S.	has.			 Presidential	hopeful	Marine	Le	Pen	has	similar	politics	to	Trump.	She	has	run	on	the	same	platform	of	clamping	down	on	Islam	and	keeping	Muslims	out	and	often	refers	to	radical	Islam	and	globalism	as	two	evil	forces	that	have	the	potential	to	destroy	France.	As	of	now,	no	proposal	for	a	Muslim	immigration	ban	has	reached	the	French	senate.		But	according	to	National	Front	mayor	Steeve	Briois,	a	leading	member	of	Le	Pen’s	campaign,	there	is	the	possibility	of	a	Muslim	ban	if	Le	Pen	wins.	When	asked	whether	his	party	would	consider	employing	the	same	ban	as	Trump	he	replied,	“Why	not…sometimes	we	may	take	authoritarian	measures,	even	if	they	shock.”198	This	is	a	policy	the	National	front	has	supported	since	the	1990’s,	but	only	in	the	last	few	months	has	it	seemed	likely.	The	current	French	government	has	however	condemned	the	ban,	which	is	surprising	considering	France	does	have	several	religious	laws	that	would	by	American	standards	be	considered	discriminatory	and	unconstitutional.			 The	election	of	Le	Pen	could	radically	change	the	future	of	religious	freedom	and	discrimination	policy	in	France,	just	as	Trump’s	ban	and	future	policies	have	the	potential	to	dismantle	the	country’s	identity	as	a	nation	that	values	freedom,	rights	and	diversity.	The																																																									198	“France’s	Far	Right	National	front	says	it	could	copy	Trump’s	travel	ban.”	The	Local.	The	Local,	Jan	30.	2017.	02	Apr.	2017.	
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policy	tension	here	is	that	America,	for	the	moment,	still	upholds	its	identity	as	a	country	of	immigrants,	a	“melting	pot”	where	immigrants	can	become	Americans	and	prosper,	but	Trump’s	actions	threaten	to	change	this.	In	France	the	election	of	Macron	could	shift	French	policy	to	a	more	open	model	that	embraces	its	diverse	population,	or	the	election	of	Le	Pen	could	reinforce	rigid	French	national	identity.	The	future	remains	to	be	seen.		 There	is	much	at	stake	in	both	countries.	However,	there	is	also	much	that	can	be	drawn	from	each	country’s	values	and	legal	system	that	can	be	used	to	implement	positive	policy	change.	The	French	should	take	a	page	from	the	Americans	and	adopt	a	more	inclusive	spirit.	In	terms	of	policy	France	should	move	away	from	model	of	state	first,	by	changing	the	standard	for	religious	freedom	disputes	to	the	American	model	which	judges	claims	through	a	“least	restrictive	means”	test.	In	addition,	cities	in	France	should	create	trust	building	and	informant	programs	among	police	and	residents	of	the	Muslim	majority	banlieue	to	reduce	tension	between	marginalized	Muslim	citizens	and	the	state.	In	the	U.S.,	the	government	should	continue	to	support	religious	freedom	and	furthermore	distance	itself	from	religion.	It	should	get	rid	of	the	references	to	God	in	the	pledge	of	the	allegiance,	on	money,	and	in	public	schools	especially	as	the	percentage	of	Christian	Americans	declines.199	Balancing	religious	freedom	and	national	identity	has	become	increasingly	difficult	as	the	majority	in	each	country	has	shrunk	with	the	arrival	of	new	immigrants	from	diverse	religious	and	ethnic	backgrounds.	With	new	presidents	in	each	country	the	future	is	unpredictable.	But	ultimately,	finding	a	comfortable	balance	between	religious	
																																																								199	The	percent	of	Christians	in	the	U.S.	has	declined	from	74%	in	2007	to	63%	in	2014.	In	addition	Protestantism	is	no	longer	the	majority	religion	of	the	country.	It	is	predicted	by	2050	that	the	number	of	Muslims	will	be	nearly	equal	to	the	number	of	Christians.					“Nones”	on	the	Rise:	One-in-Five	Adults	Have	No	Religious	Affiliation.”	Pew	Forum	on	Religion	&	Public	Life.			
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freedom	and	national	identity	will	increase	each	nation’s	security	make	the	odds	of	harmony	and	unity	far	more	likely.																																												
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APPENDIX:	The	Muslim	Population	of	the	U.S.			
3.3 	Million Muslims in the U.S.	
 
1% 	of the U.S. population 		 	
										
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 					
	
	
	
  69%           70% 
U.S. MUSLIMS      U.S.CHRISTIANS 
     Say religion is very important to them 
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APPENDIX:	The	Muslim	Population	of	France		 	
7.5 % of the population is Muslim 	
15% of Paris is Muslim 	
 
Only 2,000            46% of Muslims French 
Women wear veils                                   accept laïcité and  
                                  French values of  
                                           secularism 
  
Attend religious services…		
   5.1%                 16.6%               31.3% 
FRENCH MUSLIMS                  FRENCH MUSLIMS         FRENCH MUSLIMS        
    Everyday            Once a week            Never  
 
 
 
Veils…. 
57% of French Muslim women do not wear a veil 
           23%  always wear a veil 
    7%  wear a veil except at their place of work or   
school 
 
Percent Foreign born… 
50%  of French Muslims were born French 
  24%  of French Muslims acquired French citizenship 
26%  remain foreigners 
 
(Source: “Un Islam Francais Est Possible.” Institute Montaigne, Sept 2016.) 				
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